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Introduction 
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 1.1. RELEVANCE AND GAP 
 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are strong representatives of the heterogeneous matrix of 
institutional investors which support capitalism as we know it today. With assets amounting 
to $7.2 trillion, SWFs own on average 9% of all listed equities globally (Capapé and Santiso, 
2017); yet, little is known about them. This thesis will help to better understand this critical 
investor group and the influential role SWFs might have on the corporate governance of their 
portfolio companies. 
 
Sovereign wealth funds are government-owned investment funds without explicit pension 
liabilities that typically pursue long-term investment strategies (Aguilera, Capapé, & Santiso, 
2016). Given the novelty of many SWFs (70% of the 94 funds in existence were born after 
2000) and the emergence of SWFs with new institutional forms, it is difficult to find a 
concept which captures the heterogeneity of these institutional investors. SWFs are 
commonly established out of the revenues from natural resources (oil, natural gas, copper, 
etc.), while other SWFs are funded from the balance of payment surpluses, official foreign 
currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations or fiscal surpluses (Das, Lu, Mulder, & Sy, 
2009).  
 
Their nature as long-term state-owned funds qualifies them as a unique institutional investor 
class (Truman, 2013). SWFs differ among themselves as well and it is complicated to group 
SWFs, given their large disparities in terms of size, age and institutional forms. This in part 
explains the difficulties of building a body of research focused on these particular 
institutional investors (Megginson & Fotak, 2015). Thus, one of the main contributions of 
this thesis is to first bring clarity towards the research unit of analysis: what is a sovereign 
wealth fund? Why should we care about them? These questions have been already answered 
in the cases of pension, hedge, mutual or private equity funds. Yet, the literature focused on 
SWFs is still nascent. The thesis sheds light on this particular but relevant aspect of the 
financial world from a multidisciplinary perspective drawing on existing research from 
economics, finance, management and strategy.  
 
Sovereign wealth funds are framed properly within a new form of state capitalism 
(Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Since the financial global crisis of 2007-08, the state weight 
in the global economy has grown (Bortolotti, Fotak, & Megginson, 2015). This is in line with 
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the recent new wave of populism that succeeded the financial crisis in the Western economies 
and the growing role played by emerging countries such as China or Russia; all of which lead 
to the consideration of new ways of managing the economy where the state plays a larger 
role. This thesis refers to this new state capitalism and explains how SWFs are key players in 
this new economic order.  
 
Also, sovereign wealth funds represent an opportunity to test how their strategic governance 
can play a role as global investors and public policy tools (Aguilera et al., 2016; Clark, 
Dixon, & Monk, 2013). SWFs help to develop economic domestic goals, save natural wealth 
for the next generations, pay future pensions and correct fiscal imbalances (Das et al., 2009). 
The multiplicity of the goals of state-backed institutions is one of the key features of this new 
form of state capitalism: economic goals and financial returns are both present in the mission 
of SWFs.  
 
On one hand, SWFs invest to promote specific economic sectors domestically or to enhance 
public recognition (legitimacy), both politically and economically, when investing abroad. 
Other goals include securing natural resources or accessing foreign markets of state owned-
enterprises. These are called strategic goals. Recipient countries and shareholders of SWFs 
portfolio companies may fear the non-market strategies of SWFs; indeed, markets tend to 
discount this “liability of sovereignness.” On the other hand, SWFs are competing for assets 
with other public and private global investors. They invest or co-invest in a whole array of 
assets looking for an appropriate risk-adjusted return. These are described as financial goals. 
Recent research claims that SWFs portfolio companies tend to have lower returns than 
private comparable investments, due to the assumption that political interference decreases 
firm value (Bernstein, Lerner, & Schoar, 2013). This thesis reveals that this assumption does 
not hold true for all SWFs; funds with independent structures, clear investment mandates and 
professional staff have similar financial returns as other large institutional investors 
(Bortolotti et al., 2015).   
 
In fact, financial and strategic goals are the two types of “investment motivation” represented 
in the vertical axis of the two-by-two main matrix (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2). This matrix 
serves as the most important tool of analysis of the first two essays. The matrix helps to 
understand SWFs as dynamic institutions, subject to changes in strategy, governance and 
mission. This concept of duality of goals is consistent throughout this thesis. First, it helps to 
 4 
 understand the four strategic governance scenarios of Essay I. Second, it illuminates the four 
real cases of Essay II. Finally, it is present in the Essay III, because this duality explains why 
sovereign wealth funds should be treated as an institutional investor that is different from a 
mutual, pension or hedge fund. The blurred lines between strategic and financial goals are 
explained through this lens.  
 
The first two essays propose that SWFs should be studied as a different group of principals, 
given that SWFs are distinct owners. Taking advantage of this fact, the third essay follows 
two related research perspectives. First, it considers heterogeneity among shareholders 
(Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). This is key to enriching the 
principal-agency dyadic relationship with the idea of heterogeneous principals. Second, the 
third essay analyzes the impact of shareholders on the governance quality of portfolio 
companies, the so-called activism (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2014; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & 
Hitt, 2010), using a comprehensive dataset from the Norway’s SWF.  
 
As long-term investors, SWFs fit well in the growing literature on responsible investment 
(Døskeland & Pedersen, 2015; Sievänen, Rita, & Scholtens, 2013). Responsible investment 
research has centered around social, environment and governance issues. This thesis focuses 
on the latter and explore the strategies adopted by a sovereign fund as an active owner (Essay 
3). This impact of activism – shareholders trying to change the governance provisions of its 
portfolio companies – has been analyzed extensively in management and finance. The 
theoretical ground for most studies that analyze activism still relies extensively on agency 
theory (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The essay expands 
the understanding of the effects of activism by adding SWFs to the group of active 
shareholders. New evidence is provided of the influence SWFs exert over investee 
companies.  
 
Finally, this thesis adds new insights to the literature framed in emerging markets, research 
which focuses on contexts beyond the United States, Europe and Japan. In fact, most SWFs 
are based in countries such as China, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and a growing 
number are being established in Africa and South-East Asia. The first two essays of this 
thesis focus on SWFs based in emerging markets, thus improving the understanding of 
emerging market research contexts (Wills, Senbet, & Simbanegavi, 2016).  
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1.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In this section I review the most up-to-date SWF research in two main areas. First, it explores 
what we know about SWFs. This helps to understand how SWFs are defined. Also, it details 
the main results that explain how SWFs impact firm value. The second part is devoted to the 
theories behind heterogeneous principals and activist shareholders. SWFs may play a critical 
role as large shareholders and they are able to shape the governance of portfolio companies 
and influence other investors.   
 
1.2.1. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Dual objectives and new developments 
The main contributions of the literature in the first years of SWFs research are dedicated to 
the impact SWFs have on firms’ value. These analyses, based on scarce SWF data and using 
event studies as the main methodological tool, have yielded a disparity of results. The short-
term impact is analyzed first and then continue with the main results of the long-term impact 
of SWF investments on portfolio companies.  
 
Sovereign wealth funds generate a positive short-term stock reaction for portfolio companies 
after announcing the investment (Dewenter, Han, & Malatesta, 2010; Kotter & Lel, 2011). 
These first empirical papers use event study’s methodology and conclude there is no evidence 
SWFs yield results different from other large institutional investors. Yet, as pointed out by 
Megginson and Fotak (2015), these first papers reflect the fact that SWFs belong to the 
institutional investors group and confirm positive stock reactions when large investors 
announce their deals.  
 
Despite being positive, the short-term reactions in the case of SWFs investments are less 
intense than in other private counterparts (Bortolotti et al., 2015). This “discount” explains 
the complex nature of SWFs, which occasionally reflect conflicting goals. In fact, the 
discount is larger when politicians are more involved in the strategy of the SWF (Bernstein et 
al., 2013) or for SWFs that play a stronger role in corporate governance, for example, by 
taking a seat after a large stake is acquired. The independence of the SWFs from its 
sponsoring government remains a key variable that explains both the portfolio firms’ stock 
reactions in the short-term and the long-term operating impact on companies.  
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 In the long-run, SWFs negatively impact portfolio companies in financial performance 
measures such as Sharpe-ratio (Knill, Lee, & Mauck, 2012b) and price-to-equity ratio 
(Bernstein et al., 2013). The results suggest that SWFs are not good monitors (Knill et al., 
2012b), or at least, they are worse than private investors (Bortolotti et al., 2015). On the 
contrary, other authors have found evidence of positive influence after SWFs investments in 
terms of firm value (Fernandes, 2014) and corporate credit risk (Bertoni & Lugo, 2014).  
 
Apart from the results and the impact of SWFs, other authors have focused on the investment 
decision process. The most intriguing question to governments of recipient countries is where 
SWFs invest and, moreover, what their investment criteria are. Given the specific nature and 
governance structures of SWFs, it makes sense to analyze the differences in the investment 
process. Regarding the geographic allocation, SWFs invest in countries with which they have 
weaker political ties (Knill, Lee, & Mauck, 2012a). Yet, this result goes against economic 
rationality, and the authors suggest SWF investment decisions are partially influenced by 
non-financial (strategic, in our terminology) motives.  
 
This behavior explains why SWFs use investment vehicles when they internationalize their 
activities. Research shows that strategic motivations, the acquisition of larger stakes and a 
higher alignment with broad national economic goals, increase the likelihood of using 
investment vehicles (Murtinu & Scalera, 2016). The usage of intermediary investment 
vehicles is a way to defend SWFs from protectionist international investment laws of 
recipient countries and to diminish the “liability of sovereignness” (Aguilera et al., 2016; 
Bassan, 2015; Kratsas & Truby, 2015).  
 
This defensive attitude towards SWFs is explained by economic nationalism. Governments 
oppose foreign merger and acquisition attempts and fight for keeping the domestic ownership 
of those businesses considered the “jewels of the crown” (Serdar Dinc & Erel, 2013). In the 
case of SWFs, this opposition by recipient countries is amplified due to the strategic 
motivations attributed to SWFs (Bird-Pollan, 2012; Cohen, 2009; Hemphill, 2009). This fear 
of host countries of companies receiving SWF investment in critical sectors (infrastructure, 
defense, utilities, national champions) is negatively correlated with economic and credit 
conditions. The higher the need of external capital, the lower the concerns of recipient 
governments towards SWFs investments. In fact, during the 2008 global financial crisis 
several SWFs from Qatar, Kuwait and China helped to rescue the largest banks in the 
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Western economies. We cannot think of more critical assets than Morgan Stanley, UBS or 
Barclays, yet SWFs were welcome to the capital of these banks (Balding, 2012; Castelli & 
Scacciavillani, 2012). Years later, concerns about SWF investments grew again when the 
economy recovered (Calluzzo, Dong, & Godsell, 2017). The trade-off between national 
security and open capital markets remains an unresolved debate (Epstein & Rose, 2009; 
Gilson & Milhaupt, 2008).  
 
However, recent developments point to a potential solution to these controversies. There are 
more co-investment funds established (Russia, France, Italy, Belgium) or planned (Spain, 
Nigeria, Morocco) that attract capital from foreign SWFs. This cooperation between recipient 
countries and foreign sources of capital may work as a solution to the fears introduced by the 
dual goals present in SWFs. On one hand, the consistency of the laws of recipient countries 
regulating direct foreign investments should be enhanced to avoid discretionary decisions 
based on “national security” concerns and to establish clearer rules and procedures (Bassan, 
2015; Boubakri, Cosset, & Grira, 2017). On the other hand, steps taken by SWFs to improve 
governance standards and to adhere to best practices would reduce the “sovereign discount,” 
improve market perception and facilitate cooperation. 
 
There is a particular case of SWFs that could be classified as domestic SWFs, which can take 
the form of development agencies, public holding corporations or public private equity funds 
and have no direct influence in foreign countries. These strategic SWFs may include 
geopolitical goals but the core focus is to enhance economic development of specific sectors 
(Sun, Li, Wang, & Clark, 2014; Wu, Goh, & Hajela, 2012). These strategic SWFs invest 
more domestically (Bernstein et al., 2013; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2008) and, more 
importantly, align their investment goals with national industrial plans (Dyck & Morse, 2011; 
Haberly, 2011).  
 
These SWFs with economic development goals, are part of a larger network of state-backed 
institutions such as development agencies, public banks or public credit lenders that work as 
state tools for economic development. Indeed, SWFs are substantially connected to the 
government fiscal policy: resource-based SWFs are financed with proceedings of natural 
resources which can be used to balance fiscal budgets or deployed into SWFs, according to 
fiscal rule. The clearer the fiscal rule that indicates how much a government can tap yearly 
from the SWF, the easier to integrate SWF strategies within the network of state-backed 
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 institutions (Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, Skancke, & Sung, 2013; Gelb, Tordo, & Halland, 
2014). 
 
1.2.2. Extension of agency and stakeholder theories 
Researchers have explained the relationships between owners and managers of modern 
corporations (Berle & Means, 1932), following two academic traditions: the agency theory 
that is based on the alignment of interests between principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973), and the stakeholder theory, which considers the 
critical role of other non-shareholder groups or individuals such as employees, customers, 
suppliers, media, competitors or communities that can affect or be affected by the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives  (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Williamson, 1985).  
 
Both theories have been enriched in recent years, updated to address the current context of 
large institutional investment power and activism (Ryan & Schneider, 2003). In the case of 
agency theory, there has been a critical turn towards the heterogeneity of principals 
(Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Investors vary substantially in terms of investment horizons, 
size or institutional settings, and consequently, their demands for better corporate governance 
differ (Agarwal, Daniel, & Naik, 2009; Bebchuk, Brav, & Wei Jiang, 2015; Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, & Rossi, 2009). This openness to recognize each investor class separately 
(Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014) offers an opportunity to explore further the motivations and 
interests of SWFs as a distinct type of institutional investor. 
 
Stakeholder theory departs from the classical input-output representation of a company and 
adds complexity through multiple stakeholders with interests in the firm (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). The theory understands that diffused ownership has yielded passive and 
uninterested shareholders and facilitated an increased managerial discretion. Yet, the original 
theory did not consider the shift that occurred in the last two decades: institutional investors 
own larger stakes and they have increased activism to enhance the control of managers 
(Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Ryan & Schneider, 2003). This preeminent position makes 
institutional investors a peculiar and special group within the array of stakeholders (workers, 
governments, competitors, etc.). While the importance of a stakeholder management style to 
balance and harmonize the interests and needs of multiple stakeholders holds true (Freeman, 
1984), it is also true that institutional ownership has changed the share of power among 
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stakeholders. Institutional investors cannot be understood as similar in power to other 
stakeholders (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). Recent updates of the theory include the 
heterogeneity of motives among stakeholders (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009; Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014), which imply that investors may have different interests in the firm. Some 
of these motivations now feature enhanced managerial supervision and control via 
shareholder activism. Also, the use of stakeholder orientation can act as a specific way to 
address shareholder interests in emerging market contexts (Jain, Aguilera, & Jamali, 2016).  
 
In fact, a range of different causes (legal, social, corporate bylaws, governance codes, and 
technology) have reduced the costs of being active, and therefore increased the number of 
interactions between investors and managers (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016). Moreover, the 
enhanced awareness of the general public of corporate governance matters, has facilitated the 
tilt of power from managers to owners. 
 
 
1.2.3. Heterogeneity of principals and activism 
This sections examines how heterogeneity and activism are framed in recent literature about 
institutional investors. Also, it considers how the reduced costs of monitoring and engaging 
have resulted in increased activism.  
 
The extensions of both agency and stakeholder theories in aspects related to institutional 
investors bring two key concepts key to understanding SWFs: there is a stronger 
heterogeneity of principals and, among them, some institutional investors are enhancing their 
activism. In the case of the agency theory, it is expanded by adding the complexities of 
different principals. In the case of stakeholder theory, it is enriched by the “activism” of 
institutional investors which extends their strategies beyond shareholder value to include 
other aspects such as governance (affecting managers and employees), environment (with 
direct impact in communities and media) or social issues (communities, governments). Thus, 
stakeholder theory, too centered in the management, sees institutional investors at the 
epicenter, as they take care on other firms’ stakeholders.  
 
SWFs are different to other institutional investors (Boubakri, Cosset, & Grira, 2016). This 
heterogeneity among shareholders has been reinforced in recent strategy literature (Goranova, 
Abouk, Nystrom, & Soofi, 2017; Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014) and it has been used to 
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 understand better how different owners may have different interests towards management 
practices, investment horizons or controlling stakes (Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). This 
effort helps to identify how different owners integrate SWFs as a new and different asset 
owner type with their own peculiarities. 
 
Large institutional investors have faced three main difficulties in developing activism. First, 
free-riding of other investors prevents large investors from engaging with investee 
companies, and, given the positive externalities obtained, would benefit other investors that 
do not bear the costs of such monitoring. Second, large investors need to balance the benefits 
of activism with the costs of establishing a comprehensive engagement strategy comprised of 
new processes, guidelines, audits, etc. These large investors hold stakes in multiple 
companies – sometimes thousands – and to plan such an active ownership strategy implies 
new internal costs. They need to carefully assess whether is worth it to follow the “voice” 
strategy, rather than “exit” firms that do not comply with their governance expectations 
(McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016). Third, regulations, despite becoming more relaxed in 
recent years (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016), may find coordinated actions difficult with other 
investors and may be required to disclose holdings positions in listed equities beyond a 
threshold. In the specific case of SWFs, there is a fourth cost, the liability of sovereignness 
(Aguilera et al., 2016): the more exposed a strategic state-owned fund to media or regulators, 
the higher the scrutiny it receives and the lower its returns on investment (Bortolotti et al., 
2015).  
  
However, recent investor-friendly regulations and management scandals have lowered costs 
for activism and brought new players to the shareholder activism space (Goranova et al., 
2017). Today, more funds are actively engaging with companies, through direct 
conversations with board members and managers, filing shareholder proposals in annual 
meetings or via proxy advisors. As a result, there is a higher interest in the governance 
mechanisms that help to obtain such alignment: more professional boards, independent 
directors or enhanced shareholder voting rights. These pressure results in reduced agency 
costs, and, given more frequent communications, imply less information asymmetries and 
facilitates the alignment of interests.  
 
Paradoxically, these new impulses in governance monitoring have brought new costs to the 
equation: the principal costs. More heterogeneous owners are trying to engage, through 
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various channels, with investee companies, resulting in a misalignment between owners. 
However, it is difficult to measure how significant the effects of these new principal costs 
are, given most of the conversations are held privately (Becht et al., 2009). 
 
Long-term capitalism is another interrelated theme that accompanies these heterogeneous and 
engaged principals. The issue of how to improve the capitalist system is related to the role of 
institutional investors. These investors (investment funds, insurance companies, pension 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds, hedge funds and exchange traded funds) 
own the majority of shares listed globally. A prudent estimate is that these owners control 
65% of all listed equities globally. Given their empirical importance, new research has 
advanced on the responsible ownership of mutual funds, pension funds or hedge funds. 
Investment criteria now includes other stakeholders and the ultimate purpose of maximizing 
shareholder value is today enriched with environmental, social and governance 
considerations.  
 
1.2.4. Implications for research on sovereign wealth funds 
Sovereign wealth funds are viewed as passive shareholders (Mietzner, Schiereck, & 
Schweizer, 2015). The main reason is the liability of sovereignness which incentivizes SWFs 
to maintain a low-profile strategy when investing abroad. To avoid an active shareholding 
strategy is in line with this cautious approach. There are two other interrelated factors: size 
and age. Size prevents the largest SWFs from establishing a comprehensive engagement 
strategy, due to the costs associated with effectively monitoring thousands of minority 
positions. The other factor is age: the majority of SWFs were established in the last decade 
and engagement strategies are normally developed by mature and professional sovereign 
funds, when strategic capabilities have been sufficiently developed.  
 
Indeed, the three essays of this thesis reveal the importance of acknowledging these 
differences among SWFs. While heterogeneity among SWFs explains why some funds might 
be good representatives of the responsible ownership movement (Essay III), in fact, the 
dynamism of the strategic governance (Essay I) explains why is reasonable to expect more 
sovereign wealth funds will adopt an active and engaged ownership approach. As sovereign 
wealth funds change, institutional pressures change with them (Clark et al., 2013; Schnatterly 
& Johnson, 2014). 
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 The third essay shows how the largest SWFs (the Government Pension Fund Global, 
managed by Norges Bank Investment Management, NBIM), and one of the few established 
before year 2000, has developed a comprehensive strategy for improving the corporate 
governance of its investee companies. Institutional pressure, coming from NBIM or other 
large institutional investors, may exert an isomorphic effect on other SWFs (Vasudeva, 
2013).  
 
This thesis would help increase awareness of the dual objectives of SWFs: both financial and 
strategic. To understand that these two objectives do not contradict one another is one of the 
main learnings of these collection of essays. The dual objectives can be complementary if the 
appropriate governance is guaranteed. Indeed, the Santiago Principles 1, a voluntary code 
which works as the governance and risk management guideline for SWFs, detail that “if 
investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these 
should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.”  SWFs will 
benefit from transparency and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds – the 
voluntary group that brings together more than 30 SWFs to strengthen the community – is 
helping funds move in this direction.  
 
Yet, strategic motivations could dominate financial returns and this risk is higher for those 
domestically oriented SWFs, where majority positions dominate minority stakes, where 
governance is not strongly established, where accountability is reduced, and where the 
connection to government is more intense. The negative effects of political interference have 
been documented (Bernstein et al., 2013; Bortolotti et al., 2015), yet, it remains critical to 
deepen our understanding (empirically above all) on how to combine the dual objectives 
present in the majority of funds. This is more relevant today, when commodity prices seem to 
stay low for longer periods and SWFs return to domestic issues. This domestic orientation 
appears in different forms: governments tapping more from SWFs to fix unbalanced budgets, 
the establishment of domestic infrastructure funds, or the design of co-investment vehicles 
attracting foreign resources to push local sectors.  
 
1 Available at http://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles-landing/santiago-principles. Accessed Feb 25, 2017. 
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This thesis also brings the sometimes “siloed” lessons on SWFs contained within different 
theoretical disciplines. From finance to management, or economics to international law, this 
thesis helps to acquire a more holistic view of the funds.  
 
 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The first two essays have helped to develop a theoretical framework and test its applicability 
in a specific and real context. The first essay started as a literature survey on SWFs, and then 
was modified for publication into a theoretical paper which provides a framework for 
studying SWFs dynamically. The method of the second essay tests the theoretical validity of 
the framework designed in the first essay. The fitness of the model was tested in a real case 
study, applying the investments of SWFs in Spain.  
 
The third essay is the most salient piece from a methodology standpoint. We applied a 
difference-in-differences procedure to test the effectiveness of NBIM as an active owner. 
Before running the analysis, we generated a matched sample. The matching strategy, 
described in detail in Section 4.6.1., was necessary to provide a valid assessment of the 
effects of NBIM. 
 
We matched every control firm with a unique match in the treated group. We chose a single 
match and do not allow for replacement (a firm from the treatment group can only be used 
once as a match). We followed this procedure because our treatment group is larger than our 
control group. We were more concerned with minimizing the bias at the cost of larger 
variance, since our sample is large enough to be less concerned about variance (Abadie & 
Imbens, 2002).  
 
We matched the treated and control groups in size (measured by total assets), performance 
(measured by the ratio of EBITDA to total assets) and institutional investors (percentage of 
shares in hands of institutional investors). We restricted the number of covariates since there 
was a trade-off between the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption and common 
support (Black & Smith, 2004). Following Sianesi (2004), we focused on covariates that 
simultaneously affect the treatment status (belong to the NBIM’s portfolio) and the outcome 
variable (our corporate governance measures).  
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 Data collection has been a limitation in research on SWFs. The bias of most samples 
towards the most transparent funds is patent. There are not publicly available datasets that 
provide universal, historic and consistent data on SWFs equity holdings. This issue is avoided 
in the third essay, as data is used from just one SWF, similarly to research on asset managers 
such as Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme (Becht et 
al., 2009) or TIAA, formerly TIAA-CREF, studied by Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998).  
 
 
1.4. THESIS STRUCTURE AND SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION 
 
This thesis is a monograph of three essays on sovereign wealth funds (Table 1.1). The first 
essay develops an original theoretical framework to better understand this institutional 
investor class. The development of strategic capabilities is the main construct used to 
examine the investment strategies and risk management of SWFs. The essay is grounded on 
comparative corporate governance and strategic governance for the firm-level analysis of 
SWFs. The second essay applies the framework developed in the first essay and tests its 
validity in a real context. We uncover the strategic capabilities developed by SWFs through 
investments made in Spain. We show the validity of the main theoretical contributions of the 
analyzing framework. The third essay focuses on the extensions of agency and stakeholder 
theories to include active ownership and heterogeneous principals. We empirically prove the 
effectiveness of the shareholder engagement strategy developed by NBIM, a sovereign 
wealth fund, on its investee companies.  
 
The Table 1.1 provides a summary of the scientific contribution of the three essays presented 
in this thesis. The first essay, co-authored with Dr. Ruth V. Aguilera and Dr. Javier Santiso, 
was accepted for publication in May 2015 and published in the Academy of Management 
Perspectives. The second essay was accepted for publication as a chapter in the Oxford 
Handbook of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Oxford University Press). The third essay is an on-
going project with Dr. Ruth V. Aguilera, Dr. Vicente Bermejo and Dr. Vicente Cuñat, and is 
aimed for publication in a “class A” journal.  
 
For the simplicity of the structure of this thesis all tables and figures, as well as references, 
are placed at the end of each chapter. 
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1.4.1. ESSAY I 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: A STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE VIEW 
 
In this essay, we develop an organizing framework to better understand the firm-level 
characteristics of SWFs and their consequences. Recent tectonic, global economic and 
political shifts have spurred the emergence of new organizational forms such as sovereign 
wealth funds – state-owned investment organizations without pension liabilities – primarily 
in emerging markets. Although scholars have begun to explore SWF macroeconomic trends, 
little is known about the challenges these institutional investors face or their strategic 
capabilities in addressing these concerns.  
 
We began by briefly reviewing the state-of-the-art findings on what we know about SWFs. 
They are a highly heterogeneous group. SWFs investments generate positive short-term stock 
reactions, their investment strategies tend to have a substantial domestic bias when politicians 
are involved, and they face the “SWF discount” or the liability of sovereignness. This 
concept means two things; the first is that markets and recipient countries consider SWFs as a 
different investor class. Secondly, while SWFs have a positive impact, the effects are lower 
than those of comparable private institutional investors peers.  
 
Our SWF framework, while an ideal type, identifies the strategic challenges these 
institutional investors face and reveals four strategic governance approaches they deploy to 
overcome them. First, we uncover shareholder activism to combat the principal–agency 
conflict. SWFs exercise this activism with their voting rights and demand for effective 
corporate governance standards in their investee companies. Second, SWFs might face severe 
information asymmetries and intrinsic principal-principal costs when investing in private 
firms. By enhancing their in-house capabilities, SWFs have been able to simultaneously 
reduce their dependence on external managers while also increasing their professionalization. 
 
Third, strategic SWFs might be deployed as governmental tools, decoupling and investing in 
publicly traded firms to gain legitimation, though their sovereign interests may likely not be 
fully aligned with the core shareholder value maximization interests of their co-owners. 
Fourth, strategic SWFs investing in private companies seek to obtain long-term learning 
templates that will help them acquire the relevant know-how and diversify the base of their 
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 own national economies. With our proposed strategic governance framework, we discuss 
movements across strategic governance dimensions and uncover two research topics that 
need further attention: the idea of long-term capitalism and the role of politicians and politics 
in SWFs.  
 
SWFs have introduced a new way of thinking the relationship between the state and the 
private sector. However, some questions still remain: Will states that sponsor SWFs be able 
to attract or develop enough talent to achieve their goals? Will SWFs lead to improved 
governance worldwide although they are in need of better management practices? The latter 
is addressed in Essay III.  
  
1.4.2. ESSAY II: SPAIN AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:  
FOUR STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE TYPES 
This second essay focuses on the case of Spain as a destination for SWFs investments. In 
2011, Spain was the first destination for SWFs foreign direct investments in Europe (Santiso, 
2012). The relationship Spain has had with SWFs led to the establishment of the first Spanish 
co-investment SWF, which has not been operated yet, following a model already used by 
Italy and France.  
This variety of SWFs allows the identification of four different governance strategies 
(described in Essay I) used by SWFs when investing in Spain. First, SWFs with minority 
stakes could play an important role in Spain as corporate governance watchdogs. Funds like 
NBIM (analyzed empirically in Essay III) will have an important role to ensure that the codes 
of governance and the best practices spread to more companies. We define this type of SWFs 
as responsible investors.  
Second, we offer evidence about the role played by in-house capabilities to improve the 
quality of deal scouting, to access direct investing and to enhance partnerships. In this 
section, the case of the Kuwait Investment Authority is analyzed.  
Third, we examine Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) as the best example of a strategic fund 
looking for legitimacy. The Gulf country has landed in Spain with a very clear objective: to 
leverage its financial firepower and re-invent the image of the Arab country. Investments and 
partnerships with Spanish companies in sectors such as football, airlines and hotels allow 
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QIA to build trust with local institutions and to deploy a comprehensive strategy that aims to 
diversify its national economy.  
Fourth, with the knowledge acquired over the last decade dealing with SWFs, Spain set up its 
own co-investment fund with Oman. The joint fund has plans to invest in Spanish companies 
going abroad. Both Oman and Spain focus on learning and encourage the establishment of an 
international joint-venture to achieve strategic national goals. This fund has not been operated 
yet.  
1.4.3. ESSAY III 
TOO BIG TO LEAVE: THE CASE OF ACTIVE OWNERS 
 
This third essay is an empirical work which addresses the question of how effective large 
owners are in improving the corporate governance of their investee companies. This question 
was raised in Essay I, and explored for the case of Norway in Spain in Essay II. In this third 
essay, we seek to contribute to research on active shareholders by focusing on NBIM 
(Norway’s sovereign wealth fund manager). While we know that different owners have 
different interests in the firms in which they invest and different views as to how their 
corporate governance should look like, there is much to learn from unique institutional 
investors such as sovereign wealth funds.  
 
In particular, we explore whether there is any governance improvement after NBIM makes an 
explicit and unexpected announcement in November 2012 that it will put pressure on firms in 
which they invest to improve their governance. We uncover, relative to a matching sample, 
that NBIM investee companies do change their corporate governance post-announcement.  
 
In this essay, we demonstrate the monitoring role of sovereign wealth funds. Our results shed 
light on the literature of shareholder activism and the growing theme of heterogeneous 
shareholders (Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; 
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Regarding the literature of sovereign wealth funds, this 
research may help to unpack how, without having a seat on the board, large funds can exert 
an influence (Vasudeva, 2013) and impact their investee companies’ corporate governance. 
This “voice” mechanism, put in place through different channels, most of them “behind-the-
scenes” (McCahery et al., 2016), turns out to be effective and can be a way to circumvent the 
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 “liability of sovereignness” or the discount effect detected in the literature (Aguilera et al., 
2016; Bortolotti et al., 2015). 
 
Post announcement, the share of independent directors in firms owned by NBIM improved, 
compared to those firms not owned by NBIM. The same applied to the share of women on 
boards, as well as to the specific skills of boards. We discuss other counterintuitive results: 
the difficulties of establishing audit and compensation board committees and the issue of 
equal voting rights, in line with discussions on long-term capitalism and active ownership. 
Our findings shed light on active ownership among a unique set of owners and expands the 
knowledge on heterogeneous principals. 
 
In sum, this thesis have sought to first categorize the different types of SWFs, develop a 
strategic governance model of their dual mission (economic and political), and explain the 
dynamic forces that drive SWFs changes. Then the thesis tests this model in a qualitative 
study of SWFs investing in Spain. This research concludes with an empirical study of how 
the world’s largest SWF has acted as an engaged shareholder in changing the corporate 
governance of their portfolio companies.  In this regard, I hope that this thesis is a first step to 
better understand this very important type of institutional investors so that corporations and 
governments can develop better strategies towards SWFs, as they travel around the world and 
become significant players. 
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2.1. ABSTRACT 
Recent tectonic, global, economic and political shifts have spurred the emergence of new 
organizational forms such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), state-owned investment 
organizations without pension liabilities, arising primarily in emerging and frontier markets. 
Although scholars have begun to explore SWF macroeconomic trends, little is known about 
the challenges these institutional investors face or about their strategic capabilities to address 
these concerns.  Drawing on comparative and strategic corporate governance research, we 
develop an organizing framework to better understand the firm-level characteristics of SWFs 
and their consequences. Our analysis of these investment funds’ multidimensional strategic 
governance traits contributes to the literature on state capitalism and comparative corporate 
governance. 
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 2.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
State intervention in the form of full ownership and management of state-owned national 
champions or large diversified conglomerates has progressively eroded, with the role of the 
state being reinvented into new organizational and strategic forms. This gradual 
transformation is partly explained by waves of privatizations, changes in state and non-state 
relationships, new industrial policies, and the dismantling of large diversified business 
groups. As Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) and Bruton, Ahlstrom, Stan, Peng, and Xu 
(2014) have documented, we are entering a new era of state capitalism where governments 
tend to share their ownership with other non-governmental owners and/or provide strategic 
support to private firms by means of subsidized credit and/or other state protections. This 
“new state capitalism” is centered on a reinvented state, one that as an owner seeks to 
simultaneously achieve the often conflicting goals of financial efficiency (i.e., short-term 
shareholder value maximization) and political pursuits (i.e., industrial policy, geopolitical 
positioning, national security, etc.). Sovereign wealth funds such as Singapore’s Temasek, 
the China Investment Corporation (CIC) or Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global 
(GPFG) are a salient class of funds within this new state capitalism, blurring the lines 
between finance and politics. SWFs are government-owned investment funds without explicit 
pension liabilities that typically pursue long-term investment strategies. They also tend to be 
internationally focused and manage multi-billion assets. This excludes other types of 
organizations such as state-owned enterprises (e.g., Gazprom), pension funds (e.g., 
CalPERS), and private equity investors (e.g., Blackstone group).  
 
 It is important we understand the emergence of SWFs within the context of the latest 
global financial developments. The world economy has changed rapidly, particularly in terms 
of the distribution of international reserves which are a core funding source for SWFs. At the 
turn of the 21st century, central banks from advanced economies held 66 percent of the 
world’s reserves (mostly in foreign exchange and gold), while emerging and developing 
economies held the remaining 34 percent. A decade later, the tables have turned. Emerging 
and developing economies now hold 60 percent of all reserves and, more strikingly, they 
have grown six-fold in this period, increasing their assets from US$2.2 trillion in 2000 to 
$12.1 in 2011 (Truman, 2012). These systemic global imbalances account for some of the 
features of today’s global financial scenario. On the one hand, export-led economies and 
those sitting on large natural resource reserves benefit substantially from more prudent fiscal 
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and foreign-exchange policies, an increasingly integrated world economy, and the recent past 
period of high commodity prices. On the other hand, most Western economies now face 
sovereign deficits, debt pressures, and low growth rates. Thus, investors from the Middle 
East, South-East Asia (and particularly China), and, to a lesser extent, Latin America, have 
the liquidity that Western economies seek. SWFs have become highly liquid organizational 
investors in an illiquid world.   
 
However, SWFs adopt unique and differing governance structures to manage 
enormous pools of capital from the surplus regions and to engage in strategic investment 
relationships with firms and managers from a wide array of industries and foreign countries. 
While there exists a handful of excellent compilations on SWFs (Balding, 2012; Bernstein, 
Lerner, & Schoar, 2013; Castelli & Scacciavillani, 2012; Clark, Dixon, & Monk, 2013; 
Megginson & Fotak, in press), existing research tends to take a macroeconomic or financial 
perspective or is otherwise highly segregated across the different disciplinary fields. 
Therefore, there is a strong need to integrate the “siloed” knowledge on these global 
institutional investors, though, most importantly, we seek to study SWFs at the organizational 
level of analysis (as opposed to country level) where we can identify these funds’ strategies 
and challenges. In this paper, we offer an organizing framework to shed light on these fairly 
unknown yet important institutional investors, uncovering the different dimensions of their 
investment strategies and governance traits or what we refer to as their strategic governance. 
Our underlying proposition is that SWFs seek to align their unique governance capabilities 
with their interest in excelling in the global investment arena. In particular, we explore how a 
wide variety of states (personified by a wide array of leaders ranging from politicians in 
dictatorships to ruling elites in countries with weak institutions and financial bureaucrats in 
developed democratic countries) and SWF managers relate to investee firms, the latter’s 
managers and co-owners.  
 
There are at least five reasons why understanding SWF patterns and their potential is 
both critical and timely. First, these investment organizations have become key players in the 
global economy, collectively managing $6 trillion2 as of the end of 2014 and with their total 
assets having surpassed that of hedge funds and private equity combined in less than a decade 
2 Institutional sources used include: Sovereign Wealth Center (London), ESADEgeo (ESADE Business School; 
Madrid), SovereigNET (The Fletcher School, Tufts University; Medford, MA), and Sovereign Investment Lab 
(Bocconi University; Milano). 
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 (Megginson & Fotak, in press). Thus, SWFs are clearly shaping today’s global financial 
landscape, and their presence will surely rise in coming years. That notwithstanding, these 
organizations have been understudied, and we need to integrate all we know about them into 
a cohesive framework to help improve how well managerial scholars, practitioners and 
policymakers understand them. Second, SWFs became salient global players during the 2008 
financial crisis by recapitalizing most of the Western banking system and they have since 
become top players in other industries such as natural resources, real estate, transportation 
and utilities. For example, Norway’s GPFG (the world’s largest SWF, managing 
approximately $900 billion in assets) owns three percent of all publicly-listed shares in 
Europe. Moreover, GPFG is part of the global strategic governance movement of 
“shareholder activism” and it has the potential to impact many global companies. Third, 
SWFs are learning organizations, venturing into managing more complex types of assets such 
as infrastructures, private equity and real estate. For example, SWFs account for 9.5 percent 
of all private equity investments made during 2003-2007 (Bernstein et al., 2013). Fourth, 
SWF investment trends are not only geared toward the advanced industrialized world; they 
have also begun to shift towards strong “South-South” (non-OECD countries) investment 
relationships. For example, Singapore’s Temasek holds more than $17 billion in Chinese 
bank stock. Moreover, four out of the five largest deals in 2013 were South-South 
investments. Lastly, some SWFs are leading the economic transformation of their own 
national economies. For example, the Mubadala Development Company from the Emirate of 
Abu Dhabi has developed a world class aerospace industry through foreign strategic 
investments and alliances, now supplying components to EADS, the European champion in 
the aerospace industry.  
 
 In sum, SWFs are unique investors due to their size, central involvement in global 
finance, their systemic power, unique capacity to learn, geopolitical breadth, and 
developmental strength. Although they are certainly quite heterogeneous given their diversity 
in size, country of origin, and source of wealth, they capture the spirit of this new state 
capitalism. And despite being state-owned investors, their capacity to intervene in private 
firms is equal to other institutional investors, though their incentives are likely to frequently 
diverge. These state-owners adopt a unique type of governance in that they are equity owners 
that cannot exercise sovereign regulatory or supervisory powers in the organizations in which 
they invest. SWFs are simply one more investor among many others and they have a 
fiduciary duty to the state (or, ultimately, the citizens) of a given country. They are still under 
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pressure to achieve the same financial efficiency as other institutional investors in the race to 
become global players, but the challenge is to balance their dual strategy of financial 
efficiency and political effectiveness. This dual focus is often hard to reconcile and ultimately 
defines the boundaries of new state capitalism. 
 
 Unfortunately, existing research on SWFs remains highly fragmented across different 
disciplines: finance, economics, and law. In this paper, we begin by briefly highlighting the 
main findings from our review of existing literature and then turn to the firm level to analyze 
the combined strategic motives and governance traits of SWFs as the star representatives of 
this new state capitalism. We draw on research from the strategic management and corporate 
governance fields to develop an organizing framework that systematically identifies four 
strategic governance dimensions on which SWFs rely to compete in the global financial 
arena. We then discuss the theoretical logic present in this new form of governance and 
conclude by identifying promising areas of future research and the possible managerial 
implications for SWF practitioners.  
 
2.3. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
 
Table 2.1 includes a summary of the existing body of research on SWFs in the 
finance,3 strategy, political economy, economics, international law, and organizational theory 
fields. The conclusion from our review is that, while there is increasing interest in the topic, 
current literature remains fragmented by disciplines. To partially amend this dissonance, we 
uncover three consistent findings from our analysis of SWF literature. The first element that 
stands out is that these organizations are highly heterogeneous in terms of size, geographic 
origin, geographic destination, funding sources, and policy purposes (as shown in Table 2.2). 
Although the first SWF technically dates back to 1854 (Texas Permanent School Fund), 
SWFs are a fairly novel type of organization in the new state capitalism. The term was first 
coined in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov (2011), then Managing Director of State Street. 
However, there is still an ongoing debate on the definition of SWF. 
 
Second, in terms of financial performance, SWFs’ short-term influence over investee firms is 
comparable to that of other institutional investors, despite the fact that SWFs are often 
3 For a detailed literature review on SWF asset allocation, geographic and industrial investment patterns, and the 
impact of SWF investment in target companies, please see Megginson & Fotak (in press). 
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 portrayed as “barbarians at the gate” (Reed, 2009).  Some scholars have uncovered that 
SWF investment announcements cause positive short-term stock reactions (Bortolotti et al., 
2013a; Dewenter et al., 2010; Kotter & Lel, 2011). However, their long-term impact is 
neutral in terms of absolute returns (Bortolotti et al., 2013a) and negative when measured by 
Sharpe and P/E ratios (Bernstein et al., 2013; Knill et al., 2012a). According to Bernstein et 
al. (2013), long-term performance worsens when politicians are involved in SWF 
management, reflecting embedded agency issues in which politicians’ investment interests 
are not always aligned with those of the SWFs. Bortolotti et al. (2013a) refer to SWFs’ 
inability to keep up with the performance of peer institutional investors as the “SWF 
discount,” thus alluding to these organizations’ most salient feature, i.e., that they are state-
owned investment funds. This discount is in line with corporate governance research 
claiming that the configuration of types of owners has a great deal of influence on firms’ 
strategic decisions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). In terms of SWFs, governments serve as co-
owners and might thus be able to influence the non-financial goals of their investee firms and 
capture private benefits of control that might ultimately expropriate from their co-owners’ 
financial goals. Contrarily, there is also evidence showing how SWFs can increase investee 
companies’ value and performance through stable and long-term access to capital and 
markets (Fernandes, 2014). 
 
Lastly, we know quite a bit about the investment and economic motives that led to the 
creation and growth of SWFs: inter-generational balance, macro-stabilization, resource 
diversification, national economic development, and greater supremacy in the international 
geopolitical arena. Bodie and Briere (2013) shed light on this macro view, revealing how 
SWF strategies are not typically in line with the governments’ fiscal, monetary, and public 
debt strategies. Economists have sought to attribute the increasing surge of SWFs in recent 
years to the immense accumulation of international reserves, a takeaway from the Asian 
crisis in 1997 accompanied by soaring oil and gas prices at a time of low global interest rates 
and recent oil and gas discoveries in Africa (Aizenman & Glick, 2010; Castelli & 
Scacciavillani, 2012; Megginson & Fotak, in press). This capital hoarding has encouraged the 
establishment of SWFs all over the world and the need to decide on optimal capital 
allocation. 
 
 
 
 33 
 
2.4. AN ORGANIZING STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
Drawing on notions from strategic management and corporate governance research, 
we propose a framework to better understand the underlying SWF organizational capabilities 
and challenges and to analyze how the ultimate owners of SWFs (states personified by 
politicians and executed by SWF managers) relate to both managers in the investee firms and 
to their co-owners. We first draw on the logic of principal-agency theory (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, 
& Dalton, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in which SWFs (agents) as minority shareholders 
and globally diversified investors with a limited ability to influence managerial decisions and 
managers (principals) can have their own, often disparate incentives. We subsequently 
introduce the principal-principal agency perspective (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; 
Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008) because it enables us to engage in the debate 
regarding co-owners. In particular, we explore some of the challenges that SWFs encounter 
when interacting as minority shareholders with other (majority) influential co-owners and 
when seeking to minimize information asymmetry. Our framework classifies SWFs in two 
dimensions: 1) investment motivation and 2) the ownership type of the investee firms. These 
two key dimensions (reflecting strategy and governance traits) offer important insights into 
the capabilities and constraints that SWFs are likely to face in terms of their strategic 
governance to become effective global investors. Figure 2.1 summarizes the four possible 
scenarios that we propose. 
 
2.4.1. Investment Motivation: Financial and Strategic 
 In terms of the first dimension, investment motivation, we would like to underscore 
that SWFs are government-owned, often without much managerial involvement in investee 
companies (Rose, 2013). The principal-agent problem is embedded because of “who” the 
owners are, which is distinct from owners and managers of state-owned enterprises (Bruton 
et al., 2014). The key challenge in this classic agency conflict is to define the motivation 
behind the investment. Comparative corporate governance literature makes a sharp 
distinction between investors that are typically short-term oriented and pursue mostly a 
shareholder value maximization strategy and those that are long-term oriented and seek 
broader societal or political goals such as sustaining full employment, keeping harmony 
within business groups, guaranteeing a minimum social welfare threshold, protecting 
business elites, etc. (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997). We can extend the dichotomy between 
shareholder and stakeholder-oriented governance systems to the SWF context as financial 
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 versus strategic goals (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 
2005). The differentiation between financial and strategic motivation is relevant because it 
moves away from purely Anglo-American conceptions of short-term financial gains and 
includes broader market logics tied to political interests prevalent in emerging and frontier 
markets with weak shareholder right protection and strong national states. We thus propose 
two investment motivations: financial and strategic. 
 
 In terms of financial motivation, some SWFs operate fairly similarly to their 
institutional investor counterparts in that they invest in global, diversified portfolios to 
maximize their long-term returns subject to an acceptable risk level (Balding, 2012; Bernstein 
et al., 2013; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009; Fernandes, 2014). In this way, they might seek to 
invest internationally to entrench themselves from domestic political pressures and thereby 
differentiate themselves from SWFs that pursue non-financial goals. Moreover, as Das et al. 
(2009) argue, the pursuit of purely financial goals might insulate the sovereign economy from 
resource price and supply fluctuations and diversify revenues from non-renewable resources. 
 
We define strategic motivations as those adding to sovereign value. Sovereign 
developmental goals encompass several strategies such as assisting national industrial-
planning (Dyck & Morse, 2011), securing natural resources or establishing alliances with 
foreign industry leaders. Governments can deploy SWFs as a means to engage in 
international relationships with other countries and/or foster national security. Broad 
development aims can entail legitimate goals within the global financial arena, accounted for 
in the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for SWFs (also known as “Santiago 
Principles”, a voluntary code which works as the governance and risk management guideline 
for SWFs). However, strategic capital allocations range widely. For instance, Clark et al. 
(2013) show how SWFs can be “tools for facilitating autonomy and sovereignty” to 
governments or a powerful form of protection from the global economy preying on their 
currency and commodity fluctuations. We conceptualize this investment motivation as a 
continuous and bidirectional factor as SWFs move between strategic and financial poles. In 
the discussion section below, we return to this point, namely that SWFs are dynamic 
organizations whose interests evolve over time (Fotak et al., 2013). 
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2.4.2. Investee Ownership Type: Publicly Versus Privately-Held Companies 
In this section, we discuss the other dimension of our organizing framework of SWFs, 
namely the ownership nature of investee firms, a discrete variable consisting of either 
publicly or privately-listed firms. We also discuss under what conditions the principal-
principal conflict is likely to be greater. Each ownership structure is linked to unique 
governance modes. This is an important differentiation because the firm’s ownership 
structure conditions how the owners can influence managers and the intensity of the 
information asymmetries. Publicly-traded firms tend to have a more dispersed and broader 
floating ownership. From the point of view of an investor such as an SWF, public entities 
imply less uncertainty and less information asymmetry regarding their value due to disclosure 
requirements, market pricing, coverage from analysts, and ties with investment banks. The 
intrinsic characteristics of publicly-traded firms result in lower search costs, implying more 
effective explorations and a lower risk of adverse selection (Capron & Shen, 2007). 
However, publicly-traded companies experience higher pressure to achieve short-term 
results. These firms welcome passive institutional investors such as public pension funds and 
SWFs because they are not likely to “rock the boat” (Barclay, Holderness, & Sheehan, 2007). 
SWFs can calculate expropriation risks by private benefits of control as there is more 
information and, hence, they can better assess the principal-agent conflicts. 
 
Conversely, private firms have a higher concentration of ownership (Claessens & 
Tzioumis, 2006), while the reduced liquidity of their shares encourages investors’ long-term 
commitment (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). That notwithstanding, firm 
valuations are more uncertain due to the lack of publicly disclosed information and lower 
scrutiny (Cumming & Waltz, 2010). We do not refer here to SWFs investing in private equity 
firms as limited partners. Rather, our focus is on the SWFs as direct investors in privately-
held companies, infrastructures, properties and timber projects or as co-investors with private 
equity firms as general partners. From the investor point of view (i.e., the SWFs), they are 
likely to benefit from the “private firm discount,” that is, investors can negotiate more 
advantageous prices and invest at a substantial discount relative to public firms (Capron & 
Shen, 2007). This benefit is accentuated by the fact that private firms are not as rigorously 
regulated (Henisz, Mansfield, & Von Glinow, 2010). Moreover, Capron and Shen (2007) 
show that there is industry specialization in the context of acquisitions of privately-held firms 
given the risk of adverse selection. Investors favor private firms in familiar industries while 
they tend to invest in listed companies when they don’t have a knowledge advantage. This 
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 investment behavior supports their ability to manage the principal-principal problem. In 
other words, when SWFs have good information about their co-owners, they can minimize 
the risk of expropriation and other risks derived from low shareholder protection. 
Accordingly, SWFs investing in private firms are likely to specialize in two familiar 
industries: natural resources and financial services. On the one hand, SWFs funnel their 
natural resources through funds (e.g., Middle Eastern funds and Norway’s GPFG) or they 
need to secure their access to key natural resources (e.g., SWFs from Singapore and China. 
On the other hand, all SWFs are, by definition, investment organizations and, thus, financial 
players in themselves.  
 
2.5. A STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS 
 
Next, we turn to our framework of SWFs, drawing on the two dimensions we’ve 
discussed thus far: SWF investment motivations and investee firm ownership type. Our 
framework yields four analytical quadrants which we use to identify four key strategic 
governance modes, each with unique managerial advantages and challenges. In particular, we 
discuss how SWFs in each of these quadrants have different strategic governance traits to 
manage principal-agent and principal-principal challenges, as well as align with their unique 
state capitalism style.  
 
2.5.1. Quadrant 1. Shareholder Activism  
Quadrant 1 in Figure 2.1 encompasses SWFs that can play an important role as 
shareholder activists. These SWFs primarily seek financial goals and invest in publicly-
traded firms to either set the country’s investment tone and become national investment 
benchmarks, or to overcome the “liability of sovereignness,” protecting themselves from 
domestic politicians. Moreover, while SWFs are asked to comply with typically high 
standards of financial and social disclosure, they are also empowered with shareholder rights 
to monitor investee managers and exercise their voice as owners. SWFs in this quadrant have 
the governance capacity (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi-Cladera & Garcia-Cestona, 2013) to 
minimize agency problems with managers.  
 
Moreover, the state capitalism perspective is also applicable when SWFs are seen as a 
state legitimizing tool. Since these SWFs’ investments are transparent and typically large, 
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they tend to set the investment choices for other domestic firms that seek to invest globally 
yet do not have the research resources to select investee firms. Thus, we can see that these 
investment organizations are not only active in their investment choices and governance 
practices but, within the new state capitalism, they are also perceived as legitimate 
organizations (Ang, 2012) that activate isomorphic investment dynamics (Vasudeva, 2013).  
 
Norway’s GPFG is the best known case of an active shareholder among these 
investment organizations and, in this sense, it is a clear example of strategic governance. 
First, through its government commissioned Council on Ethics, GPFG carries out active, 
widespread monitoring of its investments in nearly 7,500 companies (by the end of 2013), 
identifying inconsistencies between its portfolio companies and its ethical guidelines. When 
necessary, the Council on Ethics recommends the exclusion or close monitoring of a 
company to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance which has the last word in this respect. Since 
2004, firms potentially causing environmental damage, those involved in producing either 
nuclear weapons or cluster bombs, and tobacco companies have all been excluded from 
GPFG’s investment portfolio. This list of excluded firms includes well-known companies 
such as Boeing, EADS, Rio Tinto, and Wal-Mart. In addition to exercising its exit 
shareholder right, GPFG recently launched a campaign for increased corporate governance 
engagement in companies where it has a substantial investment and a long-term interest (e.g., 
in BlackRock, BG Group, UBS, Prudential, Volvo and Svenska Cellulosa). GPFG publishes 
its voting intentions ahead of general meetings for selected companies and for given issues 
they want to highlight. The rationale is that GPFG seeks to express its voice in governance 
issues such as director nominations and remuneration policies. In other words, this SWF is 
using governance strategically to define what the organization does but also to align it with 
the geopolitical stance of the Norwegian government. 
 
We argue that SWFs with a financial purpose and investing in publicly-traded firms 
are more likely to be perceived as other institutional investors equipped to engage in 
shareholder activism, exercise their voting rights, and demand effective corporate governance 
standards in the investee companies where they have become state co-owners. Along with 
GPFG, Korea Investment Corporation is another good example of SWFs in this quadrant.   
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 2.5.2. Quadrant 2. In-house Capabilities 
SWFs in quadrant 2 seek financial goals and invest in private firms. There are 
significant differences between the motivations to invest in private versus publicly-listed 
firms as discussed above. In this quadrant, we would like to introduce the idea of SWFs as 
investment organizations gradually developing in-house capabilities. Typically, institutional 
investors hire external fund managers (e.g., Goldman Sachs, UBS, etc.) who manage their 
assets. In the case of SWFs, many give mandates to external fund managers to pursue their 
established investment strategies and goals. Until recently, SWFs like other institutional 
investors paid high fees to their external fund managers, usually to invest in private equity as 
limited partners or co-investors to general partners (Hoskisson, Shi, Yi, & Jin, 2013). 
However, the 2008 financial crises altered the relationship between investors and external 
fund managers and brought in a new practice. During the financial turmoil, these external 
fund managers did not succeed in providing reasonable returns on investments, leading SWFs 
to seek alternative solutions that would minimize the transaction costs of their investments 
(Dixon & Monk, 2013). One of the responses to this non-contingent external management 
fund cost is internalizing this service, reducing SWF dependence on external agents as well 
as the intrinsic agency costs (Clark et al., 2013). Thus, by investing in private equity to 
diversify risk and achieve greater profitability, SWFs have achieved greater professionalism 
and developed in-house investment capabilities. 
  
Investments in private equity face two key principal-agency challenges that can be 
partially overcome by developing in-house investment capabilities. On the one hand, the 
general opacity of private equity (relative to publicly-traded companies) exacerbates the 
information asymmetry between the principal (SWF) and the agent (external fund manager) 
(Johan et al., 2013). These asymmetries are even larger in the context of SWFs investing in 
foreign markets. However, the continuing growth of these state-owned funds within the new 
wave of state capitalism (Bremmer, 2014; Karolyi & Liao, in press; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014) has 
fostered the development of new capabilities that can either be developed internally or, more 
commonly, acquired by hiring foreign senior talent, in turn making SWFs more professional 
and sophisticated (Ang, 2012). The development of this internal human capital facilitates 
greater internationalization, particularly in private equities.  
 
Therefore, SWFs are drawing on strategic governance through their growing direct 
investments in private equity to address three challenges. First, their engagement with private 
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equity fund managers forces SWFs to professionalize their internal investment teams by 
developing and/or acquiring talent. Better human capital is likely to lead to an overall 
efficient organization. Second, as a result of developing new internal investment capabilities, 
SWFs lower their dependence on external investment management, reducing their transaction 
costs (fees). Moreover, greater internal investment capabilities are typically associated with 
the ability to manage more complex assets such as private equity which is increasing in 
volume (Hurst, 2014). Third, the development of in-house investment capabilities reduces 
agency costs by more closely aligning the interests between SWFs and investee shareholders 
(principal-principal conflict) as well as SWFs as owners and investee firm managers (Clark et 
al., 2013). 
 
The main challenge for this type of SWF investment is co-existing as state-owners 
with other owners (not always state-owners) who might have different interests in the firm. 
This raises the classic principal-principal problem (Young et al., 2008). In terms of strategic 
governance and to minimize both principal-principal and principal-agent problems, SWFs 
might set up investment management offices closer to their investment partners and investee 
companies to minimize moral hazard and to exert more control over managers, respectively 
(Al-Kharusi, Dixon, & Monk, 2014). Thus, SWFs can reduce the institutional distance (Eden 
& Miller, 2004) with their investment partners (co-owners) by developing in-house 
managerial capabilities to monitor this risk. This closer relationship is likely to foster trust 
and reduce information asymmetries, which in turn might decrease the principal-principal 
costs. Doing so also exposes SWFs to learning opportunities with other co-investors and 
financial intermediaries.  
 
ADIA from Abu Dhabi is an illustrative example of SWFs in quadrant 2. ADIA’s 
volume in assets is estimated to be above $700 billion, and it is in the process of reducing its 
reliance on external investment managers (which in 2012 was around 75 percent) as well as 
capturing international talent (for instance, ADIA is hiring managers from Deutsche Bank, 
Credit Suisse, and BP as heads of key private equity departments). In addition to reducing 
transaction and agency costs, this internalization effort also demonstrates ADIA’s strategic 
governance, incorporating human capital to obtain higher control. GIC from Singapore is 
another good example of this strategic governance. This $280-billion SWF is increasing its 
investments in private equity (in 2014 around 15 percent of its portfolio) as well as engaging 
in product diversification. It is now one of the ten largest investors in real estate in the world 
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 and an active player in the venture capital industry. These in-house capabilities were 
encouraged by the Singaporean government in its attempt to raise the quality of the country’s 
asset management industry. The recent opening of GIC’s San Francisco office is further 
proof of its commitment to venture capital, its efforts to minimize principal-principal conflict, 
and the strength of its internal investment capabilities (the same applies to Khazanah National 
which recently opened its first non-Asian office in San Francisco). 
 
2.5.3. Quadrant 3. Legitimacy and Decoupling 
SWFs in quadrant 3 pursue strategic (non-financial) goals and invest in publicly-
traded firms. Their investments seek legitimation by being listed in foreign public markets 
while simultaneously pursuing non-financial goals. The dynamics of this quadrant follow the 
behavioral perspective of corporate governance and strategy which emphasizes social 
structural relationships, institutional processes, and social cognition (Westphal & Zajac, 
2011). Four strategic dynamics fall into this quadrant, complemented by these SWFs’ unique 
governance structure: the state ownership of the SWF and the publicly-traded ownership of 
the investee firms. First, an increasingly common trend within state capitalism is that the 
governments responsible for SWFs develop financial relationships with host country 
governments, the ultimate goal being to establish strong political and financial ties with them 
(Clark et al., 2013). This tends to happen particularly with SWFs from small governments 
that do not have a significant geopolitical profile. It is a strategic governance move to 
minimize uncertainty and develop trust through relationships. Clark et al. (2013) refer to 
these SWFs as “post-colonialist.”   
 
Second, SWFs in quadrant 3 rely on their large state-owned endowment pool to 
launch long-term investment relationships with organizations equipped with critical 
economic or political power, i.e., multinational firms and non-governmental organizations. 
Here, SWFs are used as a governmental tool, differentiating them from other countries’ 
investment mechanisms.  In this sense, these SWFs move strategically from the parameters of 
state capitalism into market capitalism. For instance, Singapore’s Temasek has a stake in 
Repsol, the Spanish oil national champion, whereas CIC made a sound investment (now sold) 
in Morgan Stanley in the midst of the financial crisis. 
 
Third, there is a risk associated with pursuing international public investments that 
seek national strategic goals as opposed to purely financial ones. The potential stigma 
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connected with state ownership (i.e., deep pockets accompanied by non-financial goals) can 
be overcome when choosing the publicly-traded firms in which to invest. In this regard, we 
argue that SWFs in this quadrant might decouple and undertake dual agendas in order to 
overcome the “liability of sovereignness.” In other words, they invest in publicly-traded firms 
to legitimize themselves and pursue their strategic goals. This is a symbolic as opposed to a 
substantial effort (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, their sovereign interests are not likely 
to be fully aligned with the core shareholder value maximization interests of the publicly-
traded firms. The presence of strategic SWFs can be quite powerful when countries seek to 
gain international investment legitimation. A good example is the SWF, Qatar Holding, 
whose clear goal is to promote the national country brand. Qatar Holding has invested in 
European global companies such as Volskwagen, Banco Santander, Hochtief, Lagardere, 
Iberdrola, and Harrods. It has also been involved in one of the largest acquisition deals of the 
decade, showing its strength as a shareholder. In particular, Qatar Holding, with a 12 percent 
ownership in Xstrata (a multinational mining company) pressured Glencore (a global 
commodities trading firm) to increase its initial bid by 9 percent. We interpret this 
governance activism as the SWF’s attempt to show that it is a legitimate investor.  
 
Finally, it is also possible that SWFs in this quadrant engage in cross-national 
institutional arbitrage (Witt & Lewin, 2007) in the sense that they look for the most 
institutionally appropriate foreign markets to invest in public firms. SWFs borrow from the 
host country’s national institutions to gain the home country legitimation that they lack. This 
is also labeled “institutional bonding” (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Coffee, 2002). 
Most of these strategic funds originate from non-democratic countries that lack accountability 
and shareholder protection laws (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, & Williamson, 2008; World Bank, 
2013). These SWF managers have to take into account the sovereign interests when making 
investment decisions and while seeking global investment legitimation. SWFs in this 
quadrant include those from small countries such as Qatar Holding and Temasek (Singapore) 
but also other funds from countries with significant political clout and strategic policies 
tightly aligned with the government, e.g., the Chinese CIC. 
 
2.5.4. Quadrant 4. Long-term Learning 
Quadrant 4 includes SWFs that pursue strategic investment goals and invest in private 
firms, typically with a domestic focus. This quadrant introduces three new strategic 
governance dimensions among SWFs. First, they are interested in learning and acquiring new 
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 capabilities, achieving this through alliances and joint ventures with leading international 
private companies. The governance associated to this strategic effort entails the need to keep 
a low governance profile in terms of public scrutiny and financial disclosure, though also 
coping with the principal-principal tension. An example of how acquiring knowledge and 
pursuing long-term investment can help a country diversify its domestic productive portfolio 
is Mubadala from Abu Dhabi. It started a series of private joint ventures in the renewable 
energy industry with leading Western companies such Total (France), SENER and Abengoa 
Solar (Spain), and E.ON (Germany). This strategy also illustrates state capitalism at its core 
by engaging in financially viable projects that mostly benefit the home country’s economic 
prosperity. 
  
Second, SWFs form many of these strategic alliances with non-listed companies. In 
particular, SWFs represent the highest percentage of institutional investors in private equity 
(Johan et al., 2013), as the logic of state capitalism is consistent with opaque governance of 
private equity. Often, SWFs that seek more than just financial goals will engage in extreme 
strategic governance such as taking a private company in order to maximize control and 
minimize the need for disclosure. The owner can easily reduce agency costs by eliminating 
external shareholders and, as a result, directly set the management incentives and redesign the 
strategy. Another SWF in this quadrant is the International Petroleum Investment 
Corporation (IPIC), Abu Dhabi’s SWF specializing in oil. IPIC began investing in the 
Spanish petroleum multinational, Cepsa, in 1988 and it made the company go private in 
2011. Although, IPIC was seeking to acquire Cepsa’s existing geographic diversification 
capabilities, the main objective was to obtain the necessary knowledge to undertake more 
efficient operations in the SWF’s own extensive energy investment portfolio.   
 
Third, SWFs in this quadrant, like those in quadrant 3, seek to develop long-term 
country-to-country relationships (Clark et al., 2013). Strategic SWFs have stronger ties to 
their sponsoring governments than financial SWFs and more intensely embed the dual 
objectives of state capitalism: economic and socio-political goals. These aims and mandates 
are aligned with those of the respective governments. Thus, these SWFs directly represent 
their governments (and are often run by government officials), making it easier and faster to 
engage in agreements with other states. For example, SWFs such as Russia Direct Investment 
Fund and Qatar Holding have established agreements with the governments of Italy, France, 
and Ireland in key strategic sectors: export-oriented companies, medium-sized enterprises, 
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and technology companies, respectively (Santiso & Ríos, 2014). In all cases, host 
governments are interested in the SWFs’ large financial resources for their private companies 
for whom access to credit and investors is difficult. In this regard, SWFs are an arm of the 
state in question to pursue its goals through private financial agreements. It is important to 
note that these strategic goals are not necessarily harmful, often resulting in a win-win 
situation. Foreign companies and countries secure long-term investments, and SWFs gain 
access to resources and know-how in relevant industries.  
 
2.6. DISCUSSION 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds as state-owned institutional investors without pension 
obligations are one of the key players in new state capitalism, with states no longer serving as 
the sole owners or controlling managers in investee firms as is the case with state-owned 
corporations. States as owners engage in economic and political relationships with other 
owners and external managers. This new state capitalism also embraces the idea that SWFs 
can pursue both political and financial objectives, at times fulfilling both simultaneously. In 
this paper, we shed light on the “siloed” research on SWFs by offering an organizing 
framework based on SWFs’ investment motivation and the ownership type of the investee 
firms. We have defined four distinct strategic governance dimensions in which SWFs cope 
with the principal-agency problem, the principal-principal problem, and behavioral 
governance challenges. First, we identified financial SWFs that play a larger role as active 
shareholders of listed companies worldwide. This still incipient trend aligns well with a more 
active capitalism in which owners have greater influence in the investee company’s strategic 
management. Second, financial SWFs are developing stronger in-house capabilities. Several 
factors have triggered this move towards more numerous and specialized human capital: 
organization professionalization, investment fees, and lower agency costs. Third, 
governments use strategic SWFs to obtain state goals while simultaneously seeking to gain 
legitimacy as institutional investors. These policy objectives are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive from financial efficiency. Fourth, strategic SWFs are learning organizations. The 
funds act as catalysts of domestic economic diversification and leverage relationships with 
global industry leaders in order to learn.  
 
These four strategic dimensions comprise an organizing framework with four 
quadrants, representing a valuable tool with which to study SWFs. However, these four 
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 quadrants sometimes have blurred boundaries or overlap. In addition, funds evolve over 
time (goals, structure, and teams) so that one fund may currently fit into a given quadrant and 
later move to another. To analyze this complex and dynamic scenario, we examine the 
movements between quadrants and the reasons that lead funds to shift between them. After 
that, we offer two productive avenues for future research with implications for the 
management and finance areas. 
 
2.6.1. Dynamic Strategic Governance: Movements between Quadrants 
SWFs are multi-dimensional organizations in that, at any given time, they might 
belong to more than one quadrant in our ideal-type organizing framework (Figure 2.1). SWFs 
are evolving organizations (Clark et al., 2013) and might also change or expand to other 
quadrants over time (Schena & Kalter, 2013). This mobility includes both public financial 
(asset classes and geographic allocation) and private financial SWFs (in-house capabilities 
through specialized workforce and new organizational challenges via international offices). 
We discuss four of these common movements.   
 
The first movement we have detected comes from financially-oriented SWFs 
transitioning from quadrant 1 to quadrant 2 (from a focus on publicly-traded to privately-held 
target firms). The most financially-oriented SWFs from Norway and Korea invest heavily in 
listed assets, representing more than 90% of their equity portfolios. However, they also 
participate in more complex asset classes, increasing their exposure to private assets. 
Norway’s GPFG is a good example. Although it has traditionally split its investment strategy 
between equity (40%) and fixed income (60%), it has shifted gears and started to invest 
directly in private real estate assets. As of June 2014, GPFG had acquired property in Europe 
and the U.S. worth $10.3 billion (Yu, 2014), and it forecast to invest at least 5% of its 
portfolio in real estate (approximately $45 billion). Jumping into quadrant 2 while keeping a 
foot in quadrant 1 will reinforce GPFG’s internal teams by hiring new talent and increasing 
its in-house capabilities. The logic behind this first kind of movement reflects the growing 
“sophistication” of SWFs. Investing directly or indirectly in private assets allows SWFs to 
expand the universe of investable assets while keeping a return-risk financial motivation. 
Nowadays, given the globally low interest rates, turning to private assets helps increase the 
possibility of higher returns. And, given the new risks arising especially when SWFs by-pass 
private equity funds and invest or co-invest directly in private companies, the need for more 
internal talent results in better prepared workforces. Thus, this first movement implies 
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jumping from more standard investment organizations in quadrant 1 to reinforced in-house 
sophisticated talent found among SWFs in quadrant 2.  
 
Second, there are funds in quadrant 2 moving towards quadrant 4. For example, 
SWFs from New Zealand, Australia, and even Alaska are transforming into strategic funds by 
investing heavily to promote specific domestic sectors or to secure the provision of natural 
resources. These SWFs with clear investment mandates might suffer from political instability 
or external shock (i.e., changes of government, long-term low oil prices, and domestic 
banking crises). A possible response might be to tackle short-term problems with long-term 
resources. This implies that funds might change their goal from acquiring in-house 
capabilities to investing abroad towards more domestic and sector-specific arrangements in 
an attempt to obtain long-term economic returns. A good example here is Ireland, but we can 
apply it to any country that has to take a more strategic (and usually domestically-oriented) 
stance after a profound financial crisis in order to establish investment programs to revive the 
local business ecosystem and economic activity. After rescuing the national banking system, 
the old National Pension Reserves Fund is now transferring its assets to the Ireland Strategic 
Investment Fund. The ISIF is committed to investing on a commercial basis to support 
economic activity and employment in Ireland. Thus, it has changed the financial goals 
typically found among SWFs in quadrant 2 to provide a broader economic and strategic 
support typical of funds in quadrant 4.  
 
We see the third movement with funds moving from quadrant 3 to quadrant 1, that is, 
strategic funds investing heavily in listed equities which reduce their political alignment and 
then shifting into global financial players. An example of this is China Investment 
Corporation (CIC). China has five SWFs, two of which are among the largest in the world: 
CIC and SAFE. CIC was created in 2007 and has grown exponentially since then, from $200 
billion originally to approximately $600 billion today. While CIC and SAFE compete 
globally for deals and domestically for political favors in the cradle of state capitalism, the 
Chinese government seems to have split their respective roles, with CIC becoming a global 
financial player (quadrant 1) and SAFE remaining a strategic fund in quadrant 3. 
Consequently, avoiding competition between same-country funds can be an important driver 
behind this movement, helping to create funds with financial goals (with a focus on foreign 
listed equity) and keeping others with more strategic objectives (typically domestic). When 
symbolic goals represent an obstacle to achieving substantial goals (as explained in Figure 
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 2.1), a given country may opt to abandon strategic motivations to engage with other 
“standard” institutional investors such as public pensions funds in quadrant 1. 
 
Fourth, a few SWFs are multi-dimensional and dynamic such as Singapore’s Temasek 
which was incorporated in 1974. Since then, Temasek has pursued strategic goals such as 
championing formerly private and inefficient Singaporean government-linked companies 
(e.g., SingTel and Singapore Airlines) and turning them into regionally listed giants. Thus, it 
shifted from quadrant 4 to quadrant 3. By doing so, Temasek has reduced its exposure to 
domestic companies and gained prestige in the international investment community. The 
jump from quadrant 4 to quadrant 3 is explained by a certain natural evolution among the 
funds towards a more diversified international portfolio. This evolution also reflects the 
transition of funds that have a development vocation (common in quadrant 4) towards being 
more open to investing in listed companies. This is a common transition among sovereign 
funds from developing countries that achieve specialization. Typically, these funds then cede 
financing development projects to banks or public development agencies. 
 
2.6.2. Future Research: An Exploration of the Bright and the Dark Sides of SWFs 
Our strategic governance framework touches on two key features of this investment 
organization at the apex of new state capitalism: the logic of long-term capitalism and the 
role of politicians and politics (sometimes leading to crony capitalism). We think these are 
fascinating areas for future cross-disciplinary research. First, SWFs are well equipped to 
become significant actors in the new “long-term capitalism” (Bolton & Samama, 2012). In 
principle, long-term investors provide patient capital and managerial rewards to companies 
with long-term focus (Davis, 2009; Krippner, 2012), thereby alleviating the short-term 
distortions and pressures introduced by stock volatility. The gigantic needs of global 
infrastructure investments (estimated to be around $5 trillion per year over the next two 
decades by the World Economic Forum (2014)) reinforce the new opportunities for SWFs as 
long-term investors. Infrastructure’s steady long-term cash flows also serve to diversify and 
legitimate SWFs. Thanks to the sustained, successful track-records in other asset classes, 
funds like ADIA and GIC have attracted international talent (both funds are included in 
quadrant 2 with strong in-house capabilities) and are now able to deploy long-term 
investment strategies (Barbary, 2014). As SWFs acquire these in-house capabilities, they will 
play an increasingly important role in the long-term economy focused on the global 
enhancement of corporate governance and real assets such as infrastructure and agribusiness. 
 47 
 
For example, GPFG’s voting intention disclosures (and potential herding behavior coming 
from its website but also social media) serve as a quasi-natural experiment to analyze the 
market’s reactions to sensible corporate governance questions.  
 
Second, SWFs also have a darker side that deserves further scholarly attention: the 
hidden political motives behind SWFs and how political interventionism may affect the 
management of SWFs and their investment targets. One of the main risks that SWFs face 
(particularly, those with strategic goals) is excessive involvement by politicians in SWF 
operations, goals, and governance. This is normally associated with a bias towards domestic 
investments, less reliance on external fund managers (Bernstein et al., 2013), a higher risk of 
political rent-seeking (Pistor & Hatton, 2011), and a turn towards short-term goals. This 
context of non-efficiency seeking is particularly salient during economic downturns when 
politicians face higher pressures to alter the SWFs’ mandates and use their resources to 
capture specific electorates. Similarly, different rhythms of the political and economic cycles 
account for short-term pressures, and SWFs may succumb to the temptation of coming to the 
rescue of underperforming companies for political rather than economic purposes, such as 
during election times.   
 
In sum, politicians’ influence in SWF investment decisions is at the intersection 
between regulation and policy (Balding, 2012; Rose, 2009). In this regard, funds in quadrant 
3 face a permanent trade-off between symbolic (political legitimacy at home and abroad) and 
substantial goals (efficiency by investing in top listed equities). If the government decides to 
tip the balance towards political goals, legitimacy will not be attained and the sovereign 
discount will increase. According to Deephouse (1999), they can be as strategic as 
legitimately possible. 
 
2.6.3. Managerial and Financial Challenges 
Another interesting area to explore for management practice refers to the nature and 
development of SWFs’ human capital (a hybrid between state employees and global 
investors). The workforce of new state capitalism comprises employees from SWFs but also 
from SOEs, development banks and public agencies, each with unique skills and incentives. 
SWF professionalization (quadrant 2) demonstrates that investment managers in this kind of 
organization require a global orientation and the ability to reconcile divergent interests. 
Managers from state-owned organizations are mostly presumed to be unmotivated and 
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 inefficient (Rajan, 2010). The new state capitalism is at a turning point as it reconciles the 
strengths of capitalism (results-oriented and open to global markets) with the goals of states 
(long-term objectives and political influences). Interestingly, at the individual level, the 
unresolved question is whether managers will be able to combine state and political goals 
with financial returns. This question affects funds in every quadrant of our analysis as it 
reflects a tension rooted in the very nature of SWFs: they are state-owned organizations in a 
capitalist playground. 
 
Two other areas within the management arena demand further attention. The first 
involves the SWFs’ own corporate governance. Here, a key question is whether in-house 
capabilities will grow evenly within the entire SWF industry. Depending on the pace of these 
changes, the gap between the most and the least sophisticated funds will grow wider, leading 
to a two-speed industry in terms of investment capabilities. In fact, there is still scarce 
research linking SWF performance and corporate governance (including size, top-
management teams and organizational design).  
 
Second, SWF governance within the state institutional architecture requires more 
exploration. A main problem to be solved is SWF alignment with stable long-term strategic 
state plans rather than discrete short-term political goals. State plans would thus serve as 
long-term benchmarks to improve scrutiny over SWFs’ returns and objectives. Therefore, 
research on disentangling state and political goals, though complex, would be useful for 
governance and management purposes. However, it is also critical to improve transparency 
domestically and internationally by aligning the SWFs’ strategy with the well-publicized 
long-term state plans. This would serve to avoid facing a disclosure premium due to 
predictable investments.  
 
Turning to future financial-related research regarding SWFs, we propose three main 
areas for further exploration. First, the question whether countries need a SWF or not remains 
unresolved. After years of economic and commodity windfalls, most countries with old and 
newly established oil-related SWFs are now facing lower oil prices and, thus, substantially 
reduced margins at best. Will SWFs react as the fiscal buffer funds they are meant to be? Is 
there an alternative way to shield a commodity-dependent economy? What are the main 
empirical findings and differences in countries such as Russia, Angola and Nigeria? In 
addition, long-term horizons would need better analysis, particularly when assuming that all 
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risks become financial in the long run. Similarly, risk management, specifically uncertainty 
management, will require further attention given the duration of the wagers SWFs make.  
 
Second, as extensions of the state, SWFs benefit from fewer information asymmetries 
compared to private players when dealing with governments. Therefore, a pending research 
question is whether there is a “sovereignness advantage” for SWFs in specific projects and 
countries compared to their private investment competitors.  
 
Lastly, there is an interesting issue intersecting the management and finance areas. As 
stated in the discussion section, more external managers might insulate SWFs from politically 
short-term and biased decisions and help to deal with complex investment opportunities 
otherwise out of reach. However, external managers come at a cost in terms of asymmetries 
and fees. The question is, what would be the proper balance between managerial 
independence and financial returns? 
 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Most of the existing research on SWFs is grounded on specific disciplinary fields and 
has primarily focused on economic and performance trends. In this paper, we sought to bring 
this research to the firm-level and explore SWFs’ strategic governance. We began by briefly 
reviewing the state-of-the-art findings on what we know about SWFs: they are a highly 
heterogeneous group, SWF investments generate positive short-term stock reactions, their 
investment strategies tend to have a substantial domestic bias when politicians are involved, 
and they face the “SWF discount.” However, we lack an in-depth understanding of these 
state-owned institutional investors as players in the long-term focused state capitalism and as 
organizations adopting different strategic governance dimensions.   
 
Our SWF framework, while an ideal type, identifies the strategic challenges these 
institutional investors face and reveals four strategic governance approaches they deploy to 
overcome them. First, we uncover shareholder activism to combat the principal-agency 
conflict.  In this case SWFs exercise this activism with their voting rights and demand for 
effective corporate governance standards in the investee companies where they have become 
co-owners. Second, SWFs might face severe information asymmetries and intrinsic principal-
principal costs when investing in private firms. By enhancing their in-house capabilities, 
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 SWFs have been able to simultaneously reduce their dependence on external managers 
while also increasing their professionalization (risk management and due diligence 
requirements are currently similar to those for well-established global investment 
institutions). Third, strategic SWFs might be deployed as governmental tools, decoupling and 
investing in publicly-traded firms to gain legitimation, though their sovereign interests may 
not likely be fully aligned with the core shareholder value maximization interests of their co-
owners. Fourth, strategic SWFs investing in private companies seek to obtain long-term 
learning templates that will help them acquire the relevant know-how and diversify the base 
of their own national economies. With our proposed strategic governance framework, we 
discuss movements across strategic governance dimensions and we uncover two research 
topics that need further attention: the idea of long-term capitalism and the role of politicians 
and politics in SWFs.   
 
State capitalism is salient in each of the quadrants in our theoretical framework as is 
the governance tension between owners, co-owners and their managers. Interestingly, some 
SWFs have become corporate governance global watchdogs such as GPFG, and this is an 
organizational innovation. Also, SWFs have introduced a new way of understanding the 
relationship between the state and the private sector. Some questions still remain pending, 
however: Will states sponsoring SWFs be able to attract or develop enough talent to achieve 
their goals? And, will SWFs lead to improved governance worldwide while they are in need 
of better management practices?  
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 TABLE 2.1: Main Findings on Research on Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Discipline  Findings 
Finance 
 
SHORT AND LONG-TERM IMPACT ON TARGET COMPANIES: SWFs’ investment announcements cause 
positive short-term stock reactions (Bortolotti et al., 2013a; Dewenter et al., 2010; Kotter & Lel, 2011) but they 
are lower than those from their private counterparts (Bortolotti et al., 2013a), reflecting a “SWF discount.” The 
long-term impact on target companies is negative in terms of abnormal returns (Karolyi & Liao, in press), 
Sharpe ratio (Knill, Lee, & Mauck, 2012a) and P/E ratio when politicians are involved (Bernstein et al., 2013), 
implying SWFs’ weak monitoring role. On the contrary, some findings suggest that SWFs add value (15% in 
Tobin’s q) to investee companies (Fernandes, 2014) and that there is a reduction in target companies’ credit risk 
(Bertoni & Lugo, 2014). Paradoxically, however, firms with SWF investment experience higher debt costs 
(Borisova, Fotak, Holland, & Megginson, in press).  
 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: Mixed findings. The evidence shows SWFs’ preference for both stable 
(Karolyi & Liao, in press) and distressed companies (Kotter & Lel, 2011). SWFs also select target companies 
aligned with national industrial-planning strategies (Dyck & Morse, 2011; Haberly, 2011) or based on political 
bilateral relations (Knill, Lee, & Mauck, 2012b). Other findings demonstrate that SWF portfolios do not 
diverge from mutual funds strategies (Avendaño & Santiso, 2011) but show certain home bias (Bernstein et al., 
2013; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2008). SWFs do not show a systematic preference for specific industries and 
tend to diversify in equity markets (Miceli, 2013). 
 
Strategy 
 
- SWF investment practices may spread to the rest of private domestic investors as showed in the Norwegian 
case (Vasudeva, 2013).  
 
- Governments should design SWF portfolio allocation (financial assets) taking into account underground 
(minerals, oil, and gas) assets (Van den Bremer, Van der Ploeg, & Wills, 2013).  
  
- Contrary to FDI theory, SWFs prefer to invest in private (vs. public) equity in countries with lower investor 
protection and where the bilateral political relations between the SWF country and the target one are weaker 
(Johan, Knill, & Mauck, 2013). 
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- Company target and recipient countries will benefit (lower transaction costs) from coordinated actions with 
respect to SWF investments (Rose, 2009).  
 
Political 
Economy 
 
- SWFs represent a new mode of state-capitalism; they enable governments to exert “soft-control” through 
minority stakes (Fotak, Gao, & Megginson, 2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). SWFs as means of new state 
capitalism might allow governments to exert control in non-state companies through financing (Milhaupt & 
Zheng, 2014).  
 
-  SWFs’ investment agendas and mandates should be integrated with the rest of state-owned vehicles such as 
development banks, regional agencies and SOEs (Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, Skancke, & Sung, 2013; Gelb, 
Tordo, & Halland, 2014). 
 
- SWFs engage in idiosyncratic political accountability (Clark et al., 2013; Gelpern, 2011); as a heterogeneous 
group, SWFs have been created across the wide political spectrum, ranging from the most to the least 
democratic countries.  
 
- SWFs serve ruling elites to maintain their privileges (Pistor & Hatton, 2011) even in times of crisis by 
concentrating substantial resources. They can lie in the shadows of regulations and politics (Balding, 2012; 
Rose, 2009). 
 
Economics 
 
-  SWFs have evolved as a sophistication of stabilization funds (Balding, 2012; Das et al., 2009) in terms of 
asset management (expanding both geographic allocation and asset classes) and corporate governance (clearer 
rules and accountability). However, SWFs have been used as sovereign development funds (Santiso, 2008) with 
inherent risks of political capture (Gelb et al., 2014). 
 
- The recent surge of new SWFs depends on international reserve accumulation (due to high commodity prices 
and current account surpluses) in times of low global interest rates (Aizenman & Glick, 2010; Castelli & 
Scacciavillani, 2012). 
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International 
Law 
 
- Host countries receiving SWF investments face a trade-off between national security and open capital markets 
(Cohen, 2009). Regulatory burdens might decrease with better transparency practices from SWFs (Rose, 2014).   
 
- Sovereign wealth immunity in the U.S. favors SWF taxation (Bird-Pollan, 2012). To overcome this, tax 
reform should encourage investments with low political risk and require higher accountability for SWFs 
(Fleischer, 2009) or even distinguish financial SWFs from strategic SWFs by proposing a suspension of voting 
rights (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008). 
 
- On the contrary, evidence shows that SWFs have acted thus far as model investors (Epstein & Rose, 2009). 
Thus, imposing additional obstacles to SWF investments in the U.S. seems unreasonable. Discouraging SWFs 
from investing in the U.S. will impose political and economic opportunity costs larger than the natural security 
benefits. 
 
Organizational 
Theory 
- Governments use SWFs as institutional innovations (Weiss, 2009). Clark et al. (2013) foresee two different 
paths for SWFs: adopting global financial standards or transforming into nation-state development institutions. 
 
- The Norwegian SWF, GPFG, maintains its political legitimacy primarily through the “process” governing the 
decision-making of the public interest rather than through its functionality (Clark et al., 2013). 
 
- Truman (2013) simplifies SWF transparency analysis through a scoreboard comprising structure, governance, 
transparency and accountability, and investment behavior.  
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TABLE 2.2: Sovereign Wealth Fund Characteristics 
  
Age 
Senior (five SWFs) <1960s  
Adult (nine SWFs) 1970-80s 
Teen (nine SWFs) 90s 
Baby (56 SWFs) 2000-10s 
Senior: Including the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority and Kuwait Investment 
Authority. 
Adult: Three SWFs from the U.S., two from 
Singapore and Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA).  
Teen is the largest group in terms of assets 
under management ($1.77 trillion): 
Norwegian GPFG ($900 billion) and SAFE 
(China).  
Babies: 56 new funds ($1.63 trillion) 
established in the SWF baby-boom led by 
China Investment Corporation ($575 
billion).  
Size 
 
Extra Large (five SWFs) > $400 billion 
Large (eight SWFs) > $100 billion 
Medium (37 SWFs) > $5 billion 
Small (28 SWFs) < $5 billion 
The SWF industry has $6 trillion in assets; 
industry concentration is key. The top-10 
SWFs manage 70% of the industry’s assets. 
We foresee a continued transfer of wealth 
from central banks’ foreign-exchange 
reserves to more sophisticated SWFs.  
Global 
Location 
 
Middle East (17 SWFs) $2.1 trillion - 
34% 
China (five SWFs) $1.5 trillion - 25% 
Norway (one SWF) $0.9 trillion - 15% 
SEA (eight SWFs) $0.7 trillion -  12% 
New poles in Africa and, to a lesser extent, 
in Latin America are surfacing. Central 
Asia will continue to grow. SWFs from 
emerging markets will dominate even more 
in the foreseeable future. 
Funding 
Sources 
Commodity: oil, gas, other minerals, 
metals 
Non-commodities: foreign-exchange 
reserves 
Others: leverage, privatizations, SOE 
profits, etc. 
Oil-related SWFs will benefit from recent 
global demand projections. However, other 
funding sources (e.g., debt issuance) will 
become more prevalent. 
Policy 
Purposes4 
Macro-stabilization (“rainy day fund”) 
Savings (“future generation” 
distribution) 
Reserve investment 
Pension reserve 
 
SWFs’ objectives are compound, 
overlapping, and changing over time (e.g., 
short-term stabilization of SWFs may 
evolve into savings funds; likewise, pension 
reserve SWFs may choose more active and 
direct investment strategies).  
 
  
4 As defined by Kunzel, Lu, Petrova, & Pihlman (2011). 
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 FIGURE 2.1: Strategic Governance Types of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
 
Investment 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Quadrant 1. Shareholder Activism 
SWFs play a strong monitoring role 
and help to improve the corporate 
governance of listed companies 
worldwide. 
An SWF as the principal seeks to 
enhance the target company’s 
(agent’s) corporate governance 
through active participation in the 
company’s committees and annual 
general meetings. 
Norway’s GPFG is designing a new 
approach to intervene in its largest 
equity positions. Others will follow. 
Quadrant 2. In-house Capabilities 
SWFs establish specialized teams 
looking for higher returns and new 
asset classes and geographies. There 
are spillover effects for the 
organization: professionalization, fee 
reduction, and lower agency costs. 
An SWF as a principal engages with 
other owner(s) (also principal(s)) in 
low shareholder protection schemes. 
Setting up investment offices “closer to 
the action” helps to overcome this P-P 
conflict. 
New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund, 
Malaysia’s Khazanah, ADIA, and GIC 
have specialized world-class 
investment teams managing complex 
asset classes. 
Quadrant 3. Legitimacy & 
Decoupling 
Governments use SWFs to obtain 
longer-term state goals yet 
simultaneously seek to acquire 
legitimacy as institutional investors. 
The tradeoff between symbolic 
(efficiency by investing in top-listed 
equities) and substantial goals 
(political legitimacy at home and 
abroad) drives these SWFs’ decision-
making. 
QIA, CIC, and Temasek have 
different political goals, yet all of 
them aim to achieve them through 
financial efficiency and thus 
decoupling.  
Quadrant 4. Long-Term Learning 
SWFs look for domestic economic 
diversification and to engage in long-
term relations with foreign companies 
to acquire resources and know-how, 
that is, to learn. 
SWFs face Principal-Principal 
conflicts when investing with 
governments as well as with private 
companies through joint-ventures. 
Also, SWFs need to address Principal-
Agent conflicts at home with domestic 
SOEs. 
Mubadala learns valuable lessons from 
its joint-ventures with innovative 
multinational companies. RDIF uses a 
different model by co-investing with 
other SWFs and governments. 
Public                                                               Private 
Ownership Type 
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3.1. ABSTRACT 
During the last decade, Spain has become a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) investment 
destination. In this chapter, we begin by outlining the factors that have led SWFs to Spain. 
Second, we discuss the different corporate strategies that SWFs exhibit when investing in 
Spanish companies. We examine these investments in the context of an existing typology of 
four different strategic governance approaches: corporate governance supervision, in-house 
capabilities enhancement, international recognition and developmental and learning goals. 
We then show how these four strategies are effectively implemented drawing on four 
investment SWF cases in Spain. We conclude by proposing four new areas of fruitful 
research on SWFs in fields such as economics, management and international business.  
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 3.2. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are government-owned investment funds with no pension 
liabilities (Aguilera, Capapé & Santiso, 2016). They manage worldwide US$7 trillion (IE 
Sovereign Wealth Lab, 2016). These global investors are becoming popular in financial and 
economic circles with frequent presence in financial and general media. Recently, changes 
announced by the deputy crown prince Mohammad bin Salman to transform Saudi Arabia’s 
Public Investment Fund (PIF) into the largest SWF brought the topic once more to the 
headlines. In fact, today we find SWFs involved in many global events. The Volkswagen 
emissions scandal is applicable: Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)—
under a renewed effort to act as a responsible shareholder—is suing the German carmaker for 
wrongdoing and specifically addressing the poor corporate governance of the firm. 
Simultaneously, Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), another SWF and third largest 
shareholder of Volkswagen, is losing US$3.3 billion of the value of its stock in Volkswagen, 
due to the emissions scandal. This illustrates how SWFs have come out of the shadows to the 
main stage of corporate governance global cases.  
Only a decade ago, SWFs were banned from investing in Western “strategic assets” such as 
ports, oil companies and defense industry. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, SWF 
presence took a different turn. Today, SWFs are not only the owners of Heathrow, the busiest 
passenger airport in Europe or the sponsors of Real Madrid Football Club, the current 
UEFA’s Champions League champion (Real Madrid is supported by Emirates Airlines and 
International Petroleum Investment Company, IPIC, from Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
respectively) but they are players with key strategic roles in some of the largest international 
business deals.  
Another interesting case is the ride-hailing industry in Asia. Uber, the industry leader based 
in San Francisco and valued at US$63 billion (as of May 2016), is supported by Qatar and 
recently by Saudi Arabia (they invested through PIF more than US$3.5 billion in the 
privately held company). Conversely, SWFs from Singapore, and China are supporting 
Uber’s local rivals in India, Singapore and China. Hence, SWFs are also betting and 
competing in disruptive industries and startups. With generally long-term horizons, SWFs are 
equipped to invest in startups today and reap the profits of these future market champions.  
 67 
These two recent examples illustrate the changes in the perception of SWFs by target 
companies and countries. In sum, they also reflect a transformation in the nature of this 
heterogeneous group. SWFs, as organizations, evolve over time, and become more 
sophisticated and expand their investment activities to new industrial sectors and territories.  
In this chapter, we analyze these recent strategic changes through the SWF investments in 
Spain. The case of Spain is relevant because SWFs before and after the financial crisis align 
with SWFs’ long-term objectives. In fact, during the worst part of the financial crisis, Spain 
became the main investment destination of SWFs within the European Union, ahead of the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France (Santiso, 2012). This foreign location choice 
exemplified many SWFs’ goals of capturing value for the long run instead of looking for 
short-term returns. While this holds for some SWFs such as IPIC or QIA, some SWFs such 
as GPFG (from Norway) chose to divest from Spanish public and private debt during those 
years. This shows that the SWF landscape is complex as it encompasses an heterogeneous 
group of organizations.   
This chapter begins discussing the specific economic conditions of Spain that have attracted 
the investments of SWFs: the economic crisis, the linkages of Spanish multinational 
companies with Latin America, the internationalization of equity and the financial sector 
reform. Then, we analyze four strategic governance types followed by SWFs when investing 
in Spain: corporate governance supervision, in-house capabilities enhancement, international 
recognition and developmental and learning goals. We examine these four strategic 
governance approaches through four different SWFs investing in Spain: Norway’s GPFG, 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and the Oman’s 
State General Reserve Fund (SGRF). The deal closed by the SGRF establishes the de facto 
first Spanish co-investment SWF.  We conclude by proposing four areas of fruitful future 
research.  
3.3. THE SPANISH ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Spain is the fifth largest economy in the Eurozone and twelfth in the world (International 
Monetary Fund, 2016). The country relies on four economic pillars for economic growth: 
food and beverage (represent 13% of GDP), real estate (12%), construction (12%), and 
tourism (11%) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2016). Among its strengths, Spain has 
world-class infrastructure, high life expectancy and high quality management schools. 
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 Conversely, its labor market and tax system inefficiencies, the challenges of starting a 
business and the poor quality of education persist as major weaknesses.  
Spain recent economic events are marked by the burst of the real estate bubble and 
consequent credit crunch. Spain experienced its golden years from 1998 to 2007. It grew 
faster than any other large European economy, except Ireland, at an average annual GDP 
growth of 3.9%, doubling the growth rate of Germany and France during this period 
(International Monetary Forum, 2016). Yet, this growth was not evenly distributed and the 
Spanish economy became extremely dependent on the housing sector. When the global 
financial crisis started in the United States, the European housing markets suffered a trickle-
down effect. In 2007, Spain was constructing more residential real estate than Germany, 
France, and Italy combined. The housing dependency was accompanied by poor corporate 
governance and political ties in regional saving banks that were building dangerous 
speculative developments. Additionally, low interest rates fueled investment in real estate by 
foreign banks and financial institutions from the Eurozone. The real estate bubble collapsed 
in 2008, provoking a strong credit crunch (Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez, & Ruano, 2013). Since 
then, property prices have halved, unemployment rates reached historic records of 26.1% and 
the economy was forced to painfully adjust in real terms. Although the GDP recovered to 
2008 levels six years later, the International Monetary Fund (2016) estimates the 
unemployment rates will not be back to pre-crisis levels (15%) until 2020—far from low 
rates of 8.2% in 2007. In conclusion, both the weak governance in saving banks and political 
interference are important factors leading to the financial crisis in Spain. These two factors 
led to an enormous investment in real estate by the financial sector, which plummeted when 
the real estate bubble burst.  
However, the most recent economic data shows once again that Spain is growing faster than 
the euro block. Its economy has grown at an annual pace of 1.2% and 3.2%, in 2014 and 
2015 respectively, since the worst of the crisis in 2013 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
2016). For some economists, the main reason behind the recovery is the Spain’s export 
industry, fueled by a steady fall in unit labor costs and the collapse of domestic demand. 
Other economists point to the bailout package from the European Union in 2012 as a main 
explanation for the current growth (The Economist, 2015). Regardless, while the “flow” is 
upward looking, the “stock” of unemployment will take years to be cleared.  
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Another key factor to understand the current state of the Spanish economy is that its 
multinational companies have solid ties with Latin America. In the early 90s, Spanish MNEs 
made a strong bet on the Latin American markets and expanded rapidly in banking, 
infrastructure, oil, telecommunications and engineering. In terms of the stock of investments, 
Spain is the second largest investor in the region after the United States The Spanish MNEs 
have benefited from this exposure to Latin America. It helped to ease the difficulties when 
domestic demand contracted substantially. This special feature of the Spanish MNEs, 
frequently known as Euro-Latinas, is a characteristic that makes Spain attractive for 
institutional investors, including SWFs.  
Spain has received a solid flow of foreign direct investments since 2013 as a result of an 
improved economic environment, its strong Latin American connections and its more stable 
institutional context in the financial sector mean. In the period from January 2014 to June 
2015, Spain received more than €4.6 billion in SWF direct investments (Capapé, 2015). The 
interest shown by SWFs in the Spanish economy and its companies follows a double logic. 
First, after years of severe economic crisis, Spain’s GDP rates are growing above the 
European Union’s average. Second, Spanish companies have strong ties with the emerging 
and growing region of Latin America. Thus, SWFs investments in Spanish Euro-Latin 
companies get exposure to fast growth rates in emerging markets in a low-risk institutional 
environment. Investing in Spanish companies means reaping yields in emerging economies 
(Colombia, Peru, or Mexico), while operating in a safer and well-regulated institutional 
environment.  
Still, beyond economic recovery and Latin American connected multinationals, there are two 
other specific underlying reasons which might also account for the current interest of 
institutional investors in the Spanish economy: a new openness to foreign shareholders and 
the 2012 financial reform. Both are discussed in more detail below. 
3.3.1. Openness to foreign shareholders 
SWFs have taken advantage of the Spanish multinational corporations’ opening up process 
since 2005, revealing their significant investment capacity. In 2006, foreign investors 
controlled 33% of listed equities, yet by the end of 2014, this figure had grown 10 points to 
43%. In the years 2013 and 2014, the pace of net stock investments has accelerated with net 
inflows above €7 billion per year. A group of institutional investors, which includes several 
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 SWFs, leads this trend. Almost 30% of foreign portfolio investments in Spain come from 
institutional investors. Their investments in the IBEX35 companies, the reference stock index 
representing the largest 35 Spanish stocks, totaled €113 billion.  
Among these investors, Norway’s SWF leads the ranking with €7.7 billion invested in 32 
stocks, followed by Vanguard, Blackrock, and Lyxor (Table 3.1). The fifth largest investor is 
again a SWF, QIA from Qatar, with a single investment in Iberdrola (a Spanish utility 
company), valued above €3.5 billion. This concentrated investment style contrasts 
substantially with the rest of the asset managers’ leading foreign investments in Spain, most 
of which invest in about 30 different stocks. 
Iberdrola, the fourth largest company by market capitalization in which QIA controls 9.6%, is 
an illustrative example of the high shareholding escalation in the largest Spanish companies. 
Specifically, it shows the growing internationalization of their shareholders. At the onset of 
the 2008 financial crisis, all significant Iberdrola stakes (above 5% of shares) were in the 
hands of Spanish institutional investors, which totaled 25% of all shares. By 2012, following 
the entrance of QIA, domestic interests had halved, with the percentage falling to 16%, and 
bottoming to 7.5% in 2014. In parallel with this, holdings of foreign entities rose, among 
them QIA and other international investment funds. In 2009, not a single foreign investor had 
controlling stakes. In 2012, QIA, Blackrock and Société Générale were close to holding 15% 
of all shares; and, by the end of 2014, the majority of shares of significant holders were 
foreign-owned.  
In a sense, one could say that while the decade of the 2000s was characterized by the 
internationalization of revenues for many Spanish multinationals, the 2010s appear to be the 
decade of the internationalization of capital. SWFs are not missing out on the opportunity to 
enter into the fifth largest economy of the Eurozone.  
3.3.2. Financial sector reform in Spain: divestments and opportunities  
The financial crisis acted as an engine fostering the Spanish equity internationalization. It 
was precisely the reshaping of the banking sector, and in particular the saving banks (or so 
called cajas) that followed the global crisis, which created a substantial shakeup and opened 
up investment opportunities to foreign investors.  
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Following the recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund, European Central 
Bank and the European Commission in the memorandum of agreement signed in 2012, 
Spanish authorities were encouraged to recapitalize and restructure the country’s banking 
system. One of the decisions that followed implied a divestment program for the financial 
institutions owned by the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FORB, the Spanish program 
initiated in June 2009 to provide cash assistance in distressed banks). Banks and saving banks 
began to sell their shares in industrial companies, which opened the door of share capital to 
new investors, including foreign players. In Iberdrola, for example, Société Générale and 
Blackrock acquired stronger holding positions, while Bankia, a large caja that received €22 
billion from FORB, sold its 5% shares interest. Other Spanish companies followed a similar 
path by selling banking shares, thereby opening up opportunities for foreign capital 
ownership investment. 
For instance, Spanish Deoleo, the world’s largest olive oil producing company, was exposed 
to these divestments. Bankia and BMN (another saving bank) sold their 30% interest to CVC, 
a London-based private equity. Following a comprehensive strategy to foster the Italian food 
and beverage industry, the Italian SWF, Fondo Strategico Italiano (FSI), manifested its 
interest in Deoleo, although the stake was eventually acquired by CVC, an option the Spanish 
government preferred to the Italian public investor. This case shows the potential conflicts of 
interest that emerge when public investors try to acquire strategic assets in a given country, 
especially if the target company has the state as a shareholder.  
Similarly, Globalvia, an infrastructure company half owned by Spanish saving bank, Bankia, 
attracted the interest of another SWF. In this case, Malaysia’s Khazanah negotiated with the 
saving bank to acquire Globalvia. They agreed to close the transaction on €420 million. 
However, in the last minute, the former creditors exercised their preferential purchase right 
and acquired the infrastructure company5.  
It is important to stress how the divestment process pursued by Bankia and other Spanish 
cajas after the financial sector reform has attracted a significant amount of institutional 
investors—including two sovereign wealth funds from Italy and Malaysia—in such diverse 
sectors as real estate, infrastructure, engineering, and insurance (Table 3.2). 
5  More details in the press release made by Bankia https://www.bankia.com/en/communication/in-the-
news/press-releases/bankia-and-fcc-sell-globalvia-to-the-funds-uss-optrust-and-pggm-which-are-exercising-
their-preferential-purchase-right.html. Accessed August 15, 2015. 
 72 
                                                 
  
3.4. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN SPAIN: FOUR STRATEGIC 
GOVERNANCE TYPES 
 
In a short period of time, Spain has witnessed the entrance of a heterogeneous group of SWFs 
that have either invested in the country or acquired Spanish-owned assets abroad. As detailed 
above, although each SWF has different goals and backgrounds, the recent openness to 
foreign shareholders, the financial sector reforms, a partial economic recovery and the 
exposure of Spanish companies to Latin American markets explain the growing presence of 
SWFs in Spain, and make the country an excellent field laboratory to examine SWF 
investment strategies.  
Aguilera, Capapé and Santiso (2016) developed a typology to analyze SWF activities. They 
categorized SWFs along two main dimensions: risk strategy (measured as the share of their 
portfolio invested in private equities) and investment purpose (whether the SWF investments 
are aligned with a broader state’s geo-economic and development strategy). Figure 3.1 
identifies the resulting four strategic governance types: responsible investments, enhanced in-
house capabilities, legitimacy seeking, and learning through co-investments. Although for 
any given SWF, these two dimensions may overlap and change over time, it is possible to 
differentiate SWFs according to this 2x2 matrix. It provides a useful strategic governance 
framework for explaining the investments made by SWFs in Spain.   
The rest of this section is divided into four parts that discuss SWF case studies and provide 
evidence of these four distinct strategic governance types. We begin with Norway and the 
role its SWF has played in improving the corporate governance of Spanish companies. 
Second, we discuss how a SWF can also develop its own corporate governance in order to 
embrace more direct, complex transactions: as in the case of Kuwait and its enhanced in-
house capabilities. Third, we focus on Qatar and its comprehensive strategy that deploys 
different state-controlled mechanisms in order to garner an enhanced international reputation 
and legitimacy. Lastly, we review the case of the new domestic co-investment SWF jointly 
established by Spain and Oman’s State General Reserve Fund, comparing it to other similar 
vehicles that had established in Europe in recent years.  
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3.4.1. Norway as the responsible investor 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global6 (GPFG) is the world’s largest sovereign wealth 
fund with over US$850 billion assets under management (as of December 2015). According 
to our organizing framework (Figure 3.1), GPFG is a financial investor as its main goal is to 
generate “high returns and safeguard wealth for future generations” (Norges Bank Investment 
Management, 2015). Also, GPFG’s low risk implies that it invests heavily in public (listed) 
markets and only three percent in real estate (private markets). Thus, we classify GPFG in 
quadrant 1 (Figure 3.1). GPFG tries to protect the value of its listed companies by exercising 
an active shareholder role with the goal of improving the corporate governance of its 
investees. It has a positive impact on Spanish multinational companies.  
Norway is the world’s third largest natural gas exporter. This enormous offshore wealth, 
although limited, is being transferred gradually into long-term financial wealth, as a means of 
obtaining inter-generational justice so that future generations may benefit from today’s 
wealth. Only recently GPFG took a radical move by deciding that it would play an active role 
as a shareholder. Precisely, the Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM)—the 
investment unit of Norway’s central bank that is in charge of the GPFG—has led the 
initiative to pursue higher governance standards in the companies it has increased its 
participation. In Europe, the potential impact of this shareholder engagement is crucial 
because GPFG owns about 2.5% of all stocks traded in the continent. 
GPFG’s renewed interest in active ownership responds to three key assumptions on the 
effects of good governance in companies: it leads companies to attain profitability, ensures 
shareholder rights protection, and guarantees an equitable distribution of profits. Along with 
improved corporate governance, GPFG encourages companies to enhance their social and 
environmental standards. In spite of this, the causal relationship between better governance 
and more profitable companies is an ongoing scholarly debate (Siddiqui, 2015). In particular, 
GPFG considers six strategic focus areas for its active ownership activities: equal treatment 
of shareholders, shareholder influence and board accountability, well-functioning, legitimate 
and efficient markets, children’s rights, climate change risk management, and water 
management.  
6 The Fund is called the Government Pension Fund Global. Despite using the term “pension” in the name of the 
Fund, it is not a public pension fund. The fund has no formal pension liabilities. The name reflects the goal of 
the fund of saving government resources to finance an expected increase in future public pension costs. 
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 NBIM has established these new goals for the GPFG, and is already taking measures to 
guarantee that the responsible investment principles are implemented through the 
appointment of a corporate governance advisory board, which is composed of three corporate 
governance experts. GPFG’s goal is to safeguard and increase the value of its investments in 
more than 9,000 companies worldwide. By the end of 2015, the fund's holdings have 
expanded to 78 countries and 51 currencies. Thus, GPFG has claimed that voting at the 
annual general meeting (AGM) is one of their most important tools in exercising its rights as 
shareholder. In 2015, GPFG voted in 11,562 AGMs and held meetings with 3,250 
companies.  
GPFG follows a “name and shame” strategy—once used by CalPERS (California Public 
Employees' Retirement System, a large public pension fund)—and publishes the list of 
companies excluded from the fund’s investment portfolio after hearing the recommendations 
from the Council of Ethics (appointed by the Ministry of Finance). Since the establishment of 
the fund, the Ministry of Finance had responsibility for making these final decisions; yet, 
recently, the central bank has taken this role in an attempt to generate more politically 
independent decisions. In August 2015, the central bank excluded four companies due to 
severe environmental damage: the Korean Daewoo International Corporation, a 
conglomerate, and also its parent company, the steel-maker POSCO; and two of the 
Malaysia’s leading conglomerates, IJM Corporation and Genting Corp. These companies 
were converting tropical forest into palm oil plantations in Indonesia. 
GPFG’s responsible investment strategy includes an active selection of sustainable 
companies. That is, not only does the Council of Ethics announces the list of companies 
excluded from the investment portfolio following their ethical guidelines (i.e., tobacco, 
weapons, human rights violations, etc.), it also recommends companies in which to invest. In 
this sense, for example, pulp and paper companies, which are strongly linked to water 
resources and specifically to forest conservation, are of great interest to a responsible 
investor. This “long-term investment” style seeks to generate an imitative process at the local 
or regional level, and bias the investment strategies followed by other institutional investors 
(Vasudeva, 2013). 
Another measure taken by GPFG is to reinforce its commitment to enhancing the corporate 
governance of its investee portfolio companies by releasing its voting intentions ahead of 
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AGMs. This tactic has been used in three large companies where GPFG has ownership 
participation: BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and AES Corporation. The former two were among the 
fund’s top ten largest equity holdings as of third quarter 2015. 
The shareholder activism demonstrated by GPFG in demanding higher standards of corporate 
governance reflects two main facts: the benefits of the internationalization of the shareholder 
base for the Spanish economy, and the potential impact of SWFs in leading this new trend.  
3.4.1.1. GPFG investments in Spain 
Foreign institutional investors can play a key role as major influential shareholders. In Spain, 
with the growth of foreign institutional investors’ stakes in recent years, the potential conflict 
of interest between managers and key shareholders has grown accordingly. In many large 
companies, between 20-40% of shareholder opposed management proposals, whereas a few 
years ago the opposition was minimal. Fund managers such as Blackrock, Vanguard and 
Amundi present in large Spanish listed multinationals voted against resolutions and forced 
the board to better explain to shareholders’ decisions they propose for the AGM’s approval.  
By the end of 2015, GPFG had investments in 80 Spanish listed companies worth US$8.9 
billion; the majority of investments were in banking and utilities (see Table 3.3 for top ten 
holdings in Spain). 
If we dig further into the analysis of Norway’s investments in Spain, we identify some 
interesting trends. Table 3.4 shows the list of Spanish companies in which GPFG keeps a 
larger controlling vote ability. It is remarkable that three of the top five companies belong to 
the paper/pulp industry. This is no coincidence as these kind of investments are aligned with 
the responsible investment global strategy pursued by the Norwegian fund. GPFG invests in 
more than 9,000 listed companies, but when this list of corporations is ordered according to 
the voting control GPFG exercises, it appears that three among the top ten companies are also 
forest and paper-related companies: The Irish Smurfit-Kappa, the Swedish Svenska Cellulosa 
and the Finnish UPM-Kymmene (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2015). 
Also, in parallel to this particular responsible investment style that gives preference to 
companies with better social and sustainability standards, the fund actively votes in the 
AGMs of Spanish listed companies. For example, in 2014, GPFG voted in 70 Spanish listed 
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 companies. If we look at the top 10 holdings, they tended to agree on almost every 
proposition made by the board to be discussed at the AGM. The only outlier was Ferrovial, a 
transport and infrastructure company, where GPFG opposed six board proposals regarding 
general meetings regulations, showing a level of disagreement close to 25% (see Table 3.5). 
Interestingly however, when we look at the bottom 10 holdings, the disagreement increases. 
For example, in the case of Codere, a gambling company, the GPFG voted against the 
reelection of four directors, including the Chairman and CEO.  A similar level of 
disagreement was found in the case of Azkoyen, a vending business, where the fund opposed 
several propositions on the regulation of the AGMs and board of directors.  
This discrepancy in voting between top and bottom companies brings up an important issue 
thus far unexplored. GPFG agrees more with management in companies which they own 
larger stakes. On average, it tends to agree on 97% of all management proposals made during 
the AGMs in the largest 10 holdings. This average goes down to 91% when in the smallest 
holdings of GPFG in Spain. This puzzle adds to the unresolved theoretical connection 
between governance and performance. If GPFG is looking primarily for their portfolio 
returns, it would focus on the most well performing companies to achieve its purpose. Are 
well-performing companies better governed than their poorly performing peers? Or do well-
governed companies obtain higher returns than poorly managed companies?  
From an empirical point of view, the conundrum is not easy to resolve: Should we consider 
that the fund improves the governance of the companies in which they invest? Or simply that 
they self-select into companies that are better governed and then deploy more capital into 
them? The answer falls beyond the scope of this chapter. We uncover that they tend to agree 
more with the companies in which they invest more, and tend to disagree more with the 
companies where they invest less. No causal relationship can be established, and is an open 
question to be further explored by governance scholars.  
The goal of GPFG to influence the governance of its portfolio companies, stands clear: GPFG 
argues that the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board should be separated, and so 
they vote against the reelection of directors holding both positions. In the United States, 
GPFG supported five shareholder proposals for the separation of the roles of CEO and 
Chairman at five banks. They consistently followed the same strategy in Spain, i.e., voting 
against the reelection of the CEO and Chairman of Iberdrola and Barón de Ley. 
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Paradoxically, GPFG, based on this voting principle, was against the reelection of Iberdrola’s 
Sánchez-Galán, who was selected by “Institutional Investor” as the best European CEO in 
2015.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that none of GPFG’s votes against the reelection or appointment of 
directors had a real impact. All the reelections proposed by the management, in which GPFG 
voted against, received sufficient support, and the proposals were ultimately approved. 
Hence, it is important to explore why GPFG does not have a greater capacity to influence 
other stakeholders. More generally, the question of GPFG’s ability to persuade both the 
management and other institutional shareholders to follow on their recommendations for the 
long-term remains unresolved. One explanation is that active ownership is not solely reduced 
to voting and proposals at AGMs. GPFG engages directly with companies’ boards and senior 
management, through investor meetings or public events. Also, in private conversations 
GPFG encourages portfolio companies to fulfill their governance expectations, particularly in 
companies where GPFG owns large holdings or in companies which operate in high-risk 
sectors (in terms of human rights, environmental issues, etc.). All these shareholder 
engagement tactics remain invisible and oftentimes the proposals in AGMs—that can be 
codified—are, in fact, the last resort option only after having had multiple private 
conversations with the company.  
GPFG is one of the most influential shareholders in Spain. It is encouraging companies to 
improve their corporate governance standards by actively voting in AGMs. Also, as a 
responsible investor with investments in diversified global listed equities, GPFG tries to 
influence others to invest in sustainable companies. GPFG can help Spanish multinationals to 
avoid the so-called “crony capitalism”, as it acts as a corporate governance watchdog. 
3.4.2. The case of Kuwait and the search for in-house capabilities 
Established in 1953, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) is one of the oldest SWFs. A 
reputed investor with an in-house investment team, KIA’s mission is to achieve a long term 
investment return. As such, KIA is classified among the “financial SWFs” in the y-axis of our 
organizing matrix (Figure 3.1). Also, given the renewed interest of KIA in infrastructure 
(typically a private market), we categorize KIA in quadrant 2. Thus, we analyze how a new 
unit, established by KIA to invest in infrastructure, is acquiring assets in Spain and how the 
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 organizational change may foster and improve investment returns by enhancing in-house 
capabilities. 
Kuwait has returned to Spain. More than twenty-five years ago, Kuwait Investment Office 
(KIO) (the KIA’s old London-based subsidiary) faced an important drawback to its 
operations in Spain. In the late 1980s, after several financial scandals and the largest 
bankruptcy case by that time in the Spanish economy, KIO abandoned the investments and 
operations in Spain, leaving behind two iconic towers in the north of Madrid (still today 
known unofficially as the KIO towers).  
Many things have changed over the last twenty-five years in both the Spanish and Kuwait 
economies. Most notably, on one hand, KIA’s enhanced professionalization has allowed 
Kuwait to invest back in Spain, and on the other hand, Spain is equipped with a better and 
stronger regulation which helps to attract foreign investors such as KIA to the infrastructure 
sector, where Spain has become a global leader. Towards KIA’s professionalization is Wren 
House Infrastructure (WHI). This is KIA’s wholly-owned infrastructure arm, established in 
2013. WHI is led by an experienced Kuwaiti national, formerly vice president at Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch in London. KIA’s professionalization has come using two channels: 
organizational change and workforce specialization. By establishing WHI, KIA made an 
organizational change which allow it to concentrate its interests in infrastructure in a 
specialized unit. This change helps KIA to better learn how to invest and co-invest in this 
complex and challenging asset class. Consequently, WHI is able to attract global specialized 
talent and to establish training specific programs to improve in-house capabilities. 
As a result of these changes, KIA is now participating in some of the most important 
infrastructure deals globally, either investing alone or as co-investor. Along with Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan, the Canadian active pension fund, WHI is jointly bidding for a series 
of infrastructure projects, including power deals in Australia, oil storage in the Netherlands, 
and the London City Airport in the United Kingdom. The agreement of WHI to jointly bid 
with the Ontario’s pension fund, a reputed partner internationally, explains KIA’s will to 
engage with the best and most competitive international players, learn from them, and have 
access to state-of-the-art global transactions.  
This international experience has helped WHI to enter into Spanish markets. There are two 
illustrative examples of WHI’s investments in Spain’s infrastructure sector. First, WHI 
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partnered with Macquarie, the largest Australian infrastructure player, to bid for E.ON, the 
German electric utility company. In December 2014, the partnership acquired all assets of 
E.ON in Spain and Portugal. Globally, it was the third largest infrastructure transaction with 
SWFs participation in 2014. WHI invested US$1 billion in the transaction. WHI, jointly with 
Macquarie, defeated the bid led by Morgan Stanley and the Spanish energy company Gas 
Natural, the largest distributor of natural gas in Latin America.  
Second, WHI acquired 25% of Global Power Generation, a fully-owned Gas Natural 
subsidiary dedicated to the global electricity generation business. It paid US$550 million in a 
solo investment to push the global expansion of the company, adding five Gigawatts in 
generation capacity in Latin America and Asia. As we explained above, this transaction 
strongly resembles the strategy followed by Asian and Gulf SWFs in Spain: to bet in Spanish 
multinationals with potential to harvest returns from Latin America. 
These two investment examples of WHI in Spain reflect well a new trend within the SWF 
industry in aiming to bring global talent to SWF workforce. KIA needs more experienced 
managers to deploy capital efficiently in the complex universe of global infrastructure 
investments. KIA, through WHI, tries to reinforce its in-house capabilities, thus moves from 
our quadrant 1 to quadrant 2 (see Figure 3.1). 
The KIA example illustrates well this pattern of human capital development. As studied by 
Bachher, Dixon and Monk (2016), there are new “frontiers of finance” either in Kuala 
Lumpur, Dubai, Beijing or Kuwait City, as in this case. In all these locations, SWFs have 
popped up, competing with established financial hubs like New York, London or Tokyo. In 
recent years, the financial crisis has forced institutional investors to drop external managers 
and be creative, which included the establishment of in-house investment teams. 
Consequently, SWFs have improved human resource strategies, designed competitive 
compensation schemes and allowed for location flexibility. It is not unusual for SWFs to 
scout for investment managers in the last years, and KIA is not an exception. 
So far, SWFs have been able to attract young investment managers due to the fact that their 
wage gap is smaller between private and public sector at early career stages and SWFs are 
likely to offer greater experience opportunities (Bachher, Dixon & Monk, 2016). SWFs have 
also fared well in the efforts to attract mature employees that want a change from long-life 
stressful careers developed in London or New York. Yet, high and rocketing salaries of the 
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 median career investment managers have remained out of the scope of SWFs. Thus, location 
and salaries are the main difficulties faced by SWFs when attracting global talent (Bachher, 
Dixon & Monk, 2016).  
One way to overcome this hurdle has been the establishment of foreign offices (Al-Kharusi, 
Dixon, & Monk, 2014), so that early and mid-career investment managers can work remotely 
from international financial hubs. Apart from hiring talent, the reasons for setting new 
international offices reflect the interest of SWFs to attract professionals with expertise in 
specific niche markets, typically startups, private equity, and real estate. Moreover, 
international offices allow for better monitoring of the partnerships SWFs establish with local 
investment companies (Aguilera, Capapé, & Santiso, 2016). In the case of KIA, in 1965 it 
established the first ever SWF’s overseas office in London. It allowed KIA to garner 
reputation as responsible and prudent long-term investor. 
However, we observe different approaches in human resources looking at the headcount of 
SWFs. Table 3.6 shows the most and least labor-intensive SWFs. We have divided the total 
assets under management of each fund by the number of employees. The average employee 
manages US$970 million, with this figure ranging from a minimum of US$70 million per 
Mubadala’s investment professionals to the US$3.6 billion managed per employee in the 
Investment Corporation of Dubai. What is not surprising is that the table is topped by the 
most active SWFs, being those who engage in daily activities of their portfolio companies 
like Mubadala, Khazanah and IPIC. The reason why Temasek and GIC, both from Singapore, 
belong also to most labor-intensive SWFs is that they are making a strong bet on venture 
capital and lead the group of SWFs that can be classified as sovereign venture funds (Santiso, 
2015). Investing in venture capital requires specialized teams, new operational units and 
developing new investment capabilities. It implies that both Temasek and GIC improved in-
house capabilities by hiring and training specialized talent as they entered into new asset 
classes, as it was the case of KIA when it decided to invest in infrastructure. Temasek, on its 
part, is also a good example of a “sovereign holding fund” because it owns relevant stakes in 
national government-linked companies, which consume a large amount of resources to 
effectively monitor them. 
On the contrary, we find among the least labor-intensive SWFs those more passive investors 
such as the GPFG (Kotter & Lel, 2011). Kuwait, Qatar and CIC are also classified as low 
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labor-intensive close to the bottom but due to different reasons. In the case of GPFG, 
headcount will increase as their investment strategies get more complicated (real estate, direct 
investments). For WHI, we foresee a rise in the headcount as the frequency and geographic 
scope of deals increase.  
In fact, labor-intensive funds may suggest more active investment roles. Among them we find 
SWFs with a hands-on approach (Mubadala, IPIC) and those who pick smaller stakes, thus 
actively monitoring third-party investment agreements (Khazanha, ADIA) or playing as 
venture capitalists (Temasek, GIC), respectively. On its part, less labor-intensive funds 
follow passive roles in two directions: either they invest in fewer companies in which they 
own large stakes (QIA, KIA) or invest passively in multiple companies taking small stakes 
(GPFG).  
In conclusion, KIA is a sophisticated investor with professional in-house investment 
management teams. Recently it has established a new investment unit, WHI, which 
specializes in infrastructure. This organizational innovation has allowed KIA to attract talent 
and to increase in-house capabilities and brings KIA back to Spain with two major 
acquisitions. Undoubtedly, further Spanish companies would benefit from these sophisticated 
investors. In addition, the strong ties that the Spanish infrastructure global leaders have with 
Latin America will attract more sophisticated SWFs, and the pool of available capital for the 
expansion of Spanish companies will increase accordingly. 
3.4.3. Qatar in Spain: A Comprehensive Strategy 
Qatar Investment Authority is probably the world’s best-known SWF. QIA is regularly 
making headlines for its sound acquisitions in trophy assets in London, New York and 
Singapore.  
The strong links between the government and QIA goals help us to define QIA as a strategic 
investor according to our typology (y-axis in Figure 3.1). In fact, QIA defines itself as an 
“important building block of the Qatar National Vision 2030” and it embraces into global 
investments with the clear mission of “supporting the development of a competitive Qatari 
economy, facilitating economic diversification and developing local talent” (Qatar 
Investment Authority, 2016). If we consider x-axis, the ownership type, QIA invests in both 
private and listed equities. However, we consider that legitimacy and recognition are better 
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 understood through public investments rather than in private markets. Thus we classify QIA 
in quadrant 3, as a strategic investor in listed equities.  
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), through its investment arm Qatar Holding, executes an 
ambitious strategy to position the Gulf’s little and resource-rich state into the world map 
(Clark, Dixon, & Monk, 2013). To secure longer horizon state-goals, Qatar investments in 
Spain (conducted primarily through QIA or QIA’s subsidiaries) capture well a strategic 
governance dimension pursued by QIA and described in our organizing framework (Figure 
3.1): legitimacy. Indeed, QIA’s vision is to “be recognized as a world-class investment 
institution, and to become the preferred partner of choice for investors, financiers and other 
stakeholders”. 
QIA captures the prototypical legitimacy strategies as it adheres to a strong recognition 
mission and vision, in search of legitimacy through financial sound investments (largely in 
Europe). Investments made in the iconic W Hotel in Barcelona or London department store 
Harrods might be seen under the “trophy asset” lens. 
QIA is experiencing a period of strong governance transformations. It has changed its CEO 
twice in the last two years. Also, as a commodity-based SWFs, QIA is facing the pressure of 
lower commodity prices (both oil and natural gas), as well as diminished demand projections. 
Now we can observe a more global investment scope which departs from the strategy 
executed under the previous CEO when QIA made a strong European bet. QIA has hired 
senior bankers with expertise in both the United States and Asia (Kerr, 2015) and is already 
investing heavily in these regions. In September 2015, confirming this new trend, QIA 
opened an international office in New York City. 
QIA has been described as trophy asset hunter. From luxury hotels in London to offices in 
Singapore, startups in California or in Bangalore, QIA deploys an active strategy to position 
and legitimate the country internationally. In 2014, QIA was the world’s fourth most active 
SWF (ESADE, 2014). In terms of the average value of deals, it ranked third only after 
Chinese National Social Security Fund and UAE Mubadala. QIA has invested an average 
US$850 million per deal (Table 3.7).  
QIA’s investments in Spain reflect well one of the main objective pursued by the government 
of Qatar so far: international recognition (legitimacy), and this is present through numerous 
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examples (Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, Skancke, & Sung, 2013; Balding, 2012). QIA tracks this 
goal using two inter-related strategies: real estate investments (with special focus on hotels 
and iconic office buildings) and the spread of Qatar Airways brand in Spain through the FC 
Barcelona sponsorship. The strategic move connecting football and tourism brings the 
opportunity to accomplish its main goal: recognition. QIA investments in Spain reflect 
another important fact: The importance of long term relationships to develop trust, the main 
ingredient and catalyzer for global M&A deals (Jiang, Chua, Kotabe, & Murray, 2011). 
QIA’s investments in football are not made solely to acquire brand recognition (international 
legitimacy) but also to establish close relationships with local and regional leaders which 
would facilitate the entry into other markets (oftentimes regulated). To create trustworthy 
relationships with local partners, help to identify new investment opportunities and to 
develop smarter and more efficient business network.   
Since 2011, Barcelona has founded strong ties with Qatar. Beyond the hotel industry, the 
linkage between Qatar and the Mediterranean city was football. Indeed, FC Barcelona, under 
a very difficult financial situation, agreed to shirt advertising for the first time in its hundred-
year history. It signed a five-year agreement with the Qatar Foundation: €30 million per 
season for the cash-constrained football club. Qatar, which aims to host the 2022 World Cup 
in the wake of the recent scandal surrounding FIFA, chose FC Barcelona as one of their most 
important crests for landing in Europe. FC Barcelona is one of the continent's leading clubs, 
and its celebrated coach, Josep Guardiola, who had played two seasons in Qatar, became the 
ambassador for Qatar in its candidacy for the 2022 World Cup. 
In 2013, Qatar decided to exploit the strategic factor that Spain’s tourism market represents 
for the airline and replaced the Qatar Foundation logo with that of Qatar Airways, which is 
now displayed on the front of the shirt. This decision was made on the same financial 
conditions. Qatar Airways is a state-owned entity fully controlled by Qatar Investment 
Authority. 
The coordinated investment capacity displayed by QIA extends to other public and private 
Qatari groups. QIA’s investments in Spain shows the importance of a comprehensive strategy 
which includes various public entities. This kind of strategy which uses the diverse state 
investment resources in a coordinated manner is deeply rooted on the basis of the new forms 
of state capitalism (Aguilera, Capapé & Santiso, 2016).  
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 In parallel to football, airlines-related investments and sponsorships, Qatar also invested 
€78.5 million in acquiring Barcelona's Hotel Renaissance through another fund linked to the 
Qatari armed forces. In 2012, Qatari Diar, the real estate arm of QIA, acquired Port Tarraco, 
Tarragona's luxury yacht marina, for a reported price of €64 million. QIA expanded its 
Spanish reach beyond Barcelona when QIA’s hotel investment arm, Katara Hospitality 
acquired a European hotel portfolio to InterContinental Hotel Group (IHG) in five cities, 
including Madrid. Katara would pay up to €60 million for IHG Madrid hotel to the Qatari 
group Ghanim Bin Saad & Sons Group Holdings (GSSG).  
However, the best known transaction in the Spanish hotel sector happened in 2012, one year 
after Qatar signed its agreement with FC Barcelona. Qatar Holding acquired Barcelona’s 
Hotel W to a group of local shareholders for €200 million. The purchase of this flagship hotel 
in Barcelona, one of the most visited cities in the world, is well aligned with the 
“international recognition” strategy pursued by QIA.  
Qatar, using different state-owned vehicles, is betting in the Barcelona hotel sector, as well as 
improving Barcelona’s flight connections with the Middle East and into Asia. Barcelona is a 
priority destination for global tourists, with special attention paid to increasing middle-class 
tourists from Asia, mainly China, who are now among the tourists that spend the most in 
Spain. This all serves Qatar’s recognition goal. Similarly, Qatar Airways now advertises its 
daily connections to Doha, from Barcelona and Madrid, in order to increase flight traffic to 
the region and position Qatar as a new aerospace hub that connects Europe with Asia, in clear 
competition with neighbor UAE’s Emirates (Dubai) and Etihad (Abu Dhabi). New customers 
and increased connections for commercial, business, and leisure activities between Europe 
and Asia position the Middle East as a strategic hub location in the aerospace industry. In a 
fierce competition for travelers, these three state-owned airlines deploy close to US$300 
million yearly in the European football sector. All these sponsorship expenses support the 
goal of establishing a strong aerospace industry in the region, it helps to alleviate the 
dependency on oil-related revenue streams, thus diversifying the local economy. 
To conclude, Qatar displays in Spain a comprehensive strategy with a main goal: legitimacy 
by international recognition. QIA and QIA subsidiaries leverage on previous deals made by 
other Qatari public and private investment companies, showing how a coordinated action in 
Spain serves its legitimacy goals. The most emblematical assets acquired by QIA in Spain 
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portray a different image of the small country (Clark, Dixon & Monk, 2013). By investing in 
iconic buildings and establishing strong sponsorships, Qatar builds trust with local partners 
and increases its reputation internationally, ultimately allowing it to expand its legitimacy 
both at home and abroad. 
3.4.4. Long-term Learning: Oman-Spain Co-Investment Sovereign Wealth Fund  
In April 2015, the Oman’s State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) and a Spanish public-private 
company agreed to establish the first co-investment SWF in Spain. The new fund, still under 
development, will finance the international expansion of Spanish SMEs.  
SGRF is situated in quadrant four (Figure 3.1) of our organizing framework. According to the 
y-axis, SGRF is classified as a strategic investor due to the close linkages between the fund’s 
goals and those of the Sultanate of Oman. Specifically, in the mission statement, SGRF notes 
the fund will “invest strategically with a long-term time horizon” and most importantly SGRF 
will work “to attract global investments and expertise to Oman through is international 
network, and act as a catalyst in investing locally” (State General Reserve Fund, 2014). The 
latter is in line with the establishment of the co-investment fund while the former describes 
its strategic mission. Looking at x-axis, the ownership type, we consider SGRF as a “private 
market” owner given that the fund focuses on small and medium enterprises, which equities 
are generally not listed in Spain. Thus, SGRF and the resulting co-investment fund will invest 
strategically to serve the interests of both the Sultanate of Oman and the Spanish government.  
This newly established SWF is part of a broader trend of European co-investment funds. In 
this section, we will review the five existing cases of co-investment funds and then focus our 
attention on the case between Spain and Oman. 
3.4.4.1. The European Co-Investment Funds 
There is a strong trend amongst European governments to establish public vehicles with the 
purpose of co-investing with foreign SWFs. These new “co-investment SWFs” seek two 
goals. On the one hand, domestic public investors gain access to the large capital pool of 
Middle East or Chinese SWFs and channel it to domestic companies that are willing to go 
abroad and enter into new markets. On the other hand, large funds get access to local 
authorities of target countries, engage in better and stable relationships with European 
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 economies, and most importantly, open new channels for knowledge sharing. So far, this 
model has been developed in Russia, France, Italy, Ireland, Belgium and is now under 
development in Spain. These European countries set up small public investment units trying 
to attract foreign SWFs, from the Middle East or China. Both domestic and foreign SWFs are 
aligned in terms of long-term investment horizon and risk-return expectations. Yet, there are 
slight differences in the scope and goals of these European co-investment SWFs.  
Russia Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) is probably the best known example of this new class 
of co-investment SWF. RDIF is a US$10 billion state-owned fund established in 2011, which 
has catalyzed US$25 billion in investments in the Russian economy from private equity 
funds, SWFs, and strategic partners.  
Partners and co-investors who have already committed or invested with RDIF include China 
Investment Corporation, Korea Investment Corporation, Mubadala, or Kuwait Investment 
Authority. The list of co-investors has grown to 21 large, private or public qualified 
institutions (US$1 billion market capitalization or a minimum of US$1 billion of assets under 
management is required), as well as other SWFs and leading financial services companies 
from India, Egypt, and Turkey.  
The main criticism that some of these vehicles receive is that “they don’t deliver”. Despite 
the media attention and coverage during the day of signing the co-investment agreements, 
operations never end up being implemented. In contrast, other co-investment funds adopt 
ambitious strategies and deliver, such as the Russia-China Investment Fund, which already 
has stakes in RFP Group (Russia’s second largest wood processing company), Magnit 
(Russia’s largest retailer), and Moscow Exchange (the largest exchange in Russia, the CIS, 
and Eastern Europe)7.  
In the case of France, the CDC International Capital (CDCIC), fully-owned by the Caisse des 
Dépôts Group –the largest public investor in France-, has been established in 2014 with the 
goal of arranging new investment agreements with foreign SWFs and other institutional 
investors to support the internationalization of French companies. CDCIC has inherited, from 
7 Full details of the RCIF’s portfolio at http://rcif.com/portfolio-companies.htm. Accessed September 8, 2015. 
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a pre-existing public vehicle, three agreements with Qatar Holding, Mubadala, and the 
RDIF8.  
Italy established by law the Fondo Strategico Italiano (FSI) in 2011, and is looking to attract 
SWFs to foster Italian companies’ internationalization. In March 2013, FSI established a 
50|50 joint venture with Qatar Holding, named IQ Made in Italy Investment Company 
(IQMIIC) to support Italian companies in key sectors such as furniture and design, tourism, 
food, or brands (luxury goods). Surprisingly, this joint-venture has been absorbed as part of 
the assets under management of the FSI Investimenti, an investment company partially 
owned by Kuwait Investment Authority (23%), worth US$2.2 billion, and established in July 
2014. This Italian situation represents a unique case in the sphere of Co-Investment SWFs. 
With the help of Kuwait, Italy manages a bulk of assets that includes the Qatari-Italian joint-
venture.  
Other cases include the recent agreement between China Investment Corporation and the 
“renewed” Ireland’s SWF (Ireland Strategic Investment Fund) to set up a fund focused on 
fast growing Irish start-up technology companies that are willing to expand into China. On 
the other hand, in 2011, Belgium and China signed some of the oldest (and most unheard-of) 
investment agreements. CIC and the public Belgian Holdings SFPI set up a fund, investing in 
European middle-capitalization companies. The joint fund is focused on attracting Chinese 
investors to Europe, particularly to Belgium9.  
3.4.4.2. A new co-investment fund in Europe: The case of Spain 
Spain, aware of the experience of other European countries, used COFIDES—a public-
private vehicle supporting Spanish SMEs to go abroad—to sign an agreement with oil-rich 
Oman’s State General Reserve Fund and to set up a 50-50 fund with the purpose of the 
internationalization of Spanish companies. Each part will contribute €100m to create an 
initial joint fund of €200 million. The fund will focus on investments in building materials, 
food, infrastructure, energy, and tourism. This will allow Spanish companies to benefit from 
the new fund through their expansion to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and 
more generally East Africa or South and Southeast Asia. 
8 More information about CDCIC can be found at http://www.cdcicapital.fr/en/. Accessed September 8, 2015. 
9 SFPI’s described in http://www.sfpi-fpim.be/en/portfolio-its-own-behalf. Accessed September 8, 2015. 
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 The joint fund, which involves the creation of an asset management company, will be 
available to subsidiaries of Spanish companies with plans for international projection and 
intention to set up in Oman.  
This strategy would help Spanish companies to explore new markets. This is of particular 
interest for Spain because international destination markets have been heavily biased toward 
Latin America and European Union. In some other markets, such as China, Middle East or 
South-East Asia, the state plays a key role in the economic activity. To have a business 
partner that is state-owned, such as the SGRF, facilitates the access to markets and to relevant 
business partners. Specifically, SGRF has the mission to act as the catalyst to increase 
investments in Oman. Thus, Spanish companies would benefit from the joint fund if they 
decide to expand to Oman or the region.  
Oman, on its part, will get access to knowledge transfers from Spanish global construction 
and infrastructure leaders; this is especially important for Oman given the investment gap the 
country is facing to modernize transportations (road, rail or air) and build basic infrastructure. 
The agreement will help Oman to position itself as a platform connecting Europe, Asia and 
East Africa, as well as to increase its economic competitiveness with neighboring countries. 
The same logic applies to the tourism sector given Spain has many mature touristic 
companies. Spain received more than 60 million tourists in 2015 and it remains as the third 
most visited country after France and the United States. Spanish hotels, tour operators, 
reserve systems, etc., may bring new approaches to Oman’s economy, in need of innovation. 
Oman holds an important touristic potential, given its benign weather compared to its 
neighbors in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar. Other sectors of interest are agri-business (of 
key importance to a country with better arable conditions in the region) and engineering 
companies that would help the Sultanate to improve energy efficiency.  
All these learning goals position Oman’s SGRF and the newly established joint fund in the 
fourth quadrant in Figure 3.1, where SWFs pursue strategic international alliances, typically 
through joint-ventures. These relationships allow shared decision-making processes and 
access to expertise, which will ultimately result in high learning opportunities from an 
investment, geographic and industrial point of view.  
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This agreement with Oman’s SGRF is the first of a series that Spain could continue with 
Qatar. The Secretary of Trade has already initiated conversations with QIA to establish a 
€500 million fund with similar objectives: to foster the internationalization of Spanish SMEs.  
Given the track record of France or Italy, other potential partners include Kuwait or RDIF. 
CIC from China, or GIC and Temasek, from Singapore, would add new value to the 
relationships. These funds have a strong presence in the technology sectors, therefore 
establishing co-investment funds with them would inject new capital in the nascent and 
growing Spanish startup ecosystem. The expertise of these funds would help the Spanish 
public investors to improve their processes and learn how to invest more efficiently in 
technology and innovation. 
The key learning experience accumulated over the last ten years is that the basis for 
successful SWFs is to establish investment units with carefully designed goals and 
governance structures (Das, Lu, Mulder, & Sy, 2009). Spain needs to consider the benefits of 
establishing a professional and independent organization to manage these new and 
prospective agreements rather than adding new functions to existing structures (Bernstein, 
Lerner, & Schoar, 2013). There are two major advantages. First, setting up a single 
organization that manages various agreements would facilitate knowledge sharing and 
learning. Second, establishing a certain independent structure would increase accountability, 
help to set more precise return schemes/benchmarks, and be the subject of clearer scrutiny 
and supervision. However, it also comes with disadvantages, which include the costs of 
capacity building and the resources deployed in setting up these structures. Once the costs are 
considered, to ensure professional and accountable asset management there would be a need 
for establishing a basic autonomous structure (i.e., an investment unit reporting to the 
Ministry of Economy) that operates independently once transparent rules and goals are 
agreed. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
Spain has gained financial and international experience by dealing with SWFs. Spanish listed 
companies, as well as real estate developers and few privately-held companies, have 
negotiated with SWFs from all over the globe in recent times. In 2011, Spain was the first 
destination of SWFs foreign direct investments in Europe (Santiso, 2012). Since then, deal 
flow has continued and interactions with SWFs have increased. The dense relationship with 
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 SWFs has facilitated the establishment of the first Spanish co-investment SWF, following a 
model already used by Italy and France.  
This variety of SWFs allows the identification of four different governance strategies 
(described in Figure 3.1) used by SWFs when investing in Spain. First, we have considered 
how SWFs with minority stakes could play an important role in Spain as corporate 
governance watchdogs; then, we focused on the intense activity displayed by GPFG through 
voting in AGMs; finally, we discussed the beneficial impact of these strategies on countries 
like Spain, which sometimes has been labeled as a “capitalism of friends” with limited 
foreign active shareholders and low corporate governance standards. In Spain, the race to 
improve corporate governance standards is under development and funds like GPFG will 
have an important role to ensure that the codes of governance and the best practices spread to 
more companies. We label this type of SWFs as responsible investors (included in quadrant 1 
in Figure 3.1). Their interest to safeguard funds’ assets lead them to act as responsible 
investors and engage with companies’ boards and management.   
Second, we offer evidence about the role played by in-house capabilities to improve the 
quality of deal scouting, get access to direct investing, and enhance partnerships. Kuwait, 
following a strategy to attract talent, has returned to Spain, a country it abandoned under 
corruption scandals twenty-five years ago. Now, both Spain’s regulatory framework and 
KIA’s governance have improved substantially, allowing KIA to participate in some of the 
largest deals executed by SWFs. Enhanced in-house investment capabilities are 
representative of SWFs in quadrant 2 with a need for larger and more prepared human capital 
as they navigate into complex private markets such as infrastructure or venture capital. 
Third, QIA is the best example of a strategic fund looking for legitimacy (those included in 
quadrant 3). The Gulf country has landed in Spain with a very clear objective: leverage on its 
financial firepower to re-invent the image of the Arab country. Investments and partnerships 
with Spanish companies in sectors such as football, airlines, and hotels allow QIA to build 
trust with local players and to deploy a national comprehensive strategy that aims to diversify 
its national economy, as well as to position the country as a bridge between Europe and Asia.  
Fourth, Spain has now set up its own co-investment fund along with Oman due to the 
knowledge acquired over the last decade dealing with SWFs. The joint fund plans to invest in 
Spanish companies going abroad. Both Oman and Spain focus on learning (quadrant 4) and 
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impulse the establishment of an international joint-venture to achieve strategic national goals. 
The experience from this first fund in Spain may be repeated in association with other 
countries, in the region and beyond. Operations, governance—including accountability—and 
clear goals should be defined in order to ensure the appropriate use of this newly created 
vehicle. Again, strategic governance would influence the results of a new sovereign venture.  
3.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research on sovereign wealth funds has been naturally biased towards its financial aspects, 
with a strong focus on the impact of SWFs’ investments in portfolio companies’ returns, both 
in the short and long term. However, we consider that research in fields such as economics, 
management and international business remain quite unexplored. Therefore, we would like to 
propose four fruitful areas for future research beyond finance that require further attention. 
Globally, policy makers are setting today’s agenda based on a combination of two economic 
trends: low oil prices and low interest rates. This new normal brings the opportunity to 
improve our knowledge on SWFs in at least two areas: for economists to test the validity of 
SWFs as rainy-day funds and for management scholars to understand change in SWFs to 
adapt to the new environment. Apart from this circumstance, we consider two other topics 
that remain unclear in the literature. On one hand, the relationship between SWFs and co-
investment partners now that SWFs are looking for more direct investments and, on the other 
hand, the exploration of the particular economic and institutional context of African SWFs. 
First, from an economic point of view, low oil prices offer an environment that can test 
SWFs’ ability as rainy-day funds. Due to these circumstances, a comparative study for the 
different reactions to oil prices by SWFs is pertinent. Analyzing how SWFs with different 
levels of governance complexity and investment mandates react to low oil prices would help 
to understand the usefulness of establishing SWFs. Research must be done on how SWFs 
cope with tough external shocks, maintain long-term trajectories over short-term needs and 
retain independence levels from political pressure.  
Second, the persistent low interest rates offer another stream of new research for management 
scholars. It remains to be understood how SWFs adapt through diversification beyond safe 
fixed income. Hence, private markets have grown in importance as an asset class for the 
majority of SWFs. Given the low interest rates, SWFs have invested in real estate, private 
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 equity or infrastructure, looking for the returns that safe fixed income is not providing. SWFs 
have acquired new resources to enter into riskier asset classes. They have either developed 
talent internally or hired from the outside. Future research should explore how governance of 
SWFs change to adapt to this complex environment, what the interactions between new hired 
talent from abroad and incumbents look like, or the theoretical advances to explain the 
behavior of foreign talent in organizations ultimately governed by nationals.  
Third, the world is witnessing the expansion of SWFs to new geographies. New offices 
opened up by CIC in the United States, GPFG in Japan or Qatar in China suggest that 
interactions with local investment partners will grow in the near future. This co-investment 
pattern brings new questions to the table that remain. How do SWFs negotiate on prices or 
quality of assets? Are there differences between SWFs or public pension funds when they 
look for specific deals? Moreover, we do not know much about the partners that SWFs 
engage with to explore new asset classes or countries.  Finally, if we assume trust is key to 
source and close deals in investment banking, how do SWFs build trust with other players in 
the industry? International business scholars could be interested in answering these questions.  
Fourth, SWFs play a role very different in Africa than elsewhere. When scholars define 
SWFs as a means to preserve current wealth for the future generations most of them are not 
thinking in Africa. In many resource-rich African economies to have a future requires 
investments today. This tension between today’s needs and inter-generational transfers is 
reflected in the different vehicles designed in Africa. Also, the fact that in many African 
countries mineral resources have led to a “natural curse”, rather than an improvement in the 
economic conditions, places SWFs as a key governance tool to resist. A careful 
organizational design and governance definition, such as the implemented in the newly 
established Nigerian SWF, may yield long-term returns, economic diversification and 
inspiration for other governments to follow. To understand the African context and the 
specific nature of its SWFs are key issues still unresolved. 
What is clear is that SWFs are here to stay and there is a lot more to understand.   
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 Table 3.1: Selected Institutional Investors in the Spanish IBEX-35 
Asset Manager Country 
Stock 
value* (€M) 
# Stocks 
Norges Bank Investment Management Norway 7,761 32 
The Vanguard Group Inc. United States 6,199 33 
BlackRock Fund Advisors United States 5,496 33 
Lyxor International Asset Management SAS France 4,555 33 
Qatar Investment Authority Qatar 3,527 1 
BlackRock Investment Management Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
3,233 32 
Amundi SA (Investment Management) France 3,008 26 
Capital Research & Management Co United States 2,918 9 
BlackRock Advisors (UK) Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
2,203 33 
BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland 
AG 
Germany 1,979 27 
GIC Pte Ltd. Singapore 838 1 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (2015).    * Valued March 
2015. Soverign wealth funds shadowed.  
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Table 3.2. Bankia: The divestment process attracts foreign interest 
Industrial holding Stake sold Acquirer Country SWF 
involved 
Deoleo 18% CVC Capital Partners  UK FSI 
Realia  28% Carso (Carlos Slim)  Mexico  
Globalvia  50% USS, OPTrust and 
PGGM 
Netherlands, 
UK, Canada 
Khazanah 
Metrovacesa  19% Santander  Spain  
Indra 20% SEPI  Spain  
Iberdrola 4.9% Qualified investors   
NH Hotels 12.6% Qualified investors   
Mapfre 12% Qualified investors   
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from companies’ press releases and media news. 
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 Table 3.3: Top 10 equity holdings in Spain by the GPFG 
Company Sub-Industry Value (US$) % Votes 
Iberdrola SA Utilities 1,338,267,389 2.97 
Banco Santander SA Banking 1,265,612,160 1.77 
Inditex SA Textile, Garment & Shoes 985,766,097 0.92 
Telefónica SA Telecoms 769,280,099 1.39 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Banking 695,327,810 1.49 
Amadeus IT Holding SA Electronics and Software 298,770,028 1.54 
Bankia SA Banking 296,444,001 2.21 
Ferrovial SA Construction 283,318,019 1.71 
Repsol SA Oil 190,682,080 1.24 
Grifols SA Healthcare 159,476,141 1.62 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Norges Bank Investment Management (2015). 
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Table 3.4: Top 10 largest equity stakes of the GPFG by voting rights in Spain 
Company Sub-Industry Value (US$) % Votes 
Papeles y Cartones de Europa  Paper 24,008,168 4.54 
Iberpapel Gestión  Paper 9,051,174 4.29 
Tubacex  Minerals, metals 9,557,255 3.78 
Miquel y Costas & Miquel  Paper 16,281,352 3.44 
Gamesa Corp Tecnológica  Capital Goods 143,122,264 2.98 
Iberdrola Utilities 1,338,267,389 2.97 
Distribuidora Internacional de 
Alimentación SA 
Consumer services 109,340,034 2.97 
Azkoyen  Capital Goods 3,416,962 2.77 
Applus Services SA Consumer services 31,740,541 2.69 
Viscofan  Chemicals 70,280,316 2.50 
Source: authors’ elaboration from Norges Bank Investment Manager (2015). 
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 Table 3.5: GPFG decisions during AGMs in Spanish companies  
Company GPFG&Board 
agreement (%) 
# Proposals GPFG voted against 
director reelection/ 
appointment 
Was  the director 
finally  appointed? 
Top 10 Holdings    
Santander 100% 32   
Telefónica 100% 13   
Iberdrola 96% 26 YES YES 
BBVA 100% 22   
Inditex 100% 18   
Ferrovial 76% 25   
Repsol 100% 23   
Banco de Sabadell 100% 23   
Amadeus IT 100% 23   
Gas Natural  97% 31 YES YES 
Bottom 10 Holdings    
Codere SA/Spain 71% 14 YES YES 
Ercros SA 93% 15 
Prim SA 93% 28 
Natraceutical SA 100% 7   
Telecomunicaciones y 
Energia 
100% 19   
Realia Business SA 86% 21 YES YES 
Baron de Ley 94% 16 YES YES 
Fluidra SA 100% 32   
Azkoyen SA 71% 21 
Vocento SA 100% 10   
 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Norges Bank Investment Management (2015) and companies’ 
press releases. 
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Table 3.6: The ranking of SWFs by labor-intensity 
Sovereign Wealth Fund #Employees AuM ($bn) 
AuM per 
employee 
($bn) 
Country 
SWF 
Ranking 
(AuM) 
Mubadala Development Company 900 66 0.07 UAE 19 
Khazanah Nasional 465 42 0.09 Malaysia 25 
GIC 1,300 415 0.32 Singapore 8 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
200 66 0.33 UAE 18 
Temasek Holdings 530 196 0.37 Singapore 11 
Korea Investment Corporation 195 85 0.43 South Korea 15 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1,650 773 0.47 UAE 2 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 841* 406 0.48 Hong Kong 7 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council 180 90 0.50 UAE 13 
Samruk-Kazyna 100 78 0.78 Kazakhstan 16 
Future Fund 98 87 0.89 Australia 14 
SAMA - Foreign Holdings 620* 757 1.22 Saudi Arabia 3 
China Investment Corporation 588 747 1.27 China 4 
Qatar Investment Authority 200 304 1.52 Qatar 9 
Government Pension Fund Global 518 850 1.64 Norway 1 
Kuwait Investment Authority 250 548 2.19 Kuwait 5 
Investment Corporation of Dubai 50 183 3.66 UAE 12 
 8,685 5,692    
 
Source: authors’ elaboration from SWFs’ websites and official sources. *These SWFs are part of the central 
bank structures, thus the official figure for the SWF workforce is less accurate. 
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 Table 3.7: The most aggressive deal hunters by transaction average value 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Country # Deals Average value* 
National Social Security Fund China 1 2,100 
Mubadala Development 
Company 
UAE 8 1,718 
Qatar Investment Authority Qatar 11 848 
GIC Singapore 23 621 
China Investment Corporation  China 7 369 
Kuwait Investment Authority Kuwait 9 359 
State General Reserve Fund Oman 5 265 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority UAE 9 223 
Temasek Holdings Singapore 44 170 
Khazanah Nasional  Malaysia 3 115 
National Pension Reserve Fund Ireland 1 50 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Fletcher SWF Transaction Database (2015) * US$ millions.  
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Figure 3.1. Strategic Governance of Sovereign Wealth Funds in Spain 
Investment 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Quadrant 1. Shareholder Activism 
SWFs play a key role in monitoring 
and improving the corporate 
governance of listed companies 
worldwide. 
Norway’s GPFG plays a critical role 
for Spanish companies, challenging the 
corporate governance “status quo”. 
GPFG has quantitative and qualitative 
potential to monitor Spanish 
multinationals more effectively. Other 
SWFs and large institutional investors 
may join GPFG and reinforce such 
messaging. 
Quadrant 2. In-house Capabilities 
SWFs establish specialized teams looking 
for higher returns, new asset classes, and 
untapped geographies. There are spillover 
effects with regard to the organization: 
professionalization, fee reduction, and 
lower agency costs. 
KIO’s newly-established arm, WHI, is 
investing heavily in infrastructure 
globally. Professionalization has helped 
WHI to partner with some of the best 
global players in infrastructure to bid for 
Spanish assets. Enhanced in-house 
capabilities will allow more SWFs to 
invest in the Spanish infrastructure sector. 
Quadrant 3. Legitimacy  
Governments use SWFs to obtain long-
term state goals, yet simultaneously 
seek to acquire legitimacy as 
institutional investors. 
In Spain, QIA displays a 
comprehensive state strategy. QIA is 
able to gain legitimacy as investors and 
at the same time to position and 
intensify the country’s image by 
investing in Spanish hotels, real estate 
companies or through football 
sponsorships. 
Quadrant 4. Long-Term Learning 
SWFs look for domestic economic 
diversification and engagement in long-
term relationships with foreign companies 
in order to acquire resources and know-
how (that is, to learn). 
Oman’s SGRF has the mission of 
attracting talent and expertise as well as 
catalyzing investments into the Sultanate. 
To fulfill this learning objective, SGRF 
has agreed to establish a co-investment 
fund with Spain to facilitate the access of 
Spanish companies to Oman’s key 
economic sectors. 
Public                                                               Private 
Ownership Type 
  
  Source: Aguilera, Capapé, and Santiso (2016) 
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4.1. ABSTRACT 
While we know that different owners have different interests in the firms they invest in and 
they align their corporate governance practices to serve these interests, there is much to learn 
from unique institutional investor such as sovereign wealth funds. In particular, we explore 
whether there has been any governance improvement after Norway’s sovereign wealth fund 
(NBIM) made an explicit and unexpected announcement in November 2012 that it will put 
pressure on firms in which they invest to improve their governance. We uncover that, relative 
to a matching sample, companies invested by NBIM change their corporate governance post-
announcement. However, the most adopted governance practices seem to be relatively 
traditional ones and they are not implemented at the same speed across all firms. Our findings 
shed light on our understanding of shareholder activism among a unique set of owners and 
expand the knowledge of heterogeneous principals. 
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“I myself own a flower,” he continued his conversation with the businessman, “which I 
water every day. I own three volcanoes, which I clean out every week  
(for I also clean out the one that is extinct; one never knows).  
It is of some use to my volcanoes, and it is of some use to my flower, that I own 
them. But you are of no use to the stars…” (Saint-Exupéry, 1943(2010): 56). 
 
 
4.2. INTRODUCTION 
It is now well known that institutional investors are concerned and can influence investee 
firms’ corporate governance (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Research in corporate governance and 
finance identifies two main channels that institutional investors deploy when they seek to 
influence their portfolio companies’ strategies and want to “assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”. Thus, institutional investors, such as large shareholders, have 
used “voice” or “exit” to express their disagreement with the governance practices of their 
portfolio companies (Hirschman, 1970; McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016). On one hand, 
they may talk directly to management or boards to address the conflicting governance issues, 
that is the “voice” channel; on the other hand, institutional investors can “vote with their 
feet,” that is, divest and “exit” the company by selling and trading their shares (Edmans & 
Manso, 2011).   
 
Recently, more governance mechanisms are available for investors to express their voice and 
influence investee companies to implement certain strategies or to adopt given governance 
practices (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010). New, accessible ways of communication, 
the ease of regulation and corporate bylaws on promoting shareholder proposals, and the role 
played by proxy advisors, are reducing the costs of stronger shareholder activism (Coffee Jr. 
& Palia, 2016). 
 
As a result, an increasing ratio of diverse institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, mutual 
funds, hedge funds, private equity funds) are able to promote active ownership practices, and 
therefore it is key to continue our understanding of the goals and strategies pursued by these 
heterogeneous institutional investors (Gillan & Starks, 2007; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
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Grossman, 2002; Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Agency theory has been enriched by the 
concept of heterogeneity of the “principals” which have different and sometimes conflicting 
objectives, depending on their stake size (Fich, Harford, & Tran, 2015), investment horizons 
(Connelly et al., 2010; Gaspar, Massa, & Matos, 2005) or non-market strategies (Aguilera, 
Capapé, & Santiso, 2016). Given this heterogeneity, which has important implications in the 
development of an extended agency theory, some investors are receiving stronger attention 
than others. Hedge funds, for example, are now better known and the debate about their 
influence in the short and the long run has received renewed efforts (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 
2015). 
 
Yet, the question of how state-owned investors as a particular group of institutional investors 
influence the corporate governance of their investee companies remains unresolved. In this 
paper, we are interested in exploring the question “do sovereign wealth funds (SWFs, 
hereinafter), as state-owned institutional investors, improve the corporate governance of their 
portfolio companies?” And the quick answer is yes. Our findings demonstrate that SWFs are 
able to improve significant governance practices such as the share of independent directors 
on boards, the share of women on boards, and the independence of the audit committees.  
 
SWFs have received scarce scholarly attention. They have not been specifically addressed in 
the literature on principal heterogeneity (Connelly et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002) or 
have merely been acknowledged but not analyzed (Goranova, Abouk, Nystrom, & Soofi, 
2017). Yet, their importance is undeniable. The size of the SWFs industry, in terms of assets 
under management, is worth three times that of the hedge funds. Also, the nature of SWFs 
makes them an intriguing combination of private and public institutions, a new form of state 
capitalism that is growing (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Their capacity to influence 
corporations all over the planet is undeniable. In one example, Norges Bank Investment 
Management (NBIM), the asset owner of the largest SWF and our object of analysis in this 
paper, controls on average 1.3% of all listed equities globally. The figure rises to 2.5% when 
referring to European listed companies. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of NBIM as an active or engaged shareholder. We 
examine in detail all the equity investments made by NBIM since 2006 to 2015, in order to 
understand to which extent they are able to influence the corporate governance of their 
portfolio companies. From November 2012 onwards, NBIM started a new “active 
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 shareholder” strategy and it released a note presenting NBIM’s expectations on corporate 
governance. Taking advantage of this exogenous event for investee firms, we analyze how 
efficiently NBIM has played its role as an active shareholder since then. NBIM began to 
engage systematically with companies, investors, regulators, etc. to improve the value of its 
thousands of holdings in areas of board accountability and equal treatment of shareholders.  
 
Based on well-spread empirical and theoretical arguments (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2004) claiming that there is a positive link between better 
governed companies and higher performance, NBIM has adopted a better governance 
strategy as part of its core identity. Therefore, NBIM, as a minority shareholder, is better 
equipped to bear the costs of acting as an active shareholder and raise its “voice,” instead of 
exiting multiple minority positions when it identifies weak corporate governance practices in 
its investee firms. This “voice” effort does not imply that NBIM cannot “exit” companies for 
governance-related reasons: it has exited positions in the past and presumably will continue 
doing so in the future. In this paper we focus on the “voice” strategies and leave “exit” for 
further researches. 
 
NBIM raises its “voice” through a variety of ownership tools such as setting up expectations, 
voting in annual general meetings, direct interactions with boards and top executives, 
promoting public policies and peer-group initiatives with other institutional investors as well 
as industry programs, promoting shareholder proposals, starting legal actions, focusing on 
governance characteristics for portfolio selection or via research.  
 
Our work contributes to strategy research in several ways. First, we add evidence on a 
different “principal” player—sovereign wealth funds—in the heterogeneous matrix of 
institutional investors which currently own the majority of shares of listed companies 
worldwide. Second, we enhance the understanding of how SWFs, with a dual objective of 
maximizing financial returns and increasing global political influence, may act as “engaged 
shareholders” in the long run, in contrast with “activist shareholders” more focused in short-
run returns. Third, we demonstrate that SWFs, as long-term investors, do have an impact on 
their investee companies’ corporate governance, which they believe will enhance value of 
companies in the long-run.  
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4.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Agency theory has dominated corporate governance research in the areas of finance and 
management (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Gompers et al., 2003). This theory 
predicts that well-monitored managers that align with principals will increase firm value. The 
literature has also discussed extensively corporate governance practices that align principals 
and agents’ interests, such as the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman, the 
independence of the board directors, and the importance of an effective market for corporate 
control. For the most part, theoretical insights support the assumption that better governance 
should improve company value in the short and long run. It follows that, in general, 
shareholder activism enhances board monitoring roles, enforces effective governance 
mechanisms, and is consistent with the agency assumption of alignment of interests 
(Gompers et al., 2003).   
 
The classic dichotomy between agents and principals has been recently enriched with new 
boundary conditions. One of the main insights is the acknowledgment of heterogeneous 
principals (such as institutional investors, families and governments) acting simultaneously 
within a  firm (Goranova et al., 2017; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). With 
heterogeneous principals, the fundamental problem of aligning conflicting interests between 
owners and managers does extend to scenarios where different owners may have different 
interests (Connelly et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008); managers may 
prioritize demands from a set of owners at the expense of others (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 
2009; Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009; Goranova et al., 2017); owners might dedicate 
monitoring efforts for the largest stakes of their portfolios and free-ride in the smaller ones 
(Fich et al., 2015). Therefore, the heterogeneous set of principals’ interests, often in direct 
conflict, forces us to move beyond agency theory to account for this renewed complexity.  
 
This diversity of owners with heterogeneous interests is reflected in the mixed empirical 
results. Research shows that activism is beneficial for companies under certain circumstances 
(Cai & Walkling, 2011; Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012), whereas other results indicate that 
the value of activism is decreasing due to private tunnelling of investors (Anabtawi & Stout, 
2008), and misguided preferences over shareholder value that prioritize other stakeholders 
such as workers’ rights (Agrawal, 2012) or investors’ political gains (Woidtke, 2002). Also, 
given investors prefer better governed companies with lower monitoring costs (Leuz, Lins, & 
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 Warnock, 2009), it brings to endogenous choices and identification issues, which has led to 
mixed results. 
 
In fact, there is a fierce theoretical and media debate between those who defend the value of 
shareholder activism in the long-run (Bebchuk et al., 2015) and those who claim the 
importance of managers, who have information advantages to design and implement the 
corporate strategy, and point to the short-term risks of activism (Lipton, 2015).  
 
As owners, institutional investors have believed in the premise (which almost turned into 
ideology) which supports shareholder value maximization and the preeminence of principals 
over managers (Davis, 2009; Rappaport, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). While, most 
institutional investors have little incentives to demand better governance of their investee 
companies due to the costs of monitoring, these costs have decreased substantially and 
incorporating the gains of improved corporate governance is now more attainable (Del 
Guercio, Seery, & Woidtke, 2008; Goranova et al., 2017). There are at least three reasons to 
explain why the shareholder’s value view has won over managers’ interests and why 
institutional investors feel encouraged to adopt active approaches. First, new governance 
codes expanded globally after the Enron scandal in 2002, which involved serious governance 
misconduct and increased awareness in multiple countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004); second, media currently exerts a reinforced pressure on issues such as CEO 
compensation or the reelection of board directors (Bednar, 2012); third, after the global 
financial crisis of 2008, more governments became owners due to the bail-out process that 
followed and citizens’ demands for increased monitoring roles grew accordingly (Tihanyi, 
Graffin, & George, 2014). All of these trends have led to a dominant position of investors 
over managers. We observe two interrelated consequences: lower agency costs and higher 
principal costs.  
 
First, the legitimation and expansion of shareholder activism have facilitated the efficacy of 
active investors (Del Guercio et al., 2008). As a result, more activism implies lowering 
agency costs by decreasing misalignments of managers’ incentives. The distance between 
managers, boards and shareholders is decreasing and the interactions are increasing. This is 
the positive outcome that results from more active institutional investors.  
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Yet, this process has also increased the heterogeneity of interests and therefore principal costs 
have grown. Principal costs refer to those derived from investors exercising control, in 
contrast with agent costs derived from managers exercising control (Goshen & Squire, 2017). 
Heterogeneity showed up when more diverse owners tried to achieve their (sometimes) 
conflicting goals. For example, meeting the demands of a large shareholder can come at the 
loss of other shareholders; indeed, managers may attend to some demands by placating 
influential investors and ignoring others (Goranova et al., 2017), incurring in principal costs. 
The more frequent behind-the-scenes interactions between managers and shareholders have 
reduced the agent costs while bringing “new” and growing principal costs into the equation 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Becht et al., 2009).  
 
For this reason, understanding the heterogeneity of principals seems critical. In fact, one way 
to understand heterogeneity is to classify shareholders according to the style of their 
interactions with company managers and boards. We differentiate between “activists” and 
“engaged” shareholders.  
 
On one hand, activists invest with a strategic plan in mind related to how the corporate 
governance of specific companies in any given sector should be. These activists find an 
underperforming company to implement and execute the governance strategy, and then leave 
the company after few years. Activists invest in a limited number of companies and aim to 
take controlling positions which allow them to have a short-term, strong impact and to 
implement the changes required. Activists aim for goals through intrusive interventions (i.e., 
firing a CEO, divesting subsidiaries or promoting spin-offs). 
 
On the other hand, engaged shareholders, also known as stewards, are normally large and 
hold a very diversified portfolio of minority positions. Engaged shareholders are institutional 
investors that follow a buy-and-hold strategy. They look for implementing policies and 
strategies to better the governance of their investee companies and thus improve the long-
term value of the portfolio (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Engaged shareholders pressure firms to 
adopt more effective corporate governance practices. They tend to focus on governance’s 
main mechanisms (board independence, CEO duality) to ensure a sustained long-term value 
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 of the company (Rappaport & Bogle, 2011). For the purposes of this paper, we consider 
NBIM as an engaged institutional investor10.  
 
In summary, reduced monitoring costs allow more institutional investors to play a more 
active role. Consequently, the misalignment lowers between shareholders and managers, and 
thus agency costs are also lowered. Yet, the participation of more different types of 
shareholders in monitoring introduces  larger principal costs due to heterogeneous principal’s 
goals (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). Researchers have accounted for the different types of 
principals/owners, such as hedge funds (Agarwal, Daniel, & Naik, 2009), pension funds 
(Becht et al., 2009) or mutual funds (Cvijanović, Dasgupta, & Zachariadis, 2016). Most of 
this research analyzes the indirect effects of institutional pressure on corporate governance 
which produces changes in operating and market performance. However, in this paper, we 
focus on the direct effects that sovereign wealth funds have on the corporate governance of 
investee companies. 
 
Given the shareholder heterogeneity, we focus on a rarely studied class of institutional 
investor: sovereign wealth funds. We add value to the current stream of literature that 
analyzes the impact of the heterogeneous goals of different owners.  
 
The rest of the paper describes the characteristics of sovereign wealth funds as state-owned 
long-term institutional investors and the expectations of the Norway’s sovereign fund in 
particular. We then describe our dataset and variables, the methods we have used, show and 
discuss the main results, and provide conclusions.  
 
 
4.4. CONTEXT: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
 
Sovereign wealth funds are government-owned investment funds without explicit pension 
liabilities that typically pursue long-term investment strategies (Aguilera et al., 2016: 5). 
 
The nature of a SWF is determined by its “sovereignty” (Megginson & Fotak, 2015). These 
funds follow dual-objectives of financial returns—like other mutual funds—and they also 
10 We will refer to NBIM as an engaged shareholder. Other authors cited in the paper talk about “active 
shareholders” or “stewards”. All these terms refer to the same idea of investors exercising a monitoring 
effort of gathering information and trying to influence managers for the long run rather than trading.  
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pursue broader economic and development returns for their countries. Sovereign wealth 
funds are a different class of institutional investors. The main reason is that this sovereignty 
is present in the pressure from politicians to use SWFs to obtain political gains or accomplish 
wider macroeconomic goals (Bernstein, Lerner, & Schoar, 2013; Bortolotti, Fotak, & 
Megginson, 2015) and is also present in the fears of recipient countries of geopolitically-
motivated investments in strategic industries (Clark, Dixon, & Monk, 2013).  
SWFs are interested in the long-run and thus deviate from short-term-oriented strategies used 
by certain hedge funds. They are not public pension funds because they do not face pension 
liabilities and as such have more flexible asset allocation strategies with reduced liquidity 
constraints. Also, most of the SWFs are based in non-OECD countries with lower 
transparency and democracy index levels. All these characteristics make SWFs a different 
owner and principal, and explain why it makes sense to focus on them separately.  
So far, research has determined that the market reaction to SWFs’ investment announcements 
is positive in the short term (Dewenter, Han, & Malatesta, 2010; Kotter & Lel, 2011) yet 
lower than announcements made by investors not owned by governments (Bortolotti et al., 
2015). This difference increases in the mid- to- long-run in the cases of SWFs taking the seats 
of boards, funds strictly controlled by their governments or under direct political influence 
(Bernstein et al., 2013; Bortolotti et al., 2015; Knill, Lee, & Mauck, 2012). This “liability of 
sovereignness” is explained and discounted by markets due to the potential conflicts between 
SWFs’ political goals and target firms’ financial performance.  
In our research, we focus in a particular sovereign fund—NBIM—because it is the largest 
one, a well-known engaged shareholder and offers high levels of transparency. NBIM has 
released all its equity positions since its inception in 1998, so it is possible to capture all 
effects produced by this unique investor and sovereign fund.  
 
4.4.1. Norges Bank Investment Management as engaged shareholder 
 
NBIM manages the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund – 
Global, by assets under management. In spite of the term “pension” in its name, it does not 
pay pensions but instead it saves and builds financial wealth for the future generations to 
prepare for the time when oil and natural gas reserves are depleted. As of March 2017, NBIM 
has assets under management worth US$920 billion. Equity investments represent more than 
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 65% of its portfolio. It owns on average 1.3% of all equities listed globally, and its largest 
stakes are in well-recognized companies such as Nestlé, Royal Dutch Shell, Apple or 
Alphabet, with stakes above US$4bn respectively.  
 
Given the size of the fund, its diversified scope (investments in 9,000 companies in 67 
countries) and minority positions (few stakes above 10%), one might assume that NBIM 
engages in a passive shareholder strategy, which was true until recently (Bortolotti et al., 
2015).  
 
More specifically, in November 2012, NBIM published a critical discussion note (“Note” 
hereinafter) stating that effective corporate governance has a positive, direct and long-term 
impact on the value of companies based on scholarly evidence from the United States 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003) and Europe (Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 
2010). In this public announcement, NBIM explicitly intended to reveal that from that point 
onwards, NBIM would demand its portfolio companies to meet certain “corporate 
governance expectations” (NBIM, 2012). The language of the press release contained 
statements such as “NBIM’s primary corporate-governance focus will consequently be on 
mechanisms shareholders can use directly and indirectly to influence companies towards 
sustained business success” or “NBIM operates a corporate-governance program. Setting out 
generic expectations for good corporate governance is one of several steps in this program 
and the topic of this discussion note” (NBIM, 2012: 3).  
 
We argue that the Note marks a substantial milestone in the NBIM strategy. No one could 
anticipate this movement by an investor which held holdings in 7,427 companies at the end 
of 2012. In fact, the novelty of this strategy was covered by financial media in the weeks that 
followed the Note release: “It is a big change in how the oil fund operates and signifies a 
more active approach to its largest investments” (Milne, 2013a) or “Norway has just 
published an important note on what it expects in terms of corporate governance from the 
companies it invests with” (Carney, 2013). Comments from the CEO, Mr. Slyngstad, 
describe how they shifted into engaged/active shareholders: “I think active is a fair 
description. We think it is the responsibility of the larger investors to be more involved in 
what in the UK is referred to as stewardship and have a dialogue not just with the CEO and 
CFO but also the chairman of the board” (Milne, 2013b). This statement implies a substantial 
change and we empirically test whether this new and different effort has paid out. 
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 While the engagement of NBIM with its companies goes back to its origins, its efforts mostly 
focused on the establishment of the Council on Ethics in 2004 and on setting “ethical 
guidelines” for the sovereign fund. These guidelines have allowed the Council to recommend 
the exclusion of companies from the fund’s investment universe, or to place companies under 
observation. The ethical guidelines propose to exercise ownership rights and to make 
decisions on negative screening and exclusion of companies operating against the guidelines. 
Nevertheless, these efforts have been focused on investee companies involved in the 
production of cluster munitions, nuclear weapons, tobacco or other conduct-based violations, 
such as severe environmental damage or serious violations of human rights. In effect, the 
monitoring role of NBIM has been centered around the “negative screening” of companies 
involved in harmful production or wrong-doing. Yet, the new explicit approach disclosed in 
the Note is universal and affects every single company in which NBIM is investing.  
 
4.4.2. NBIM’s search for effective ownership 
 
NBIM expects its portfolio companies to behave according to a set of corporate governance 
principles outlined in the Note published in 2012. While NBIM acknowledges that the 
changes it proposes are profound and would take time to implement, it is clear about the 
benefits of setting priorities to enhance board accountability and equal treatment of 
shareholders, thereby improving the governance of its portfolio companies. NBIM does not 
want to add another code of good corporate governance to the existing pool of codes, instead 
it addresses the challenges of an engaged minority shareholder from an “investment culture” 
approach. That is, while it takes into account the academic research on different corporate 
governance dimensions, it prefers to take its own practical approach, avoiding general 
statements.  
 
In this section, we summarize what NBIM expects from each corporate governance practice 
explicitly mentioned in the Note. We discuss why NBIM might pursue for each of these 
practices to enhance the corporate governance of their investee companies. Also, we include 
other additional practices regularly cited in the literature to provide a better assessment of the 
NBIM strategy. In the “Sample and data” subsection, we explain in detail the process of how 
we decided on 17 corporate governance variables: ten variables were explicitly mentioned in 
the Note, whereas we added seven more due to their importance in the current literature. 
Please, refer to the Table 4.1 for the definitions of all of these variables.  
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4.4.2.1. NBIM explicit expectations 
 
 
The first three corporate governance practices refer to board abilities: cultural diversity, 
specific skills and director’s commitment. Cultural diversity, taken as the share of board 
members with different cultural backgrounds, is regularly associated with enriched and wider 
views which help boards to understand better the business and improve advice and 
supervision roles. Indeed, there is some evidence that more culturally diverse boards improve 
the discussion angles and perspectives and the analysis of foreign acquisitions and provide 
information advantages (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012); however, there is also a danger in 
“romanticizing” cultural diversity, as more diverse boards may lead to less effective and 
integrated boards that negatively affect firm value (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 
2016; Frijns, Dodd, & Cimerova, 2016). NBIM expects its investee companies to have more 
culturally diverse board directors.  
 
NBIM also refers to board specific skills, which highlights the importance of industry 
specific backgrounds and strong financial backgrounds to better serve as a board director. 
The literature agreement is wider than in the case of cultural diversity and these more skill-
specific boards show stronger board monitoring and assessing capabilities through improved 
board decision making (Kearney, Gebert, & Voelpel, 2009). NBIM expects higher values of 
these skills in their portfolio companies as well.   
 
NBIM is interested in enhancing the dedication of the board of directors, so they prefer to 
have non-distracted directors in multiple corporate board affiliations. In fact, busy boards, 
with directors holding three or more other directorships, offer weaker monitoring  (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006; Liu & Paul, 2015). Other authors argue that busy directors bring reputation 
as good advisers to the board (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014) and can enhance firm value (Ferris, 
Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003), chiefly in the case of small firms where advice is key 
(Cashman, Gillan, & Jun, 2012; Field, Lowry, & Mkrtchyan, 2013). Given NBIM is invested 
only in listed, and mainly large companies, we expect the NBIM investee companies will 
have board directors with null or few other affiliations.  
 
There are two practices related to the board composition which have been widely analyzed in 
the literature that are also mentioned in the Note. First, the CEO-chairman separation, which 
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questions the excessive power and lack of accountability of extremely powerful CEOs 
holding CEO and chairmanship simultaneously. There have been extensive academic debates 
which show the board leadership as double-edged sword, where separation implies control 
and combination leads to collaboration (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003). Yet there are promising new explanations towards a more nuanced view of 
board leadership where chairman orientation goes beyond the duality construct (Krause, 
2017). NBIM clearly prefers to separate these positions with two different people.  
 
Second, the Note refers to independent directors. Governance scholars agree on the 
importance of independent directors to supervise, evaluate and select top management 
properly. Yet empirical and also theoretical settings have yielded other results favoring 
insider directors or bringing the issue of misclassifying strict independent directors (Crespí-
Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014). NBIM position on this debate remains clear: “We can 
conclude that the single dimension of independence brings service to the oversight function 
expected of the board” (NBIM, 2012: 16).  
 
Two practices refer directly to the concern NBIM has with staggered boards: director 
election majority requirement, which is a common mechanism used by entrenched boards to 
help directors keep their seats in spite of bad market returns; and the anti-takeover devices 
count, which are mechanisms that impede a well-functioning market for corporate control too 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). We expect that both practices would drop after NBIM announcement 
in 2012.  
 
There is another subset of practices included in the Note which directly affect equal 
shareholder rights and the protection of minority shareholders. One is the shareholders’ 
rights policy, that is whether companies have a policy to ensure the equal treatment of 
minority shareholders. Also, the Note mentions the benefits of a policy equal voting right, 
which checks whether companies have a policy to apply the one-share, one-vote principle. 
Given the NBIM mandate, as a large and diversified minority shareholder, to encourage these 
two policies is relevant. We expect these practices will be implemented in NBIM portfolio 
companies, post-announcement.  
 
Finally, NBIM refers to the convenience of setting up a succession plan of top executives and 
board members in the case of unforeseen events. NBIM considers that this critical decision 
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 should be agreed with shareholders and that the chairman, or the director in charge of the 
succession plan, should establish mechanisms to incorporate shareholders’ views in the 
discussion of board developments. Detailed information on succession plans help to alleviate 
stakeholder’s fears and prevents negative reaction from investors (Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009; Shen & Cannella, 2002). NBIM expects this practice to grow after the 
announcement.   
 
 
4.4.2.2. Other key corporate governance practices 
 
In addition to these ten practices obtained from the Note, we also include seven corporate 
governance practices which were not explicitly mentioned in the expectations of NBIM, yet 
are relevant in the current literature on corporate governance and help to provide a general 
assessment of NBIM as an engaged shareholder. 
 
The first practice being women on board. There is an important global movement to increase 
the number of women on boards. Empirical evidence suggests that more women on boards 
improve firm performance (Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014), as they tend to be more cautious on 
important corporate decisions, including acquisitions, than overconfident men (Huang & 
Kisgen, 2013; Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Also, women are better monitors and require more 
audit efforts than men (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Women bring different perspectives and 
backgrounds into the boardroom, enriching the quality of decisions adopted when assessing, 
monitoring or evaluating the top executive teams (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). 
Yet, there is controversy in the empirical literature: for some authors (Ahern & Dittmar, 
2012) quotas have not helped to improve the quality of boards given women hired were 
younger and less experienced directors, decreasing firm operating performance. The issue is 
still unresolved as other results point to negative performance in boards dominated by women 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009) or the complex moderating effect that gender diverse boards 
causes in strategic decisions (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). However, in the case of 
Norway, the country used in the paper of Ahern and Dittmar, the goal remains clear: more 
women directors are expected in NBIM portfolio companies.  
 
We also include board size. There is no clear direction in research on the optimal board size 
that would improve board goals and enhance performance. In principle, board composition is 
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driven by the scope of firm’s operations, the specific business environment or the negotiation 
between the CEO and the outside directors (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). 
Others (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) consider that the effect of board size depends on the 
complexity of the firm, and imply the relationship is U-shaped, that is, small and large boards 
would increase firm value. Other research focuses on the difficulties of information 
coordination or the challenge of providing timely decisions with large boards (Boivie et al., 
2016). Given there is rarely agreement on this topic, we cannot know which direction would 
drive NBIM decisions for this particular practice.  
 
There is an external channel to control the misconduct of firm’s executive managers in 
accounting and operating issues: the external audit fees. We include the non-audit to audit 
fees ratio to capture the strength of this external control channel. The larger the ratio, the less 
control and the more the room there is for executives to experience misconduct (Hay, 
Knechel, & Wong, 2006). We expect this ratio to decline in NBIM portfolio companies after 
the Note release in 2012.  
 
The next three practices reflect a current trend in governance and board studies: the 
establishment of board committees. Research posits that the bulk of the critical board work is 
done through board committees. We include three dimensions to check whether portfolio 
companies establish board committees: audit, nomination and compensation board 
committees. Committee members’ sophistication and commitment are key factors which 
explain how audit committees lower the likelihood of executives engaging in earnings 
management (Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003). The nomination and compensation 
committees have also received attention, and the independence of their members remains the 
key measure. NBIM would look for the establishment of these committees to enhance 
boards’ professionalism.  
 
As said, there is a need for independence in all these board committees (Aggarwal, 
Schloetzer, & Williamson, in press). In fact, committees depending on powerful directors or 
CEOs would not add value, as the existence of board committees could result in mere 
window-dressing. This is the reason we included a practice to capture the independence of 
the audit committee: audit committee management independence. We expect NBIM to 
require the independence of the audit committees.  
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 4.5. METHODS 
4.5.1. Sample and data 
In this paper, we chose to study the data of a single sovereign wealth fund: NBIM. In this 
way, we avoid the datasets bias towards more transparent or larger funds present in datasets 
collected manually or via news aggregators. NBIM dataset is comprehensive: it details all the 
transactions made in equities since its inception in 1998. It represents more than 90,000 firm-
year data points containing information such as the name of the company, equity market 
value of the stake of NBIM in US dollars and a firm’s industry.  
The second database we used is the recently launched “Environment, Social and Governance 
(ESG)” dataset from Eikon (Thomson Reuters). It provides firm-level ESG variables for 
close to 6,000 public companies since 2002. We focused on the “governance” section of the 
database for our analysis.  
 
To build our dataset, we narrowed it to the last 10 years. There are two reasons for trimming 
the sample to 2006. First, NBIM changed its investment strategy in 2006 and the share of 
equities in the portfolio grew from 40% to 60% as they started to invest in small- and mid-
cap listed equities. Second, ESG data from Eikon is substantially richer from 2006 on. Most 
governance variables offer poor coverage before 2006 when null results were above 60%, 
while the last available year the missing data points are below 15% for the most 
representative governance variables.  
 
We collected information on governance and financial variables for each company and year 
of our sample. The selection of the governance variables is as follows: we conducted an 
analysis of the Note of November 2012 in order to understand which practices are the pillars 
of the engagement strategy outlined. Two of the co-authors independently read the Note and 
identified the most significant governance practices described in the Note as NBIM 
expectations. The overall count was 13. They then discussed the mismatch and agreed on the 
10 most salient practices. Also, we included seven other frequently used variables in the 
literature, such as board size, women on board, the existence of several board committees 
(audit, compensation, nomination), and non-audit to audit fees ratio. In total, we collected 17 
governance variables per company and year from 2006 to 2015. We collected all the 
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corporate governance variables through ESG dataset from Eikon Thomson Reuters. See 
definitions of all these variables in Table 4.1.  
 
In addition to the governance variables, we added a set of financial variables: total assets, 
performance measures, capital structure and profitability. Also, we built a variable to capture 
the percentage of total shares in the hands of institutional investors. All of these financial 
variables were obtained for each company via Eikon Thomson Reuters for the same period.  
 
We cross-referenced data from the two main databases (NBIM holdings and ESG variables), 
and, given the constraint of available financial data for some of them, we obtained a final 
sample of 3,508 companies per year: 3,027 companies were part of the NBIM portfolio and 
481 companies functioned as a control group for the matching strategy explained in Section 
4.6.1. We collect firm-year data for 17 measures of governance variables and seven control 
financial variables.  
 
4.4.2. Description of the variables 
 
In this section, we describe the 17 corporate governance variables which capture the 17 
practices described in the Note. We also add seven financial control variables, mostly 
performance and ownership variables.  
 
Regarding the selection of the corporate governance variables, we have followed two steps. 
First, we developed an independent revision of the Note by two co-authors. As explained 
above, each co-author independently read the Note on the expectations of NBIM regarding 
board accountability and equal treatment of shareholders. These resulted in the first 10 
corporate governance variables. Second, we added seven variables commonly used in the 
literature that were not explicitly mentioned in the NBIM document, which include board 
size, share of women on board, the non-audit to audit fees ratio, and four variables related to 
board committees. These two groups yield 17 firm-level corporate governance variables we 
describe below.  
 
The first three variables refer to board abilities: cultural diversity, specific skills, and 
director’s commitment. Cultural diversity is measured as the share of board members with a 
cultural background different from the location of the corporate headquarters; board specific 
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 skills measures how many directors have either an industry specific background or a strong 
financial background; lastly, board member affiliations captures the average number of other 
corporate affiliations for the board member.  
 
There are two variables related to the board composition which have been widely analyzed in 
the literature and are also included in the Note. First, the CEO-chairman separation, which 
checks whether the CEO simultaneously chairs the board or whether the chairman of the 
board has ever been the CEO of the company. It takes value of 1 when both positions are held 
by the same person, 0 otherwise. Second, independent directors, measured as the percentage 
of independent board members as reported by the company. 
 
Two variables refer directly to the concerns NBIM has regarding staggered boards: director 
election majority requirement, which responds to the question: Are the company’s board 
members generally elected with a majority vote? It is a binary variable which takes value of 1 
when the answer is yes, 0 otherwise. And the anti-takeover devices count, which is defined as 
the number of anti-takeover devices in place in excess of two.  
 
There is another subset of variables included in the Note which directly affect shareholder 
rights and the protection of minority shareholders. One is the shareholders’ rights policy, 
which considers whether companies have a policy for ensuring the equal treatment of 
minority shareholders, facilitating shareholder engagement or limiting the use of anti-
takeover devices. Also, the Note mentions the benefits of a policy equal voting right, which 
checks whether companies have a policy of applying the one-share, one-vote principle. Both 
variables are binary, and take value 1 when the company has these policies in place, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Finally, NBIM is committed to ensuring a succession plan is put in place. The variable 
surveys whether the company has a succession plan for executive management (key board 
members) in the event of unforeseen circumstances. It also takes value of 1 when such a plan 
exists, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Along with these 10 variables obtained from the Note, we included seven corporate 
governance variables which were not explicitly mentioned in the expectations of NBIM, yet 
are relevant in the current literature on corporate governance. The first set are generally 
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analyzed variables such as women on board, measured as the percentage of women on the 
board; or board size, measured as the total number of board members at the end of the fiscal 
year. We included three variables linked to audit services: non-audit to audit fees ratio, 
measured as the sum of all non-audit fees divided by the audit and audit-related fees paid to 
the group auditor. Also, audit board committee, which checks whether the investee company 
has an audit board committee (takes value 1 when the company has such committee, 0 
otherwise), and the audit committee management independence, which confirms whether all 
audit members are non-executive directors - takes the value of 1 only if all audit members are 
non-executive directors, 0 otherwise. Lastly, we included two variables to capture a current 
trend in the literature: the importance of having board committees: nomination board 
committee and compensation board committee. The variables take value 1 if such committee 
has been established. 
 
Additionally, we included seven financial control variables for the regressions. For each 
company, we included the Revenue, which represents revenue from all of a company's 
operating activities after deducting any sales adjustments and their equivalents. Total assets 
are the total assets of a company; performance is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets; capital 
structure is the ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Long-term debt over total liabilities is 
the ratio of long-term debt, defined as long-term debt and capital lease obligations, to total 
liabilities. Ratio EBITDA over revenue is built dividing EBITDA over revenue. EBITDA is 
composed of EBIT for the fiscal year plus the same period's depreciation, amortization of 
acquisition costs, and amortization of intangibles. EBIT, on its part, is calculated as total 
revenues for the fiscal year minus total operating expenses plus operating interest expense, 
unusual expense/income and non-recurring items, for the same period. This definition 
excludes non-operating income and expenses. Lastly, we built a measure of institutional 
investors, which is calculated as the sum of all shares held by institutional investors divided 
by total shares, at the end of the fiscal year. These controls were used for the differences in 
differences procedures, but are not shown in the tables with the results.  
 
 
 
4.5.3. Corporate governance indexes 
 
We constructed two separate corporate governance indexes in order to capture the “intensity” 
of the changes induced by NBIM. To build up the indexes, we followed the additive index 
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 methodology used in La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Gompers et al. 
(2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009), and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011). For 
constructing our indexes, as explained in sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2., we take into account 
how the literature considers each practice impacts the quality of corporate governance and 
long-term firm value: those variables that have a positive impact are added as 1 to the index, 
0 otherwise. Better governed companies will have higher scores in the index. 
 
The first index (NBIM index) gathers all corporate governance mechanisms explicitly cited 
in the Note released by NBIM. We include 10 variables in the NBIM index. The second 
index (General CG Index) cumulates the 7 variables which are generally accepted though not 
explicitly mentioned by NBIM. We expect that the NBIM index would improve more quickly 
than the General CG index after the announcement.  
 
As the majority of variables are binary, we add a value of one to the index when the variables 
change in the direction NBIM expects, zero otherwise. For example, NBIM expects the CEO 
and chairman positions to be held by two different people, we add one to the index in the 
cases when CEO and Chairman are held by two different directors. When the variable is 
continuous, we use the median as the cutoff, as is done in La Porta et al. (1998). For example, 
NBIM expects to have a high share of independent directors in the board, we add 1 to the 
index if the value of this variable is above the median, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
4.5.4. Summary statistics 
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show country and industry summary statistics in the Eikon data set. These 
tables classify firms that are in the portfolio of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund 
(NBIM) and control firms that are never under the NBIM. 
 
Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2010 and 2011 for 
our sample. Firms are classified as treated firms (column 1) if NBIM = 1, which implies that 
these firms are in the portfolio of NBIM in 2012 (year of the announcement), or as control 
firms (column 2) if NBIM = 0, which implies these firms are not in the portfolio of the NBIM 
in 2012. We develop a matching strategy since treated and control groups are not similar 
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enough 11 . Columns 3 and 4 report summary statistics after the matching is realized. In 
column 3 we classify treated firms on support and in column 4 all control matched firms. 
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses. 
 
We also show tables that report t-test results of firm-year observations in 2010 (Table 4.5) 
and 2011 (Table 4.7) for our sample. Column 1 of these tables analyzes the mean differences 
of the unmatched sample (Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 4.4 and 4.6 respectively). Column 2 
analyzes mean differences of the matched sample (Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4.4 and 4.6 
respectively). T-statistics are shown in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
 
4.6. ANALYSIS  
 
We use a difference-in-difference procedure based on the following specification (Column 1 
in the regressions shown in Tables 4.8 to 4.17):  
yit = POST(t≥2012) + σNBIMi × POST(t≥2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (1) 
where yit is our variable of interest (a corporate governance variable such as women on 
board); POST(t≥2012) is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the 
NBIM’s announcement (2012–2015) and zero for previous years (2010–2011). We create a 
binary variable NBIMi that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 
and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012. NBIMi × POST(t≥2012) 
is the interaction term we use to observe the effects of being owned by NBIM after the Note 
is released in 2012; Firmi is a firm fixed effect and Xit is a vector of controls that includes 
revenue, total assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, the 
ratio of EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors (described in section 
4.2). Definitions for all variables are shown in the Table 4.1. We also use other measures for 
the treatment variable as robustness checks.12 
 
11 We have fewer firms in the control group (NBIM=0), so we do the matching by searching in the treated 
group for the nearest neighbor of each control firm. We match on size and lose many observations, as some 
firms don't have a nearest neighbor that satisfies our requirements, or we have missing information for size. 
12 Treatment variable takes value one if the firm ever belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in our 
sample years (2006-2015) or it takes value one if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio for 
the whole period 2012-2015.  
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 In Column 2, we substitute POST(t≥2012) by time dummies for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
We fix 2010 as our base year (omitted year) and we do not use previous years in the 
regression.  
 
 
4.6.1. Matching strategy  
 
The specifications in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4.4 and 4.6 are analogous to those in 
Columns 1 and 2 respectively, but we only used matched firms in these Columns. We use a 
matching approach to control for potential endogeneity that arises due to differences among 
the treatment and control group. The purpose of this matching approach is to make both 
groups of firms (those that belong to the NBIM’s portfolio and those that do not) as similar as 
possible. Specifically, we need our treated and control groups to be similar in all 
characteristics (observable and unobservable) that can affect the relation between the shock 
(the NBIM announcement) and our dependent variable (corporate governance outcomes).  
 
For this purpose, we adopt nearest-neighbor propensity score matching. Each firm that does 
not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 (control group) is matched to a unique firm from 
the NBIM's portfolio (treatment group). We choose a single match and do not allow for 
replacement (a firm from the treatment group can only be used once as a match). We follow 
this procedure because our treatment group (3,027 firms) is larger than our control group 
(481 firms), as observed in Table 4.6. We are more concerned with minimizing the bias at the 
cost of larger variance, as our sample is sufficiently large so as to be less concerned with 
variance (Abadie & Imbens, 2002). Moreover, to avoid biased coefficients, we set a caliper 
of 0.1.13 This implies that some control firms might not be matched if they do not have a 
treated firm within the caliper chosen. This is the reason why we observe fewer firms after 
the matching is conducted in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.6. 
  
We match the treated and control groups in size (measured by total assets), performance 
(measured by the ratio of EBITDA to total assets) and institutional investors (percentage of 
holdings in hands of institutional investors). We restrict the number of covariates since there 
exists a trade-off between the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption and common 
13 A caliper sets a maximum distance of the propensity score for each treatment and its 
control. As robustness checks, we set different calipers and results are unchanged. 
 127 
                                                 
support (Black & Smith, 2004). Following Sianesi (2004), we focus on covariates that 
simultaneously affect the treatment status (belong to the NBIM's portfolio) and the outcome 
variable (our corporate governance measures). We chose these covariates since they have 
been proven to be determinants of corporate governance decisions and are significantly 
different among the treatment and control groups (shown in Table 4.6). 
 
We conduct the matching prior to the NBIM’s announcement to make sure that our matching 
procedure is exogenous to any effects caused by the shock. All variables included in the 
matching model must be unaffected by the treatment (NBIM's announcement in 2012), and 
thus we carry out the matching by using the values of the covariates in 2011. Once a match is 
formed, it is kept for the following years. It is necessary that the treated and control groups 
follow parallel trends prior to the realization of the shock. For this purpose, we report the 
summary statistics and t-test results of 2010 and 2011 in Tables 4.4 to 4.7. 
 
 
4.7. RESULTS  
 
The results show that NBIM is effective in improving key governance practices of its 
portfolio companies after adopting an active shareholder strategy in 2012.  
 
The indexes we built did not provide statistically significant results (Tables 4.8 and 4.9), 
despite the direction of the effects were in line with our expectations. The improvement in the 
“NBIM index” is only weakly statistically significant for the matched strategy. The results 
for the “General CG Index” are mixed. Intuitively, NBIM tends to prioritize its efforts on the 
variables that are explicitly stated in the Note as “expectations”. The reason for not finding 
significant effects may lie in the correlations between different corporate governance 
mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995). For example, some research (Cyert, Kang, & Kumar, 
2002) argues that external corporate governance mechanisms, such as a freer market for 
corporate control, and internal corporate governance provisions, such as board monitoring 
capabilities, may exert substitution effects. The same happens between board independence 
and audit services: they are complementary when ownership is dispersed, yet substitute when 
ownership concentrates (Desender, Aguilera, Crespí, & García-Cestona, 2013).  
 
Given the index strategy did not help in understanding the “intensity” of changes, we turned 
the analysis towards individual corporate governance mechanisms. Eight variables showed 
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 relevant reactions after NBIM set its expectations in its Note (Tables 4.10 to 4.17). Five of 
these variables followed the logics of these expectations: the share of independent directors 
on the board, the share of women on boards, board-specific skills, audit committee 
management independence and the size of boards. We also identified contradictory results for 
three variables: policy equal voting right, audit board committee and compensation board 
committee. 
 
Post announcement, the share of independent directors in firms owned by NBIM improved 
2.6 percent points on average compared to those firms not owned by NBIM (Table 4.10). The 
results using the much smaller matched sample were consistent and yielded 4.6 average 
difference, also statistically significant. 
 
The share of women on board increased after the release of the NBIM Note (Table 4.11). 
This result is in line with the theory which predicts that more diverse boards would better 
control top-management and enhance monitoring of the company strategy. The coefficient of 
the share of women on board is statistically and managerially significant post announcement: 
on average, post announcement, there is 1.1 percent point more of a share of women on 
boards where NBIM is an owner, compared to companies where the NBIM is not owner. The 
figure reduces its significance to 1.2 percentage points for the matched sample, introducing 
some doubts about the validity of the result and inviting further robustness checks.   
 
Board specific skills improved post-announcement (Table 4.12). As in the case of women on 
board, we are cautious given the effect is less significant for our matched sample, yet, in both 
samples is significant and positive: NBIM investee companies improve post-announcement 
compared to the control group. In the case of the unmatched sample the value of the effect is 
1.9 and it increases to 2.5 in the matched sample.  
 
The last relevant result which fits with the NBIMs’ expectations is the independence of the 
management of the audit board committee (Table 4.13). The effect was small yet significant 
for both the unmatched and matched samples.   
 
Board size increased after NBIM announcement (Table 4.14). Boards grew for both the 
general and matched sample, and the average differences are statistically significant. It was 
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challenging to interpret this growth as the literature is not clear about optimal board size. We 
refer to this result in the discussion section.  
 
The results of the policy equal voting right variable were counterintuitive. In both samples 
(unmatched and matched) we show a decrease in the number of policies set up to ensure the 
“one-share, one-vote principle” (Table 4.15). The coefficient, yet small, is statistically 
significant. We explain below how this result may be motivated through two channels: one 
would be the lack of agreement in theory and among practitioners of how to treat long-term 
investors. The second argument comes from a defensive attitude of corporates which want to 
prevent minority shareholders to exert excessive influence via voting rights.  
 
In line with these defensive argument, we have also considered counterintuitive that the 
NBIM portfolio companies behave worse in terms of both audit and nomination board 
committees (Tables 4.16 and 4.17, respectively). We discuss these results in the next Section.  
 
We did not find consistent results for the remaining variables. A result is consistent when it 
fulfils four conditions: there is no pre-trend (variables for the treated and control group were 
not significantly different before 2012); there are statistically significant effects for both 
samples; the sign of the coefficient is the same; and the statistical significance is similar for 
both samples. These results are available upon request.  
 
First, we dropped out those variables which exhibit pre-trends. That is, we required corporate 
governance variables to show no differences between NBIM companies and non-NBIM 
companies before 2012. We dropped two variables because of these pre-trends: anti-takeover 
devices and shareholder rights policy.  
 
Second, we skipped the discussion on four variables which were insignificant for both the 
unmatched and the matched sample. Two of these showed non-significant effects: board 
cultural diversity and director election majority requirement. Despite the fact these went in 
the opposite direction of NBIM expectations, we do not see plausible explanations and the 
effects were very small. We do not discuss the non-audit to audit fees ratio and board 
member affiliations which dropped for NBIM investee companies as the effects are 
statistically insignificant.  
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 Third, we do not consider consistent results those which present conflicting coefficient signs 
between the matched and the unmatched sample. We withdrew the CEO-Chairman 
separation and the nomination board committee for this reason. In precedent cases, the 
coefficient was very small, non-significant, and showed conflicting signs between samples.  
 
Fourth, also withdrawn from the analysis were variables which did not yield significance 
simultaneously in both the general and matching strategy. We removed the succession plan, 
which was only statistically significant in our matched sample (the variable moves in 
accordance with NBIM expectations and the number of directorships decreases for NBIM 
companies).  
 
 
4.8. DISCUSSION 
 
A responsible and engaged owner can exert fruitful changes in the corporate governance 
provisions of its portfolio companies. In this paper, we show how Norway’s SWF is able to 
positively influence the governance quality of its portfolio companies. We used a quasi-
natural experiment: the unanticipated announcement made by NBIM in November 2012 
which outlined what the SWF expected from its portfolio companies in terms of corporate 
governance. The release of that Note initiated a comprehensive strategy of engagement with 
portfolio companies. The results are remarkably positive in the short period after 2012.  
 
We have already mentioned that four relevant variables—the independence of the board, 
women on board, board specific skills, audit committee independence—improve after the 
announcement. Along with board size, these four critical variables yield a positive and 
consistent result. It seems the NBIM strategy focuses first on the board composition and thus 
requires its portfolio companies to increase the number of independent directors, the skills of 
the board, as well as the share of women on the board. These three variables might go hand in 
hand: NBIM is effectively proposing new independent and skilled women directors. What is 
clear is that these three dimensions of governance, widely studied by the literature of boards, 
improve after NBIM decided to play a more active role in shareholder strategy, which goes in 
the right direction and is yielding positive results.  
 
The percentage of independent directors of NBIM portfolio companies is significantly higher 
than in the control group. There is still debate in academia about the benefits of having an 
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independent board instead of a board populated with well-informed insiders (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Chen, Cussatt, & Gunny, 2017). Yet, independent 
directors have yielded more positive results for firm performance and firm valuation 
improvements. In fact, the benefits of having more independent directors have caused many 
regulations including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq. NBIM firmly 
believes in the value of independent boards. Outside directors protect shareholder interests, 
balance the power of CEOs, and offer incentives to provide the best advice given their 
reputation as directors is scrutinized. Independent directors keep the boards accountable: a 
higher share of independent directors is associated with higher monitoring standards and 
lower conflicts of interests with top management.  
 
Also, our results show that NBIM portfolio companies increase the share of women on 
boards significantly. This is line with the literature that assumes that more diverse boards 
tend to perform better in monitoring roles and take strategic decisions more effectively (Post 
& Byron, 2015). This result resembles the law passed in Norway requiring 40% of board 
directors to be women. As a reminder, NBIM is not allowed to invest in any Norwegian firm, 
so the changes we have observed on this variable cannot be attributable to a domestic law 
change. This applies elsewhere too; the “regulatory changes” or quotas for more women on 
boards would affect equally all listed firms in our two samples, general and matched, 
independently of whether they are owned by NBIM or not.  
 
Our results also bring a third result linked to board composition: the percentage of board 
members who have either an industry specific background or a strong financial background is 
higher for NBIM investee companies. This result, studied often under the lens of resource 
dependency (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), aligns with the 
professionalization of NBIM itself, described in the Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
Board size increases significantly. A first explanation is that board size increases due to 
NBIM’s interest in having more independent and skilled women directors on boards. 
Increasing those percentages can be done through two channels: substituting men for women 
directors, unskilled for skilled, or insider for outsider (in this case we should not observe a 
change in the board size) or adding new members (women, skilled and outsiders) to boards. 
Given we observe that the board size goes up significantly, we can interpret that NBIM 
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 prefers to add new directors rather than substituting incumbents. This is in line with a prudent 
monitoring approach, assuming it is easier to add new members to a board than replacing old 
and established directors.    
 
So far, three critical results referred to board composition go in the direction outlined by the 
Note or the legislation in Norway. Yet, why we do not find enough consistent results in other 
critical variables such as the establishment of board committees? Furthermore, we do have 
counterintuitive results in the case of the policies for equal voting rights and in the case of 
audit and compensation committees, where the signs go in the opposite direction of the 
NBIM expectations.  
 
We provide four explanations for these outcomes. NBIM is able to push for change in the 
composition of boards (more women, skilled, outsider directors), but it is unable to go 
beyond, given its minority shareholder position. Through behind-the-scenes engagement, 
NBIM is able to convince other investors or boards (McCahery et al., 2016) of the benefits of 
having more independent and diverse boards, yet NBIM faces difficulties in reaching other 
governance provisions, such as equal shareholder policies or board committees.  
 
Indeed, NBIM has not been able to influence the establishment of board committees, a 
critical instrument for corporate governance. Given more complex and global business 
models, much of the board work is currently delegated to board committees. To ensure well-
functioning and professional board committees is more difficult than appointing new 
directors to the board. Our first explanation would be that NBIM pushes for better boards but 
it is not able to reach the second level: the establishment of board committees. It is interesting 
to notice that the positive and significant result of independent audit committees goes in line 
with this: NBIM provides independence to the audit committee once it is established, but it is 
difficult for them to push for the establishment of new board committees. 
 
A second explanation is that these results are the reaction of companies to the “excessive 
influence” of NBIM. Some firms may react by bargaining between the different governance 
provisions: the company makes concessions by adding independents to the board, but at the 
same time it ensures that there are different share classes and not all minority shareholders 
have the same voting rights or eliminates audit and compensation committees. This 
explanation fits well with the decrease in the policies related to “one-share, one-vote” of 
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NBIM investee companies. Again, NBIM is able to influence changes in the board 
composition, but is simultaneously penalized with no influence in other critical governance 
stances such as the board committees. 
 
Third, these counterintuitive results might be just a matter of timing. NBIM goes step by step. 
NBIM states in the Note that “ultimately, we expect the board to implement one share class 
with each share having one right to vote” (NBIM, 2012: 38). NBIM also mentions that 
companies which have different share classes should either explain carefully why is 
beneficial for all shareholders to hold these asymmetries or to change towards equalization. 
NBIM acknowledges that the process of changing corporate governance provisions is not 
simple and direct, and this may partially explain why we see inconsistencies at this stage. 
More time is needed to confirm whether these inconsistencies are simply a matter of timing 
and not the result of a defensive reaction against the pressure NBIM exerts in other 
governance provisions. The same applies for the situation of having less compensation and 
audit boards on NBIM investee companies.  
 
Lastly, there is a fourth complementary explanation (linked to the shareholder equality 
policy). Long-term capitalists have shown the lack of theoretical unanimity of treating all 
shareholders equally (Rappaport & Bogle, 2011). Different owners may have different rights. 
This reason would be aligned with NBIM as long-term steward contrasting with other short-
term oriented shareholders. It is interesting to note how this result is discussed frequently 
among practitioners (Barton, 2011). Those defending long-term capitalism do not defend the 
“one-share, one-vote” principle. They consider how most owners currently stay for shorter 
periods as shareholders, and those who stay longer should have a stronger voice and voting 
power to counteract the free-riding of passive, index or short-term oriented investors. These 
conflicting views of different large shareholders (principals) may explain why we obtain 
confounding results in the policies that ensure equal shareholders treatment. It also relates to 
the “case by case” approach prudently described by the Note. Generally accepted principles 
are not “one-size-fits-all” valid approaches, and the need for context may explain why this 
disputed variable leads to the results we found.  
 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
 
We add evidence of the monitoring role of sovereign wealth funds. Our results shed light on 
the literature of shareholder activism and the growing theme of heterogeneous shareholders 
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 (Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Regarding 
the literature on sovereign wealth funds, this research may help to understand how, without 
having a seat on the board, large funds can exert an influence (Vasudeva, 2013) and impact 
their investee companies’ corporate governance. This “voice” mechanism put in place 
through different channels, most of them “behind-the-scenes” (McCahery et al., 2016), turns 
out to be effective and can be a way to circumvent the “liability of sovereignness” or the 
discount effect detected in the literature (Aguilera et al., 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2015).  
 
By focusing on the direct effect ownership has on corporate governance, we also add to the 
discussion around the effects of institutional owners as long-term patient investors, instead of 
being driven by short-term gains (Bebchuk et al., 2015; Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 2016). We 
include the sovereign wealth funds in the matrix of heterogeneous principals, among these, 
patient institutional investors.  
 
One of the limitations of our research is that we focused on a single and particular sovereign 
wealth fund. This has been done by others previously, as is the case of Hermes, the fund 
manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme (Becht et al., 2009) or TIAA, 
formerly TIAA-CREF, studied by Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998). In both cases, the 
influence of institutions through private meetings is also studied. We have not accessed such 
a detailed level of information at NBIM, but similarly, we investigate the behind-the-scenes 
“voice” mechanism from the changes observed in corporate governance mechanisms. We 
expect other researchers would add more clinical cases of sovereign wealth funds involved in 
the improvement of the corporate governance of their portfolio companies.  
 
Our research does not use corporate governance changes to evaluate performance. We focus 
our attention on an exogenous event that changed the style of investor engagement and check 
whether this strategic decision had an impact on the governance of its portfolio companies. 
We do not focus on their post-event performance. By doing so, we avoid the endogeneity 
present in most research linking governance and performance (Agarwal et al., 2009). In fact, 
the decision to change specific governance settings (such as the number of independent 
directors or the establishment of an audit committee) is normally endogenous. Corporate 
governance decisions are very much related to other firm-level characteristics, such as 
financial events or acquisition plans. If you want to understand the impact of governance of 
two different companies, it is very difficult to capture these governance variables while 
 135 
simultaneously not capturing the omitted financial or strategic variables that explain the 
decision of changing governance mechanisms (Cuñat et al., 2012). 
In the end, institutional investors may choose between exiting a firm or talking to corporate 
executives and board directors when they disagree with investee companies. NBIM decided 
in 2012 to talk and engage more with companies. This “engagement strategy” yielded 
positive results in a short period of time. Key corporate governance mechanisms, such as the 
share of independent directors, or the share of women on boards, improved after 2012. We 
shed light on a different investor class, sovereign wealth funds, and show how these 
particular state-owned, long-term investors play a relevant role in the configuration of new 
capitalism, where investors secure and increase value by engaging and not only trading. 
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 4.10. TABLES 
 
Table 4.1. Definition of variables 
 
Corporate governance 
variable 
Definition 
Board Cultural Diversity Percentage of board members that have a cultural background different from the location of the corporate headquarters. Board Specific Skills Percentage of board members who have either an industry specific background or a strong financial background. Director Election Majority Requirement Are the company's board members generally elected with a majority vote? Board Member Affiliations Average number of other corporate affiliations for the board member. Policy Equal Voting Right Does the company have a policy to apply the one-share, one-vote principle? Anti-takeover Devices Count The number of anti-takeover devices in place in excess of two. Shareholder Rights Policy Does the company have a policy for ensuring equal treatment of minority shareholders, facilitating shareholder engagement or limiting the use of anti-takeover devices? Succession Plan Does the company have a succession plan for executive management (key board members) in the event of unforeseen circumstances? CEO-Chairman Separation Does the CEO simultaneously chair the board or has the chairman of the board been the CEO of the company? Independent Directors Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company. 
Audit Board Committee Does the company have an audit board committee? 
Compensation Board Committee Does the company have a compensation board committee? 
Non-audit to Audit Fees Ratio All non-audit fees divided by the audit and audit-related fees paid to the group auditor. 
Nomination Board Committee Does the company have a nomination board committee? 
Audit Committee Management 
Independence Does the company report that all audit committee members are non-executives? 
Board Size The total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
Women on Board Percentage of women on the board. 
Financial control variable Definition Total Revenue Revenue from all of a company's operating activities after deducting any sales adjustments and their equivalents. Total Assets Total assets of a company. Performance The ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Capital Structure The ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Long-term debt over total liabilities The ratio of long-term debt, defined as long-term debt and capital lease obligations, to total liabilities. Ratio EBITDA over revenue The ratio of EBITDA to total revenue.  Institutional investors The sum of all shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares, at the end of the fiscal year. 
Note: In italics, the 7 corporate governance variables not explicitly mentioned in the Note. Definitions 
taken from the Eikon ESG database.  
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Table 4.2. Country Summary Statistics in 2011 
This Table shows the number of companies in each group by country. NBIM=1 are 
companies which were part of the NBIM portfolio in 2011; they form our “treated” 
group. nonNBIM=0 are companies which have never been included the NBIM 
portfolio, they form our “control” group. 
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Table 4.3. Industry Summary Statistics in 2011 
This Table shows the number of companies in each group by sector of economic 
activity. NBIM=1 are companies which formed part of the NBIM portfolio in 
2011; they form our “treated” group. nonNBIM=0 are companies which have never 
been in the portfolio of NBIM, they form our “control” group.  
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Table 4.4. Corporate Governance Summary Statistics in 2010 
This Table shows the summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2010. Numbers reported are cross-
sectional averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for corporate governance and financial 
variables. Column 1 provides summary statistics for the companies in the portfolio of NBIM in 2010. 
Column 2 provides summary statistics for the companies which were not part of the NBIM portfolio in 
2010. Column 3 provides summary statistics for the companies in the NBIM portfolio in the “matched” 
sample described in section 5.1. in 2010. Column 4 provides summary statistics for the companies not 
included in the NBIM portfolio in the “matched” sample described in section 5.1. in 2010. Definitions for 
all variables are shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.5. T-test for CG Summary Statistics in 2010 
This Table shows t-test results of firm-year observations in 2010. Column 1 analyzes mean differences of the 
unmatched sample (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4). Column 2 analyzes mean differences of the matched sample 
(Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4). Definitions for all variables are shown in Table 4.1.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table 4.6. Corporate Governance Summary Statistics in 2011 
This Table shows the summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2011. Numbers reported are cross-
sectional averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for corporate governance and financial 
variables. Column 1 provides summary statistics for the companies in the portfolio of NBIM in 2011. 
Column 2 provides summary statistics for the companies which were not part of the NBIM portfolio in 
2011. Column 3 provides summary statistics for the companies in the NBIM portfolio in the “matched” 
sample described in section 5.1. in 2011. Column 4 provides summary statistics for the companies not 
included in the NBIM portfolio in the “matched” sample described in section 5.1. in 2010. Definitions for 
all variables are shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.7. T-test for CG Summary Statistics in 2011 
This Table shows t-test results of firm-year observations in 2011. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean 
differences of the unmatched sample (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6). Column 2 analyzes mean differences of 
the matched sample (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.6). Definitions for all variables are shown in Table 4.1.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
                
Table 4.8. Results NBIM Index 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions that explain yearly changes in the NBIM Index for the 
period 2010–2015, as defined in Section 4.5.3. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 
after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm 
belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  
NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our 
reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total 
assets, performance (EBITDA over total assets), capital structure (total liabilities over total equity), long-term 
debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 
4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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 Table 4.9. Results General CG Index 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the General CG Index for the 
period 2010 to 2015, as defined in Section 4.5.3. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 
after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm 
belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  
NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our 
reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total 
assets, performance (EBITDA over total assets), capital structure (total liabilities over total equity), long-term 
debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 
4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.10. Results Independent Board Members 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Independent Board 
Members for the period 2010 to 2015, defined as the percentage of independent board members as reported by 
the company. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's announcement 
(2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio 
in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  NBIMyeardummy_ are 
interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our reference year) and 
firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total assets, performance, 
capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional 
investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. 
***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.11. Results Women on Board 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Women on Board for the 
period 2010 to 2015, defined as the percentage of women on the board. Post is a dummy variable (structural 
break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM 
takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the 
NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year 
dummies (except for 2010, our reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other 
controls include total revenue, total assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, 
EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.12. Results Board Specific Skills 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Board Specific Skills for 
the period 2010 to 2015, defined as the percentage of board members who have either an industry specific 
background or a strong financial background. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after 
the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm 
belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  
NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our 
reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total 
assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure 
of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in 
parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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 Table 4.13. Results Audit Committee Management Independence 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Audit Committee 
Management Independence for the period 2010 to 2015, defined as 1 if the company reports that all audit 
committee members are non-executives, 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes 
value 1 after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if 
the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 
2012.  NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 
2010, our reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total 
revenue, total assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue 
and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4.14. Results Board Size 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Board Size for the period 
2010 to 2015, defined as the total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. Post is a dummy 
variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 
2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm 
does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year 
dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in 
all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt 
over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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 Table 4.15. Results Policy Equal Voting Right 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Policy Equal Voting 
Right for the period 2010 to 2015, which takes value 1 if the company has a policy to apply the one-share, one-
vote principle, 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's 
announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  
NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our 
reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total 
assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure 
of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in 
parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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 Table 4.16. Results Audit Board Committee 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Audit Board Committee 
for the period 2010 to 2015, which takes value 1 if the company has an audit board committee, 0 otherwise. Post 
is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's announcement (2012–2015) and zero 
for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the 
firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year 
dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in 
all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt 
over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.17. Results Compensation Board Committee 
This Table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly changes in the Compensation Board 
Committee for the period 2010 to 2015, which takes value 1 if the company has a compensation board 
committee, 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 after the NBIM's 
announcement (2012–2015) and zero for years 2010 and 2011. NBIM takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
NBIM's portfolio in 2012 and zero if the firm does not belong to the NBIM's portfolio in 2012.  
NBIMyeardummy_ are interactions of NBIM and year dummies. Individual year dummies (except for 2010, our 
reference year) and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other controls include total revenue, total 
assets, performance, capital structure, long-term debt over total liabilities, EBITDA over revenue and a measure 
of institutional investors, as defined in Table 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and shown in 
parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
 153 
 
 
4.11. REFERENCES 
 
Abadie, A., & G. Imbens. (2002). Simple and bias-corrected matching estimators for average 
treatment effects (NBER Working Paper T0283). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A Theory of Friendly Boards. The Journal of Finance, 
62(1), 217–250.  
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309.  
Agarwal, V., Daniel, N. D., & Naik, N. Y. (2009). Role of Managerial Incentives and 
Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2221–2256.  
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. (2011). Does governance travel around the 
world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 
100(1), 154–181. 
Aggarwal, R., Schloetzer, J. D., & Williamson, R. (in press). Do corporate governance 
mandates impact long-term firm value and governance culture? Journal of Corporate 
Finance.  
Agrawal, A. K. (2012). Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: 
Evidence from Proxy Voting. The Review of Financial Studies 25(1), 187-226. 
Aguilera, R. V., Capapé, J., & Santiso, J. (2016). Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Strategic 
Governance View. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 30(1), 5–23.  
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004). Codes of good governance worldwide: what 
is the trigger? Organization Studies, 25(3), 415–443. 
Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2012). The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm 
Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 127(1), 137–197.  
Anabtawi, I., & Stout, L. (2008). Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders. Stanford Law 
Review, 60(5), 1255–1308. 
Barton, D. (2011). Capitalism for the Long Term. Harvard Business Review, 89(3), 84–91. 
Black, D. A., & Smith, J. A. (2004). How robust is the evidence on the effects of college 
quality? Evidence from matching. Journal of Econometrics, 121(1), 99-124. 
 Bebchuk, L. A., Brav, A., & Jiang, W. (2015). The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism. Columbia Law Review, 115(5), 1085–1155. 
 154
 Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2004). What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?  (Discussion Paper 491). Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School.  
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What Matters in Corporate Governance? 
The Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783–827.  
Bebchuk, L. A., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The State of Corporate Governance Research. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 939–961.  
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2009). Returns to Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund. Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(8), 3093–3129. 
Bednar, M. K. (2012). Watchdog or Lapdog? A Behavioral View of the Media as a Corporate 
Governance Mechanism. Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 131–150.  
Bernstein, S., Lerner, J., & Schoar, A. (2013). The Investment Strategies of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), 219–238. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 1231–1273. 
Boivie, S., Bednar, M. K., Aguilera, R. V., & Andrus, J. L. (2016). Are Boards Designed to 
Fail? The Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring. The Academy of Management 
Annals, 10(1), 319–407.  
Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The determinants of 
corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 85(1), 66–101.  
Bortolotti, B., Fotak, V., & Megginson, W. L. (2015). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Discount: 
Evidence from Public Equity Investments. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(11), 
2993–3035. 
Cai, J., & Walkling, R. A. (2011). Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? Journal 
of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 299–339.  
Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). The Influence of Institutions on 
Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF. 
The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1335–1362.  
Carney, G. (2013). “World's Biggest Fund Blasts Corporate Governance Rules.” CNBC N.p., 
19 Feb. 2013. Web. 15 Jan 2017.    
Cashman, G. D., Gillan, S. L., & Jun, C. (2012). Going overboard? On busy directors and 
firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 3248–3259.  
 155 
Chen, J. Z., Cussatt, M., & Gunny, K. A. (2017). When Are Outside Directors More 
Effective Monitors? Evidence From Real Activities Manipulation. Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance. Advance online publication. doi: 
10.1177/0148558X17692691.  
Clark, G. L., Dixon, A. D., & Monk, A. H. B. (2013). Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, 
Governance, and Global Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Coffee Jr., J. C., & Palia, D. (2016). The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance. Annals of Corporate Governance, 1(1), 1–94. 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.  
Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Certo, S. T., & Hitt, M. A. (2010). Marching to the Beat of 
Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions. 
Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 723–742.  
Crespí-Cladera, R., & Pascual-Fuster, B. (2014). Does the independence of independent 
directors matter? Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 116–134.  
Cronqvist, H., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(10), 3941–3976.  
Cuñat, V., Gine, M., & Guadalupe, M. (2012). The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Shareholder Value. The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1943–1977.  
Cvijanović, D., Dasgupta, A., & Zachariadis, K. E. (2016). Ties That Bind: How Business 
Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism. The Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2933–
2966.  
Cyert, R. M., Kang, S.-H., & Kumar, P. (2002). Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-
Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence. Management Science, 48(4), 453–
469. 
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1. The Fundamental Agency 
Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate 
Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64. 
Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the Markets: How Finance Re-Shaped America. Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Del Guercio, D., Seery, L., & Woidtke, T. (2008). Do boards pay attention when institutional 
investor activists “just vote no”? Journal of Financial Economics, 90(1), 84–103.  
 156
 Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Crespí, R., & García-Cestona, M. (2013). When does 
ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior. Strategic Management 
Journal, 34(7), 823–842.  
Dewenter, K. L., Han, X., & Malatesta, P. H. (2010). Firm values and sovereign wealth fund 
investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(2), 256–278. 
Edmans, A., & Manso, G. (2011). Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory 
of Multiple Blockholders. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), 2395–2428. 
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too Busy to Mind the Business? 
Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments. The Journal of Finance, 
58(3), 1087–1111.  
Fich, E. M., Harford, J., & Tran, A. L. (2015). Motivated monitors: The importance of 
institutional investors׳ portfolio weights. Journal of Financial Economics, 118(1), 21–
48. 
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? The Journal of 
Finance, 61(2), 689–724.  
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards detrimental? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 109(1), 63–82.  
Finkelstein, S., & D’Aveni, R. A. (1994). Ceo Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How 
Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command. 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108. 
Frijns, B., Dodd, O., & Cimerova, H. (2016). The impact of cultural diversity in corporate 
boards on firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 41, 521–541.  
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding 
Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(3), 489–505. 
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005). Shareholder investment horizons and the 
market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), 135–165. 
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder 
activism: the role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 
275–305.  
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2007). The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(1), 55–73.  
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107–156.  
 157 
Goranova, M., Abouk, R., Nystrom, P. C., & Soofi, E. S. (2017). Corporate governance 
antecedents to shareholder activism: A zero-inflated process. Strategic Management 
Journal, 38(2), 415–435.  
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2014). Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review. 
Journal of Management, 40(5), 1230–1268.  
Goshen, Z., & Squire, R. (2017). Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and 
Governance. Columbia Law Review, 117(3), 767–829. 
Hay, D. C., Knechel, W. R., & Wong, N. (2006). Audit Fees: A Meta-analysis of the Effect 
of Supply and Demand Attributes. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(1), 141–
191.  
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The Resource Dependence Role of 
Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to 
Environmental Change. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 235–256.  
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., & Cannella, A. A. (2007). Organizational Predictors of 
Women on Corporate Boards. Academy of Management Journal, 50(4), 941–952.  
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource Dependence Theory: A 
Review. Journal of Management, 35(6), 1404–1427.  
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. (2002). Conflicting Voices: 
The Effects of Institutional Ownership Heterogeneity and Internal Governance on 
Corporate Innovation Strategies. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 697–716.  
Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. (2013). Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives 
overconfident relative to female executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 
822–839.  
Kearney, E., Gebert, D., & Voelpel, S. C. (2009). When And How Diversity Benefits Teams: 
The Importance Of Team Members’ Need For Cognition. Academy of Management 
Journal, 52(3), 581–598.  
Knill, A. M., Lee, B.-S., & Mauck, N. (2012). Sovereign wealth fund investment and the 
return-to-risk performance of target firms. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 
315–340. 
Kotter, J., & Lel, U. (2011). Friends or foes? Target selection decisions of sovereign wealth 
funds and their consequences. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 360–381.  
 158
 Krause, R. (2017). Being the CEO’s boss: An examination of board chair orientations. 
Strategic Management Journal, 38(3), 697–713. 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155.  
Leuz, C., Lins, K. V., & Warnock, F. E. (2009). Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly 
Governed Firms? Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3245–3285.  
Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2014). Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 28, 185–200.  
Lipton, M. (2015, January 27). The Threat to the Economy and Society from Activism and 
Short-Termism-Updated [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/27/the-threat-to-the-economy-and-society-
from-activism-and-short-termism-updated 
Liu, C., & Paul, D. L. (2015). A New Perspective on Director Busyness. Journal of Financial 
Research, 38(2), 193–218.  
Liu, Y., Wei, Z., & Xie, F. (2014). Do women directors improve firm performance in China? 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 169–184.  
Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented 
directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 
111(2), 406–429.  
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012). Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of 
foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 53(3), 527–554.  
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors. The Journal of Finance, 71(6), 
2905–2932.  
Megginson, W. L., & Fotak, V. (2015). Rise of the Fiduciary State: A Survey of Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(4), 733–778.  
Milne, R. (2013a). “Norwegian state oil fund focuses on greater corporate engagement.” 
Financial Times N.p., 26 Apr. 2013. Web. 15 Jan 2017.  
Milne, R. (2013b). “Norway's oil fund to become active investor.” Financial Times N.p., 25 
Apr. 2013. Web. 15 Jan 2017. 
Musacchio, A., & Lazzarini, S. (2014). Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, 
Brazil and Beyond. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 159 
NBIM. (2012). Corporate Governance (NBIM Discussion Note 14). Oslo: Norges Bank 
Investment Management.  
Post, C., & Byron, K. (2015). Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A Meta-
Analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571.  
Rappaport, A. (1986). Creating shareholder value: the new standard for business 
performance. Free Press. 
Rappaport, A., & Bogle, J. C. (2011). Saving Capitalism From Short-Termism: How to Build 
Long-Term Value and Take Back Our Financial Future. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Education. 
Rediker, K. J., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative 
governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16(2), 85–99.  
Renders, A., Gaeremynck, A., & Sercu, P. (2010). Corporate-Governance Ratings and 
Company Performance: A Cross-European Study. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 18(2), 87–106.  
Schnatterly, K., & Johnson, S. G. (2014). Independent boards and the institutional investors 
that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance 
preferences. Strategic Management Journal, 35(10), 1552–1563.  
Shen, W., & Cannella, A. A. (2002). Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO 
Succession: The Impacts of Successor Type, Postsuccession Senior Executive 
Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 717–
733.  
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3), 461–488. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(2), 737–783.  
Sianesi, B. (2004). An evaluation of the Swedish system of active labor market programs in 
the 1990s. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 133-155. 
Stathopoulos, K., & Voulgaris, G. (2016). The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say-on-Pay 
Voting. British Journal of Management, 27(4), 796–818.  
Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003). Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of 
Governance. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 397–415. 
Tihanyi, L., Graffin, S., & George, G. (2014). Rethinking Governance in Management 
Research. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6), 1535–1543.  
 160
 Triana, M. del C., Miller, T. L., & Trzebiatowski, T. M. (2013). The Double-Edged Nature of 
Board Gender Diversity: Diversity, Firm Performance, and the Power of Women 
Directors as Predictors of Strategic Change. Organization Science, 25(2), 609–632.  
Vasudeva, G. (2013). Weaving Together the Normative and Regulative Roles of 
Government: How the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund’s Responsible Conduct Is 
Shaping Firms’ Cross-Border Investments. Organization Science, 24(6), 1662–1682. 
Woidtke, T. (2002). Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and 
firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 63(1), 99–131.  
Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate 
governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 9(3), 295–316.  
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate 
Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal 
Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196–220. 
 
  
 161 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 162
  
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
  
 163 
5.1. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This thesis provides a theoretical framework to study SWFs which explains the 
tension between financial and strategic goals, expanding the financial-nonfinancial duality 
developed by Bortolotti et al. (2015). This is the main contribution of Essay I. We 
acknowledge the need SWFs have to combine both strategic and financial goals and we set 
up a valid theoretical framework using strategic governance constructs. Essay I explains how 
SWFs evolve in time through professionalism, in-house capabilities and decoupling. 
 
Essay II addresses the validity of the theoretical framework of Essay I. It testes four strategic 
capabilities developed by SWFs in Spain. We confirmed whether these four strategic 
governance types are implemented through four business case studies. 
 
The third essay investigates empirically the validity of one of the propositions outlined in 
Essay I: the shareholder activism of large institutional investors. This thesis reinforces the 
need of a new conceptual effort beyond agency or stakeholder theory. In fact, active 
ownership and the heterogeneity of principals bring new theoretical questions addressed in 
Essay III.  
 
SWFs fit well in the notion of long-term capitalism as long-term institutional investors as 
they face no current liabilities, and, in most cases, liquidity and short-term needs are almost 
absent. Their investment strategies reflect long-term investment horizons, value creation 
through engagement and enhancement of boards’ monitoring capabilities. 
 
Lastly, this thesis also introduces SWFs as representatives of the state capitalism. The 
comparative work on the varieties of capitalism, originally focused on developed markets 
frameworks (Hall & Soskice, 2001), has been expanded to East and Central European 
countries (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009) or Latin America (Schneider, 2009). In this thesis we 
continue this path studying institutional forms typical of the emerging markets where the 
majority of these SWFs were born: Middle East, China, Central Asia and South-East Asia. 
We extend the knowledge of state capitalism by increasing understanding about the liability 
of sovereignness and how funds may overcome it through professionalism, legitimacy and 
learning.  
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 5.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This work has managerial implications at three different levels and we add a fourth 
implication, linked to engaged ownership strategies in the context of SWFs.  
 
First, the thesis reveals conflicts at the manager-level in the state capitalism context for 
investment managers participating in state-owned vehicles. The dual objectives of financial 
returns and strategic long-term economic goals are not easily reconciled at the individual 
level. How to establish efficient strategic governance mechanisms to ensure the achievement 
of goals, also at the investment manager level, remains a key discussion among practitioners. 
 
Second, at the fund-level, institutional investors such as SWFs may choose between exiting a 
firm or talking to corporate executives and board directors when they disagree with portfolio 
companies. This thesis provides evidence about the effectiveness of NBIM’s strategy. Yet, 
what is the context in which such an engagement strategy would work? Additionally, given 
the fact that Essay III provides evidence of the effectiveness of an engagement strategy, 
would other SWFs follow? 
 
Third, at the country-level, this thesis brings more clarity for recipient countries about the 
different goals that different funds may have at a given stage of capabilities development 
(Essays II and III). International law policy makers and politicians from recipient countries 
would benefit from this work, which could help prevent overreaction when it comes to the 
regulation of investments from foreign SWFs. Also, at the country-level, governments should 
better understand the role of SWFs within the network of state-owned institutions: central 
banks, development agencies or state-owned enterprises.  
 
Finally, this work reinforces arguments favoring active ownership. Engaged shareholders 
play a critical role in today’s capitalism, the majority of shares being held by a small group of 
institutional investors. In the case of SWFs, playing a more active shareholding role implies 
exposure and risk of receiving unfavorable treatment. However, the legitimacy of NBIM and 
the isomorphic pressures may help other SWFs to follow. 
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5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis may motivate other researchers to fill the gap of SWFs’ direct influence on 
corporate governance. Yet, the data limitation that drove research towards listed companies, 
especially in Essay III, created an opportunity to explore the impact of SWFs on the 
governance of privately-held portfolio companies. This has enriched the arguments presented 
here and in previous literature.  
 
The same data constraints affected the development of systematic industry studies. Data 
availability is limited and inaccurate, consequently panel datasets are skewed towards the 
most transparent and large funds. Better datasets, including more sovereign funds and more 
domestic deals would help to reveal the heterogeneity of the industry and to test the validity 
of arguments.  
 
Sovereign wealth funds represent a good opportunity to test how strategic governance is 
critical for global investors as part of the public and foreign policies. In a world heading to 
mercantilism and less trade openness, SWFs would be at the epicenter when governments 
design consistent strategies, using different state tools, to influence domestic markets, foster 
innovation, facilitate internationalization or develop strategic sectors. How these strategies 
would be implemented remains a largely open question. 
 
One of the main important questions that has received scarce attention is precisely why an 
SWF would ever be established. There is a need for a reevaluation of the effects of SWFs on 
economic development. New funds coming from non-oil sources, like privatization 
proceedings, state-owned holdings or sector-specific co-investment platforms, present very 
different features and risks compared to resource-based SWFs. The study of these new cases 
would help to better understand the benefits and costs of establishing such a fund (Das et al., 
2009), and would serve as a strong resource for future policymakers.  
 
Lastly, institutional investors should choose between exiting a firm or talking to corporate 
executives and board directors when they disagree with investee companies. A sovereign 
wealth fund decided in 2012 to speak with and engage more with companies. This 
“engagement strategy” yielded positive results in a short period of time. Will other SWFs and 
institutional investors follow? Only time will tell. 
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